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Abstract
This is the second of two reports concerning the issue of time direc-
tionality in fundamental theoretical physics. Here a fresh perspective
is offered on several aspects of the problem of the interpretation of
quantum theory which centers around a reconsideration of the sig-
nificance of the requirement of time reversal symmetry. Following a
critical review of early time-symmetric formulations of quantum me-
chanics, it is argued that a more consistent approach must overcome
the contradictions of the orthodox interpretation that follow from its
rejection of scientific realism. It is also shown that the condition of
time-reversal invariance provides strong enough a constraint to allow
a realist interpretation of quantum theory to satisfy the principle of
local causality in the face of quantum entanglement. It is then ex-
plained that the existence of a maximum quasiclassical domain can
only be predicted to arise and to persist, following measurement, once
we consider the problem of the emergence of time in quantum cos-
mology from the perspective of the solution provided in the preceding
report to the problem of the origin of thermodynamic time asymme-
try. It is also suggested that in the context of a semi-classical theory of
the gravitational field the proposed realist, time-symmetric interpre-
tation of quantum theory would allow the formulation of a satisfactory
solution to the problem of objectification.
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1 Introduction
In the preceding report of this series1 I offered original solutions to several
outstanding problems in the fields of gravitational physics and cosmology
which were all based on an alternative interpretation of the concepts of time
reversal and negative energy. Thus, I introduced a generalized, classical
theory of gravitation that is consistent with the possibility that elementary
particles could exist that would propagate negative energy forward in time.
Based on the understanding that it is necessary to distinguish between a fun-
damental, bidirectional concept of time direction involving elementary par-
ticles and the classical, unidirectional concept of time direction associated
with thermodynamic irreversibility, I was then led to introduce a more con-
sistent formulation of the time reversal symmetry operation that was shown
to be relevant to a description of the fundamental states of matter particles
on the quantum gravitational scale. I also showed that the hypothesis that
negative energy matter was present alongside positive energy matter in the
first instants of the Big Bang allows to satisfactorily explain thermodynamic
time asymmetry as being the outcome of a certain condition that must be
imposed on this initial state in order that all the elementary particles present
in the universe be causally related to one another. But given that the bidi-
rectional concept of time that underlies this approach constitutes a challenge
to our traditional conception of causality and the idea that causes always
precede their effects, then one of the objectives of the current report is to
develop a revised concept of causality that allows to take into account the
time-symmetric nature of elementary particle processes.
Part of the progress I have achieved concerning this issue actually emerged
from an investigation of the significance of certain puzzling aspects of the
currently favored interpretation of quantum theory which did not appear to
be connected with the issue of time directionality, but which were of interest
in their own right. Yet, some of the results I obtained regarding the issue
of time directionality in gravitational physics turned out to be necessary for
developing a solution to the remaining problems that still stand in the way
of a truly consistent interpretation of quantum theory. Thus, in the present
1The document is available as a preprint [1] and it is important to mention that the
discussion featured in the present report relies heavily on the developments which were
introduced in the first report, so that reading the preceding document should be considered
necessary for a proper understanding of the analysis which is the subject of the present
one.
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report I would like to address not only the question of time directionality as
it arises in a quantum theoretical context, but also, and more specifically, the
important problem of the interpretation of quantum theory itself. I will show,
in particular, that it is now possible to provide a realist picture of quantum
phenomena that does not violate the principle of local causality, even though
it is not incompatible with the consequences of quantum entanglement. This
improved understanding will then be used to provide a definitive solution to
the quantum measurement problem that allows to explain the emergence and
the persistence of a quasiclassical world. Before concluding this discussion
I will identify a possible role which gravitation might play in explaining the
random character of the unique outcomes of quantum measurement that
once again draws its relevance from the preceding developments and that
may eventually become an essential element of a fully developed quantum
theory of gravitation.
In fact, one of the goals of the latter portion of this report is to bring some
much needed clarity to the theoretical context in which we are to address the
problem of elaborating a theory of the gravitational interaction compatible
with the basic principles of quantum theory. In the preceding report I have
already shown the essential role played by the discrete spacetime and energy-
momentum symmetry operations (appropriately redefined and extended to
comply with an improved concept of time reversal) in characterizing states
of matter at the spatial scale and energy level at which we can expect the
gravitational interaction among elementary particles to be as strong as the
other known interactions. This was achieved by demonstrating the relevance
of those symmetry operations for a definition of the microscopic states of
matter that must be taken into consideration in order to provide an appro-
priate measure of black hole information and entropy. Here I want to show
that one of the main consequences of the solutions I will propose to more
traditional aspects of the problem of the interpretation of quantum theory is
that it becomes clear that an integration of the general theory of relativity to
the rest of physics must proceed by first recognizing that in order to formu-
late a quantum theory of gravitation, it is necessary not to merely integrate
quantum principles to our classical theory of the gravitational field, but also
to adapt quantum field theory to a general relativistic description of reality
at a fundamental level.
The approach I have followed in the preceding report consisted in ex-
plaining how some specific aspect of a quantum mechanical description of
the world, namely the existence of positive and negative energy states which
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are allowed to propagate both forward and backward in time, changes our
understanding of the classical theory of gravitation and allows to improve
and simplify its formulation in a way which has decisive consequences for our
description of certain phenomena occurring on the cosmological scale. In the
present report I will go the opposite way and show how those original insights
regarding cosmology shall affect our understanding of quantum physics and
open up the way to a more pragmatic approach toward a quantum theory of
gravitation.
As I mentioned in the preceding document, the level of this discussion is
clearly philosophical, despite the fact that it remains very precise in its refer-
ence to quantitative aspects and concepts. The particular approach followed
here allows me to achieve a broadness of scope that would be impossible
to reach using a more conventional methodology. I do recognize that it is
unusual in the field of fundamental theoretical physics to formulate exact
results in such a way. But even though I would not myself have believed in
the pertinence of an approach based on reliance to expert knowledge and rig-
orous logical analysis of higher level concepts when I began studying physics
in a traditional academic environment, I have come to realize that it offers
real and significant advantages. If the reader is willing to rely on her own
judgment to assert the validity of the outcome of my analysis, it will become
pretty obvious to her that despite its originality, the approach adopted here
for deriving and communicating those results allows very useful physics to be
learned, when the appropriate effort is made to follow the transparent reason-
ing which I use to demonstrate the consistency and the empirical plausibility
of my claims.
Some of the most significant contributions I will offer in this report con-
sist in actually showing that there is indeed a problem with some aspects of
our current understanding. Two categories of questions I will try to address
more specifically are not always distinguished from one another and together
constitute the problem of the interpretation of quantum theory. But I will
explain why they must in fact be considered as independent questions in need
of separate answers. There is thus in effect a problem of interpretation con-
cerning the mathematical framework of quantum theory in general and the
distinctive features of quantum physics, which are mainly the use of proba-
bility amplitudes instead of classical probabilities (a remark which becomes
significant once it is recognized that quantum field theory is a particular in-
stance of statistical mechanics) and the appearance of non-local effects, which
are both unavoidable features of physical reality. It is not clear from a tradi-
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tional perspective how those aspects are to be understood in a manner that
is consistent with so many other well known aspects of reality which would
appear to forbid their occurrence. It is commonly believed that the problem
here does not have to do with the inappropriateness of our interpretation,
but with the inappropriateness of our traditional approach to understanding
reality. But if this posture may be legitimate for what concerns probability
amplitudes and the existence of quantum interferences in general, I will show
that it it not justified for what concerns the problem of non-locality which is
actually a question in need of an answer. Thus, answers will be offered to a
problem which I call the ‘quantum reality problem’ and which includes the
problem of quantum non-locality as a particular aspect.
This problem must be distinguished from the associated problem that
is usually referred to as the ‘quantum measurement problem’. Those who
are not actively working on this particular problem often believe that it
too may not be real, or alternatively that it was entirely solved by more
recent developments that showed how the evolution of a quantum system is
affected as soon as it becomes entangled with certain irreversible processes
taking place in its environment. But, as a handful of researchers have already
understood, this opinion is not warranted and even though real progress has
indeed been achieved in trying to solve the quantum measurement problem
and more generally the problem of the emergence of ‘quasiclassicality’, some
related questions remain unanswered and it is precisely those I will address.
However, if you happen to be among those who are convinced that there is no
longer a problem with quantum measurement, then I would ask you a very
simple question: what is the cause of the irreversibility that characterizes
the evolution of the environment degrees of freedom with which a quantum
system becomes entangled during measurement and which is necessary for
explaining decoherence? Clearly, an appropriate answer to that question
must be provided before the problem may be considered to have been solved
and this is what I have tried to achieve in the previous report. But, as I
will explain, that is not the only difficulty. In order to clarify this complex
situation I will therefore need to draw on the insights I have gained while
solving the problem of the origin of time asymmetry, but I will also have to
build on the insights I have gained while solving the quantum reality problem,
which illustrates how important it was in effect to first solve that perhaps
more intangible problem.
It is quite remarkable that in order to answer those two categories of
questions it is possible to rely on the most appropriate of the already ex-
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isting mathematical frameworks within which quantum physics is currently
formulated and it is not necessary to alter the foundations of the theory. I
must immediately point out, however, that there is something terribly wrong
with the often met remark to the effect that choosing which of the exist-
ing interpretations of quantum theory is the correct one is a mere matter
of taste given that they are all mathematically equivalent and therefore all
constitute equally valid proposals, which all agree with observations. Before
any progress can be achieved what needs to be understood is that most in-
terpretations are not equally appropriate, but rather all equally incorrect or
incomplete. It would be misleading, therefore, to argue that the problem is
that there are too many viable candidates for an interpretation of quantum
theory, because in fact none of the currently available proposals is fully con-
sistent, either from a logical viewpoint, or regarding the requirement that
the obtained theory be compatible with all observable aspects of physical
reality. This state of affairs can only mean one thing and it is that further
progress is required to formulate the one interpretation that will meet both
of those requirements. I believe that the original results I have unveiled in
the preceding report provide some of the missing elements which are required
to achieve just such a leap forward in our understanding of quantum physics,
which will, at last, allow it to become a fully coherent theory.
Before we begin, though, I would like to say a few words about what
was one of the essential principles that guided me on developing the revised
interpretation of quantum theory that is described in this report. This broad
requirement slowly emerged as being unavoidable for a solution to the prob-
lems which will be discussed in the following sections. In the preceding report
I already emphasized the importance of another essential constraint, which
is that of relational definition of the physical attributes of a system. The
relevance of this principle follows from the fact that it is not acceptable to
refer to aspects of reality that are not part of the universe to which a system
belongs in order to define its physical attributes. It is important to under-
stand, however, that the necessity to define the value of physical attributes
in a relational way does not imply, as some authors have suggested, that
nothing can exist other than the physical reality we observe in our universe.
Indeed, it must be clear that what I have found is that there can be no ref-
erence, by observers in a given universe, to physical attributes not related
to one another by the network of causal relationships belonging to their own
universe. But this does not mean that other such ensembles, or universes,
cannot exist as logical possibilities, with similar, purely relational and mutu-
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ally referring properties, objectively distinct from those existing in another
universe. This remark illustrates the importance of a further insight that
is at once required by the world view developed in this report and implied
by its likely validity. There is in effect a tendency nowadays to designate
as metaphysical every aspect of reality which may be impossible to probe
through direct observation and to conclude that such aspects are not worth
the attention of the scientific community.
What I have come to understand is that the self-imposed requirement of
systematically characterizing as metaphysical any notion that refers to as-
pects of physical reality which may not be directly accessible to observation
is actually a mild form of solipsism and constitutes one of the most seri-
ous obstacle on the way to developing more accurate models in fundamental
theoretical physics. In fact, I think that the greatest challenge with which
science is currently faced may well be that of surmounting the obstinate re-
fusal to accept as a legitimate object of scientific inquiry what cannot be
directly observed by the means of measuring instruments and as physically
meaningful what lies outside the limits of observation of a given observer
(think of the reality behind event horizons for example). In this particular
sense, the success of science might in the end depend on our willingness to
adopt a position analogue to scientific realism and opposite to instrumental-
ism, concerning ultimately the idea that something really exists outside our
immediate domain of perception of reality.
This requirement is not so different from the original condition of objec-
tive reality which was defended by Einstein and which was proposed in an
attempt to demonstrate the validity of an approach based on the hypothesis
that reality actually exists, even when it is not subjected to direct observa-
tion. But given that in the physical sciences objectivity has rather come to
characterize any conception of reality that is derived solely from empirical
knowledge and observation, then it would not be appropriate to use the term
‘objective reality’ in order to refer specifically to a reality that is not directly
observable under all conditions, even if the nature of this reality was still de-
rived from experimental facts. Thus, I cannot avoid having to speak about a
realist conception of reality as being essential to a consistent interpretation
of quantum theory, even if that may appear tautological, as there does not
exist a more appropriate term to denote this kind of approach. It must be
clear, however, that it cannot be required of such a reality that it be classical
in nature, despite the fact that it would be characterized as objectively real
(in the philosophical sense). Anyhow, I think that this scientific ‘realism’
8
must be considered a necessary ingredient for the elaboration of an accurate
understanding of the nature of reality at a fundamental level and this is what
motivates my position with respect to certain unresolved issues regarding the
problem of the interpretation of quantum theory.
Such a conviction, however, should not be confused with a belief in the va-
lidity of theoretical constructs that have no experimental justification, which
does not constitute a desirable position to hold on to and which would actu-
ally consist in the exact opposite of the viewpoint I’m defending here. What
I’m suggesting, in effect, is that it may sometimes be appropriate to extend
the validity of what we know to be true with absolute certainty to a larger
domain of reality where this validity may not be directly assessed and not
that it would be right to try to extend the domain of validity of a description
for which there does not yet exist any empirical evidence. In other words, if
we are justified in extrapolating beyond the domain of direct observation, as
may be found necessary, principles and notions which we have good reasons
to believe are indeed valid, it would be wrong to take advantage of the ab-
sence of observational data to try to justify hypotheses which cannot yet be
independently corroborated and which may therefore have no validity what-
soever from a scientific viewpoint. Those considerations will have decisive
consequences for the formulation of an interpretation of quantum theory that
contains no contradiction when considered in the broader context of the rep-
resentation of reality that emerged from the progress I have already achieved
in solving other long-standing problems in the fields of gravitational physics,
cosmology, and thermodynamics.
2 A simple analogy
One particular event from my early years in elementary school contributed
more than any other in developing my awareness of the deep structure of
physical reality. I do not remember much about the many events that hap-
pened during the period of my life when I was acquiring many of the skills
which I’m still using today (like writing and calculating), but I still remem-
ber perfectly well that when I was about eight years old my teacher once
gave me and each of the other children in my class a few copper wires, an
electrical battery, and a tiny light bulb with as a mission to figure out how to
produce light using only those components. This may seem like an easy task
and most of the kids did, in effect, manage to achieve the assigned objective
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quite rapidly. Yet, even though I was usually considered a fast learner in
most traditional academic disciplines, I really had trouble finding out how
to obtain the desired result. I believe that this is because, even as a kid,
I always preferred to actually understand things rather than simply be sat-
isfied with learning about the finished answers I was proposed. So, rather
than just trying to combine the elements in every possible way and be satis-
fied once I had accomplished my homework, like the other kids, I tried very
hard to understand what the rule could be that would justify that a certain
arrangement does in effect produce light. I don’t know why I had such an
inclination, but it has remained with me all my life as I began to develop an
interest in the sciences and learned about the unsolved mysteries of modern
physics. What I have since realized, with retrospect, is that somewhere in
this simple laboratory experiment was hidden the answer to some of the most
enduring problems facing fundamental theoretical physics.
The first lesson I retained from this experience with the light bulb and
the battery is that there is a polarity to all relevant physical properties. The
battery has a positive and a negative pole and so does any light bulb and it
is only by taking this aspect into consideration that one is allowed to under-
stand what constitute a successful configuration for producing light. In the
preceding report I have discussed at length how this aspect is relevant even
in a gravitational context, where the sign of action is the decisive physical
property that is involved in determining the attractive or repulsive nature
of the gravitational interaction between two particles. I also emphasized the
purely relational nature of any polarity, whether it regards the sign of elec-
trical charge or the direction of propagation in time of a particle. Only the
difference or the identity of any such property of a system with respect to
that of another system has a physical significance. But the most difficult
part in devising an electrical setup that works consisted in understanding
the role of the wires. What is essential to learn, in effect, is that the experi-
ment can only work if the wires are arranged so as to form a circuit that goes
from one pole of the battery into one pole of the light bulb and then back
from the opposite pole of same light bulb into the unconnected pole of the
same battery. I only realized that this must be so when I carefully examined
the light bulb and saw that there is a special kind of wire inside of it that
connects the two poles from within, thereby suggesting that for some reason
the setup must be closed on itself.
But after I came to understand the requirement for the setup to form a
closed circuit I was not only faced with the problem of understanding why
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only such a configuration would produce the desired outcome, but also with
the difficulty of understanding what was the role of the battery in allowing
light to be produced by the light bulb. In other words, I had trouble under-
standing in which way the role of the battery could be distinct from that of
the light bulb, despite the fact that both components were connected along
the same circuit. Only at a relatively late time was I allowed to learn that
what the light bulb does from a fundamental viewpoint is simply dissipate
the energy that is stored in a useful form in the battery, as a result of the
friction that is exerted on the electrical current that flows through the part
of the circuit located inside this light bulb. This is a manifestation of the
second law of thermodynamics in its purest form. The very objective of pro-
ducing the circuit is to allow the current to dissipate the energy contained in
the battery by producing an enormous number of high entropy light particles
that expand out of the system irreversibly. The whole mystery associated
with the second law of thermodynamics and the irreversibility of time is
contained in this little experiment and with it the solution to the quantum
measurement problem. Any circuit that produces a useful result that is ob-
servable and which has an effect on its surroundings (the light turns on) must
dissipate energy that was originally present in the universe in a well ordered
configuration.
I will eventually explain what is the essential role of irreversibility in al-
lowing the emergence of the quasiclassical character of reality that is revealed
by any process of quantum measurement, but first I would like to point out
the profound significance of the property of closure that is imposed on any
operational electric circuit. For anyone who works as an electrician the no-
tion of a circuit is omnipresent, but it is also somewhat lost in a practical
context where one always works with pairs of polarized wires in which the
two branches of a circuit are always contained in a single cable that invari-
ably goes from energy source to appliance over large distances, as if what
was involved was one single flow from source to sink, similar to the flow of
water inside a pipe. Thus, it is easy to forget that one is always dealing
with a closed circuit, however complicated it might be. I believe that what
explains some of the difficulties we encounter in quantum physics is that we
have always learned to work only with pairs of ‘polarized wires’ and this is
why we fail to understand that what we are dealing with in general is not
a single process that unfolds from initial conditions to final measurement,
from ‘source’ to ‘sink’, but really a closed causal chain similar to the closed
electrical circuit of my childhood experiment.
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It is the fact that, for some reason which will be discussed later, we are
always working with portions of a ‘closed circuit’ which are highly stretched
and extended along the unidirectional dimension of time and whose polarized
components are constrained to evolve along very similar trajectories, that ex-
plains that we have been allowed to ignore the fact that we are actually always
dealing with two processes which are the oppositely polarized portions of a
causal chain that closes up on itself like a functioning electrical circuit. We
always model very long causal chains, similar to electric cables, that extend
not along a distance in space, but along the unidirectional dimension of time
and for that reason we have never realized that what the polarized character
of this causal chain really means is that we are dealing with a ‘closed circuit’.
I will explain how the simple analogy discussed here can be developed into a
rigorous interpretation of experimental facts that allows to provide not only
a consistent explanation of the persistence of quasiclassicality, but also a re-
alist and fully intuitive picture of quantum phenomena that reproduces their
non-local character without violating the principle of local causality. When
we will reach that point it will become possible to actually understand why it
is, in effect, that the causal chain associated with the history of the universe
as a whole closes up on itself like any electrical circuit that produces light.
3 Time-symmetric causality
It is somewhat strange that it is Richard Feynman himself that once remarked
that one question he believes to be unanswerable or unscientific is the one
that asks why it is that we are allowed to guess from one part of the universe
what the rest of it will do? Indeed, it has become pretty clear to me that if
this is possible it is simply because things propagate, not just in space, but
also in time and, as Feynman himself first understood, not just forward in
time, but also backward, from the future toward the past. In fact, this is the
essence of causality. The events that form the universe are all related to one
another and to nothing else by the network of causal relationships that is
established by the propagation of elementary particles between those events
across spatial distances and through time, both forward and backward. This
is what explains that no part of the universe can be considered independently
from any other. The results I have discussed in section 3.9 of [1] regarding the
role of the constraint of global entanglement in giving rise to thermodynamic
time-asymmetry appear to confirm that such a requirement, regarding the
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necessary existence of causal relationships established through local contact
and propagation, is in effect essential for a consistent description of physical
reality.
Another significant conclusion from my preceding report that concerns
time directionality more specifically is that a distinction must be made be-
tween the traditional concept of time direction associated with the thermo-
dynamic arrow of time and a more fundamental concept of time direction
which has to do with the direction of propagation in time of elementary
particles and which merely distinguishes two opposite directions without fa-
voring one of them in any particular way (under most circumstances). Thus,
even at a semi-classical level of description, there already emerges a notion
of bidirectional causality more fundamental than the classical, unidirectional
concept of causality according to which causes always precede their clearly
distinguishable effects in the same unique direction of time. From this more
fundamental viewpoint there is no longer an absolute distinction between
causes and effects and all that one can meaningfully ask is whether there is
a correlation between the occurrence of a certain event and that of another
event taking place at a different time, either farther in the past or later in the
future (which would affect the probability that one of the events is observed
when the other is).
Those who have seriously examined the question usually recognize that
the idea that we can influence the future, but not the past, is not entirely
correct. Indeed, when calculating correlation probabilities we must take into
account the effect of the future on the present whenever there are antiparti-
cles in the final state, because antiparticles are most appropriately described
as particles propagating from the future. In fact, there appears to be no
real distinction at the elementary level of description between the past and
the future and despite the fact that the future remains unknown to present
observers it is as unique as the past and we are merely discovering what that
future is as we progress irreversibly towards it. What we consider to be our
control over the future is not a complete illusion, because there are correla-
tions between what we do now and what happens later, but it is no more
real than the kind of ‘influence’ we have on the past, which is made apparent
by the very same correlations when they are considered after the events have
already happened. As I will explain below, it is merely the absence of infor-
mation about the future and the fact that all possible futures are allowed to
happen (while no such freedom exists for the past, as a consequence of ther-
modynamic time asymmetry) that makes it look like we only have control
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over the future, while the future itself appears to exert no influence on the
present and the past. But once we realize that the future is only the past of
an even more remote future, then it becomes all the more obvious that this
is just an illusion.
What I’m suggesting, therefore, is that at the level of elementary particles,
where thermodynamic time asymmetry is not a meaningful concept, causal-
ity is not constrained to always operate from past to future, which means
that causes and effects cannot be distinguished based merely on the sign of
the time interval between the events they relate. Thus, while it may still be
necessary to assume that causes precede their effects, this can actually be
achieved in any of the two directions of time in which the particles conveying
the effects are propagating. At a fundamental level of description there sim-
ply is no restriction regarding the direction in which causality operates and
this means that from the unidirectional time viewpoint effects can actually
precede their causes. But instead of saying that under certain circumstances
causes may actually constitute effects, while effects would become causes it
is more appropriate to define causes and effects in a more fundamental bidi-
rectional way, so that effects can propagate either forward or backward in
time, but always in the direction in which the particle mediating the process
is propagating in time.
The absence of absolute distinction between causes and effects does not
mean that the relativistic concept of a future light cone clearly distinct from
its past equivalent and defining the causal structure of spacetime is wrong.
But it does mean that there is no a priori reason to differentiate the struc-
ture that arises as a consequence of the limits imposed on the propaga-
tion of causal signals in the future from that which would arise as a con-
sequence of the constraints imposed on the possible propagation of causal
signals in the past. Yet, it would be incorrect to argue that only correlations
exist at a fundamental level of description and that causes cannot be dis-
tinguished from their effects in any way, because what the bidirectional, or
time-symmetric nature of causality implies is merely that there is no absolute
(non-relationally defined) distinction between causes and effects (understood
as locally propagated influences of certain events on others), even though a
relatively defined notion of time directionality is still involved from a semi-
classical perspective that allows to distinguish a direction in the propagation
of causal signals.
What must be understood is that the only invariably true notion of causal-
ity is the time-symmetric, or bidirectional one, while classical, thermody-
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namic causality, or unidirectional causality is valid only as a consequence
of the existence of the constraint of low entropy that applies on the initial
conditions at the Big Bang and is not a fundamental property of nature. In
fact, what I have shown in section 3.9 of [1] is that a certain condition of local
causality that is not a priori asymmetric in time can be used to explain the
observed thermodynamic time asymmetry from which unidirectional time
and classical causality emerge. Later on, I will discuss the role played by
the constraint of global entanglement (which I previously identified as the
ultimate cause of thermodynamic time asymmetry) in constraining classical
causality to operate only in the future direction of time. It is already pos-
sible, however, to appreciate the fact that the direction of time relative to
which entropy grows and information flows is independent from the direction
of propagation in time of the particles involved in producing such a change.
The direction of propagation in time of an elementary particle, which deter-
mines its particle or antiparticle nature, merely allows to assess whether the
particle propagates an effect in the past or in the future, while the flow of
information is a higher level property that is fixed merely by the macroscopic
boundary conditions imposed on a process, regardless of whether it involves
particles or antiparticles.
Thus, a classical, unidirectional, or thermodynamic causal chain can be
differentiated by the fact that it invariably involves a unique event in the
past exerting a recognizable effect on multiple spatially separated events in
the future2. In this particular sense it transpires that unidirectional causal-
ity does in effect always operate from past to future in our universe, as no
single event in the future has ever been observed to exert a unique recogniz-
able influence on multiple physically separated events in the past that would
actually involve a flow of information from that future time into its past.
But, again, this does not mean that a future event cannot influence a past
event, merely that such an influence cannot, in effect, occur in a way that
2In fact, as emphasized by Lawrence Sklar [2], it is not always possible to associate the
asymmetry that distinguishes causes from effects with the thermodynamic time asymmetry
other than by relying on the property of parallelism of the direction of time that allows
to ‘project’ the thermodynamic asymmetry characterizing certain causally related pairs
of events onto other pairs of causally related events where the cause is not so easily
differentiated from the effect (as in the case of certain mechanical or astronomical processes
where friction and dissipation are not manifestly apparent). But this only strengthens the
validity of the position I’m defending, to the effect that causality is not by necessity an
asymmetric property.
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would allow the formation of mutually consistent records of the future. It is
not causality in the fundamental sense that is asymmetric in time, but the
making of records by which it is usually made manifest. This asymmetry has
already been recognized as arising from the existence of a thermodynamic
arrow of time associated with the continuous decrease of entropy that takes
place in the past direction of time.
Therefore, the only mystery regarding the apparent absence of causal
chains that would run from the future toward the past does not have to do
with a real absence of such phenomena, but with the fact that future causes
do not exert the same kind of recognizable consequences on the past, as
past events exert on future events. The absence of recognizable effects at an
earlier time from an event that would have taken place at a later time can
always be attributed not to the absence of backward in time causality and
to a fundamental character of unidirectionality, but to the fact that entropy
always increases only in the future direction of time, while records can only be
formed in the direction of time relative to which entropy actually increases.
Given that in the preceding report I have explained that the thermodynamic
arrow of time is not a fundamental property of nature, but arises from a
condition regarding the homogeneity of the initial distribution of matter and
radiation energy at the Big Bang (in the presence of anomalously gravitating
negative energy matter), then it clearly follows that there is absolutely no
rational motive to argue that backward in time causation is forbidden in
our universe. Indeed, all the observable properties of naturally occurring
processes can be explained without relying on this assumption, while the
requirement of a relational description of the direction of propagation in
time implies that backward causation must exist at a fundamental level,
given that it cannot be distinguished in any absolute way from forward in
time causation.
I believe that it is again our failure to recognize the full significance of
Feynman’s description of antiparticles as particles propagating backward in
time that is responsible for our ignorance of the necessity (and not just
the possibility) of a time-symmetric description of causality in the quantum
realm. Once it is understood that there is a requirement for causality to be
described in a time-symmetric way (due to the existence of backward in time
propagation), then what we are facing is no longer merely the problem of
understanding how the future can influence the known past, but really how
it can be that a unique future may itself be causally related to this unique
past when there is obviously more than one way it can be influenced by
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those past events. Indeed, the relative nature of the order in time of space-
like separated events, which is implied by the special theory of relativity,
means that what appears to be the future for a certain observer is actually
the past for a different observer in a different state of motion and therefore if
a unique past is causally related to the experienced present, then the future
can only be similarly characterized. In a time-symmetric context it is not
just the teleological character of backward causation that would need to
be justified, but the equivalent teleological character of ordinary forward in
time causality. If one insists that there is a problem with the possibility of
causally influencing the known past, then one must at least also admit that
this problem could not be distinguished from that which would arise from
the fact that the past also influences the future, while a unique (even though
unpredictable) future is associated with the known unique present.
What makes it look like the present state of the universe is not causally
related to one particular future is simply the fact that all future states are in
principle allowed to be the outcome of random evolution from a given present
state (any outcome is possible for future measurements), while not all past
states are allowed as ‘final’ states in the context where the constraint of global
entanglement discussed in section 3.9 of [1] exerts a limit on entropy growth
in the past. In fact, this is precisely the nature of the difference between what
we usually call causality and which relates to the thermodynamic asymmetry
of causes and effects and the kind of causality that is involved in a time-
symmetric context. Once it is realized that the past and the future are not
distinct from a more general perspective, then it clearly follows that if we
are willing to accept that the future can be influenced by what happens in
the present, as confirmed by our direct experience of reality, then it is also
necessary to recognize that the future can itself affect the present and the
past just as well, so that imposing final conditions is no less appropriate
than imposing initial conditions, as long as these conditions are not those
responsible for the observed thermodynamic time asymmetry itself.
One commonly encountered misconception regarding backward causation
in general, as well as in a quantum context, is that if the future is allowed
to causally affect the past, then we can no longer be confident that the
past is what it seems to be, because it can be altered by future events.
This is usually provided as an argument against backward in time causation
because, as everyone knows the past is unique and unalterable and therefore
any approach that would allow the future to ‘change’ the past is certainly
based on incorrect assumptions. But what is incorrect with this apparently
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logically unassailable conclusion is the idea that an alteration of the past
would involve changing an observable fact from the past which we already
know has occurred, just like we are allowed by our apparent free-will to
alter the course of future history. In fact, that is just an inappropriate
understanding of the meaning of backward causation, because if an event in
the future changes the outcome of an observation in the past, this change is
already effected at the moment in the past at which it was observed and the
fact is not changed ‘again’ from an alternative counterfactual at the moment
in the future at which its ‘cause’ occurs. In other words, it is not possible to
change history using the kind of time-reversed causal chain that is allowed
by fundamental theories. History is the outcome of all causal influences from
both the past and the future and is experienced only once as such a globally
consistent whole. No known fact is altered or changed by future influences
as any change that would be effected would need to have already taken effect
at the time at which the fact first occurred. The ‘effects’ that the future
may exert on the past would always be made conspicuous merely through
the influence they would have on correlation probabilities established after
the fact (when that future itself becomes a known past).
Now, it must be clear that the condition imposed on special-relativistic
transformations that they should preserve the direction of all time-like inter-
vals (the causal ordering postulate) is not incompatible with the conclusion
that backward in time causation must be allowed at a certain level, because
all that is required by relativity is that if a causal chain operates from the
past toward the future (as we usually assume to always be the case) then the
same causal chain cannot be found to operate from the future toward the past
as a result of such a transformation. But that does not mean that a distinct
causal chain cannot operate from the future onto the past, merely that if
such a backward propagating causal chain exists it too cannot be turned into
a causal chain propagating in the opposite direction of time, which in this
case would be toward the future. In any case, the fact that the causal time
of relativity theory is not unidirectional does not itself constitute a problem,
because, even in such a context, unidirectionality is allowed to emerge from
the global entanglement constraint which imposes a condition of low gravi-
tational entropy at the Big Bang, as I have explained in section 3.9 of [1].
What explains time asymmetry is not a fundamental property of unidirec-
tionality applying to causal chains, but the particular boundary conditions
which apply at a certain time in the history of our universe. What makes a
flow of information from the future toward the past impossible is not a limi-
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tation that would be arbitrarily imposed on the direction in which causality
operates, but a distinct constraint that limits the growth of entropy in the
direction of time toward the initial Big Bang state. Thus, as long as a causal
signal does not propagate faster than the relativistic speed limit it cannot
give rise to a violation of the classical, unidirectional principle of causality,
whether the signal propagates forward or backward in time.
It is not true that the scientific method excludes the possibility that ‘final
causes’ of any kind might exist despite the fact that time-symmetric causal-
ity appears to be allowed by relativity, because what can be scientifically
demonstrated is merely that entropy does not increase in the past, not that
there is no backward in time propagation of effects. What explains that we
have become naturally suspicious regarding the possibility that causes could
propagate backward in time is only the fact that from a classical perspec-
tive it never appeared necessary, or even possible to describe an object or
a component of an object as propagating backward in time, while the time
asymmetry that characterizes the history of macroscopic systems was always
observed to operate from past to future (which made it look like a funda-
mental requirement). This prejudice remained in effect even when it became
clear that backward causation was a necessary assumption in the context
where one must recognize that certain particles do propagate backward in
time (even though from a unidirectional time viewpoint they are observed as
oppositely charged particles propagating forward in time which are involved
in the same entropy increasing processes as their ordinary matter counter-
parts). The teleological problem of time, which is often believed to arise in
the context where a unique future is associated with the known present, is
not a true problem, but merely follows from the psychological expectation
of unidirectional causality that we inherited from our thermodynamically
constrained experience of reality and which does not reflect any fundamen-
tal limitation. There is no other explanation for the widespread belief that
causality must always operate forward in time.
What must be understood, then, is that it is not merely the order in which
time flows that varies for an antiparticle, but really the fundamental direction
in which causes propagate in time. When a particle propagates backward
in time, the direction in which it may come to influence other particles is
actually reversed and it is merely the thermodynamic arrow of time and
the direction in which classical causality operates that remain unchanged.
If there is any meaning to be associated with a concept of causality from
a fundamental viewpoint, then a reversal of the order in which causality
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operates must be allowed to occur and future events must be allowed to
exert an influence on past events. There cannot be a distinction between
causality and the order in which elementary particle processes occur in time,
even though this order is a relatively defined property and is only significant
in relation to the order in which another such process is unfolding in time.
This requirement may perhaps appear doubtful in the context where it seems
that many distinct histories, which may involve unobservable subprocesses
with variable directions of propagation in time, are required to take place
all at once in order to account for the statistics of quantum processes. But
I will explain later in this report why this apparent lack of uniqueness of
particle trajectories is not an obstacle to a proper understanding of causality
as actually depending on the direction of propagation in time of elementary
particles. Causal order may be a locally variable property, but it is not
arbitrary, even when backward in time causation is allowed.
4 Closed causal chains and time travel
As is already apparent from the viewpoint of a semi-classical description, the
time-symmetric nature of causality does not merely imply that there is no
absolute distinction between causes and effects, it also means that a certain
event can all at once influence another event and be influenced by the very
same event. In other words, not only is there no absolute difference between
causes and effects, but the cause of a certain event can also be an effect of the
same event, although this circularity can only be appropriately described in
the context of a purely quantum mechanical model of reality such as the one
I will propose in a latter portion of this report. It must be clear, though, that
the possibility that such closed causal chains may occur does not constitute
a valid motive to reject the whole concept of time-symmetric causality and
backward in time causation, because, as I will explain, it is possible to pro-
vide a consistent description of such phenomena without encountering logical
contradictions.
Reichenbach’s insistence [3] that one must be able to differentiate causes
and effects independently from their temporal order if we are to avoid the
occurrence of closed causal chains is not totally inappropriate, however, be-
cause, as I mentioned in the previous section, the direction in which causal
chains propagate is determined locally by the direction of propagation in time
of the particles involved and therefore it is not fixed merely by the global time
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order of causally related events. But, in fact, it is precisely for this reason
that closed causal chains are unavoidable and that they must be properly de-
scribed and interpreted at the most fundamental level. Yet, even at the level
where closed causal chains may occur it is certainly necessary to require that
no inconsistencies can arise, which would involve an incompatibility between
some known present and some known past. What I will eventually explain is
that there is actually a requirement for histories not to be self-contradictory
and this condition can be satisfied not merely despite the fact that causality
also operates backward in time, but as a very consequence of the reality of
backward causation.
In any case, it is certainly incorrect to argue that there is empirical ev-
idence to the effect that closed causal chains are forbidden, because in the
course of elementary particle interactions particle-antiparticle loops are of-
ten encountered that constitute just such a phenomenon, which can be ad-
equately described, even from a semi-classical perspective. Once again, I
believe that the problem here does not have to do with the possibility that
closed causal chains themselves may occur, but rather concerns the hypoth-
esis that classical, unidirectional causality could operate in both the future
and the past directions of time along a closed causal chain. I will soon re-
turn to this question, but what should be clear already is that it is, in effect,
only at the level where unidirectional causality operates that the order of
events in time should be absolutely distinguishable and that no closed causal
chains would be likely to arise. But, as I have mentioned already, this is a dis-
tinct issue, because at the fundamental level, where time-symmetric causality
operates, thermodynamic time asymmetry is ineffective and any restriction
that would be imposed by the existence of the thermodynamic arrow of time
would be irrelevant.
One significant outcome of the existence of closed causal chains is that
it is not always possible to establish the time order of events in an absolute
way, because one event occurring along such a causal chain can be considered
to occur both before and after another event occurring along the same chain,
even if the events are uniquely ordered from the macroscopic viewpoint of
thermodynamic time. The topological order of time is always clear locally
along a particle world-line, but globally (even on a small scale) it must be
determined in a purely relational way (as dependent on an arbitrarily chosen
reference point along a given circular trajectory), like any physically signifi-
cant property.
It is important to realize that the existence of closed causal chains does not
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introduce additional unpredictability above that which is already assumed
to characterize quantum evolution, because the current framework already
involves some backward in time propagation (I will further explain in section
8 what motivates the idea that backward causation is involved in determining
correlation probabilities in quantum mechanics). But even in a deterministic
context, the fact that the present cause of a certain future event could itself
be affected by this very same event would imply that it is not possible for the
future to be determined by the past alone, because the future itself would
be involved in determining the past that determines this very future. Thus,
it seems that even in the context of a hidden variables model, backward in
time causation would imply that reality must remain fundamentally random
and not merely unpredictable due to an absence of knowledge of the exact
present state of a system. Of course the simple fact that the cause of a
future event can be located not in its past, but in its own future also implies
that even when a complete knowledge of the present quantum state of a
system and its environment is available, it is not possible to identify all the
causes which exert an influence on its evolution, which means that a certain
measure of unpredictability is unavoidable that would not be present from a
conventional viewpoint.
It is usually recognized that the problem which would be raised by what
might be called a time travel experience has to do with the fact that such a
phenomenon may allow the kind of closed causal chain in which the classi-
cal, unidirectional principle of causality would be violated. More specifically,
given the assumption that we are free to decide how we influence the future
in the context where our evolution is taking place irreversibly toward what
would normally be the unknown future, it may appear that a time-traveler
arriving from the future would be able to alter the course of a known history
in the same way a normally evolving person is allowed to influence the un-
known future. The problem here does not only have to do with the fact that
we don’t know why such unidirectional causality violating evolution is never
observed, it also concerns the fact that if we are, in effect, free to influence
the course of events taking place along the direction in which our thought
processes are functioning, then it would appear that by ‘traveling’ back in
time we might be able to alter a known future and to modify the course of
events in a way that would be incompatible with the very possibility that
the experience itself might have occurred, thereby giving rise to a time travel
paradox.
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Although time travel has never been observed to occur and therefore
remains a purely hypothetical problem for physics, the standard answer to the
questions it raises is often believed to be David Deutsch’s proposal [4] based
on the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics. What Deutsch
suggested, basically, is that every time a paradox would be expected to occur
that would involve a particle arriving from the future and altering the past
conditions that gave rise to the future state that allowed the process to
happen, the universe would ‘split’ into alternative branches where both the
initial history (in which the backward propagating particle did not change
the future) and its modified version (were the particle does effect a change
that would prevent it from having effected this very same change) do occur,
but cease to interfere quantum mechanically with one another. Thus, it is
proposed that there is an alternative future for every possibility that might
be produced as a result of the influence exerted by a future event on a past
event through backward causation.
I’m not sure what most people make of this description, but the problem
I have with it is that I just can’t figure out how it actually makes things
any better. If we say that a particle arrives from the future and changes
the past, then this past must be assumed to have already taken the ‘effect’
into account and must be such that it allows the said future to occur, as I
previously explained. So, how could this future be made different by such an
altered past? Clearly the problem with the hypothetical problem of a future
‘cause’ influencing a past ‘effect’ only occurs when we assume that there
can actually arise inconsistencies or contradictions in the observed historical
description of events. But when it is assumed that a particle can arrive from
the future and change the past to which it was causally related, it is not
possible to say that the future is merely altered from what it ‘originally’ was
by the presence of the particle, because the particle itself could not even have
arrived from the future in such an altered version of history. How could one
possibly argue that a new future is written in an alternative branch of the
universe’s history as a result of the arrival of a particle from the future, if the
backward propagating influence of that particle did not even occur in this
alternative branch of history?
What the many-worlds approach purports to show is that inconsistencies
and contradictions can actually arise in our historical description of facts,
but that this is acceptable, because the future always adapts to the incon-
sistencies it itself generates. But this is just non-sense, because if a future is
such that it influences a given past then this past must be such that it nec-
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essarily gives rise to this unique future and this is not made to ‘happen’ by
some hypothetical splitting process taking place at a given arbitrarily chosen
moment, it is just how things actually are all along, in both the past and the
future. Also, if we are to allow for the existence of other universes then by
definition those universes should be causally independent from one another
and things happening in one universe should not be allowed to influence what
is taking place in another universe. I believe that what is missing from our
current understanding is an acknowledgement of the fact that a universe, by
necessity, actually consists of a unique ensemble of events causally related to
one another and to nothing else (as a consequence of the requirement of rela-
tional definition of physical attributes which was discussed in [1]). From such
a viewpoint if an event in the past is influenced by the presence of an event
in the future then this past event cannot be causally related to a different
future, but only to the future that actually influenced it. Thus, it becomes
a fundamental requirement for the universe to form a consistent whole, free
of internal contradictions.
Of course we never experience time travel, so this issue only has to do
with elementary particles propagating backward in time and in this realm
quantum field theory already does a very good job of consistently describ-
ing physical reality and predicting facts. In this particular sense Deutsch’s
proposal is a solution to a problem that does not exist and this becomes
especially obvious in the context where, as I will later explain, the many-
worlds interpretation of quantum theory is not required to make sense of the
quantum measurement process and can even be understood to have consis-
tency problems of its own (which does not mean that the multiverse concept,
as a distinct hypothesis, cannot be considered valid and fully justified). I
believe that the strange and convoluted reality that emerges from such a
description merely illustrates the kind of complications we would run into
if we adopted an interpretation of quantum theory involving such multiple
splitting realities present all at once in the same universe. If the many-worlds
approach cannot even be made to work in a quantum mechanical context,
what motive do we have to invoke it in order to explain problems occurring
at a classical level? Consistency requires that if a process happens backward
in time, this backward evolving process must in effect evolve backward in
the same universe in which it was previously evolving forward, in the sense
that it must remain causally related to the same external reality, otherwise
nothing at all could be assumed to be causally related to anything else. But,
then why is it, in effect, that we never experience time travel if backward in
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time causation must by necessity be allowed? Does this prohibition have to
do with the fact that if it was not in effect, then real contradictions might
occur whenever closed causal chains would form?
To answer those questions I must first point out that what would really
differentiate time travel experiences from the backward in time propagation
of elementary particles that is routinely observed in laboratories is the fact
that with time travel a macroscopic and thermodynamically constrained sys-
tem such as a living human being would need to evolve not just in the past
direction of time, but with its thermodynamic arrow of time reversed and
pointing toward the past instead of the future. From the viewpoint of an
observer not part of the process this evolution would be seen as a local vi-
olation of the second law of thermodynamics, or the principle that entropy
never decreases in the future, because indeed if the time traveler really travels
back in time, then as he does so he would not just remember what happened
at his past destination, but also what happened in the future (which to him
would appear to be the past), thereby allowing information to flow from the
future toward the past. But this means that from the viewpoint of a normal
observer the processes of memory formation and all the other irreversible
processes usually involved in allowing a person to experience time as a uni-
directional phenomenon would all appear to function backward for the time
traveler, even if the time traveler is not composed of particles (like ordinary
antiparticles) usually considered to be propagating backward in time. Yet,
for an external observer, the time travel process would be visible at all times
while it is taking place, beginning from the point in the past where it ‘ceases’
and right through to the instant in the future when it ‘began’ and would thus
actually involve the splitting of the time traveler into forward and backward
evolving copies and the later merging of the backward evolving copy with
the original process.
At this point it is necessary to recall the discussion from section 3.9 of [1]
concerning the origin of thermodynamic time asymmetry in a universe like
ours. There, I explained that it is the inescapable nature of the constraint of
global entanglement (which must be imposed in order to allow relationships
of causality to be established between all elementary particles in the universe)
that explains the parallel nature of thermodynamic time asymmetry (there
does not coexist opposite thermodynamic arrows of time in different regions
of the same universe), even for temporarily isolated branch systems. Thus,
in a universe in which negative energy matter is necessarily present (for
reasons I explained in chapter 1 of my preceding report) gravitational entropy
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(and therefore all entropy) must be continuously decreasing as we approach
the instant in the past (which corresponds with the very first instant of
the Big Bang) where the global entanglement of all elementary particles is
effected, because otherwise certain particles would not be allowed to be in
contact with other particles present in the universe at the Planck time. Thus,
all macroscopic systems must evolve with decreasing entropy in the past
direction of time, because all matter particles without any possible exception
must become entangled with the rest of the matter in the universe if they
actually constitute elements of that universe.
Of course the point here is that if time travel is never experienced or
observed, it is not because backward in time causation is impossible at a fun-
damental level, but merely because entropy must be continuously decreasing
in the past and only in the past (because no global entanglement constraint
applies to the future), which means that the conditions necessary for the
thermodynamic arrow of time to be experienced backward are not merely
unlikely, they are actually forbidden for all practical purpose. Unidirectional
causality only operates from the past toward the future, because it would
take a very significant fluctuation for entropy to temporarily decrease in the
future from a present state of non-maximum entropy, but given that this
would be required for time travel to occur, then it is possible to understand
why we never experience time backward. Indeed, classical, unidirectional
causality is reflected in the fact that it would take only a little change in
the past to allow a present event not to have occurred, while it would in
general require enormous changes in the future for some present event not to
have occurred. This asymmetry is precisely what is enforced by the global
entanglement constraint when it is assumed that causal relationships must
exist between all elementary particles in the universe. For time travel to
be possible this thermodynamic time-asymmetry would need to be reversed
locally for the whole duration of the process and the unlikeliness of such an
evolution is responsible for the fact that time travel is virtually impossible,
at least as a controlled phenomenon.
Therefore, it is not possible in practice to be involved in a closed causal
chain while remembering what occurred at a later time (no information can
be transferred from the future toward the past), even if this restriction does
not affect the possibility for microscopic systems to be involved in such causal
chains, as long as global consistency is preserved (I will explain in section 8
how this condition is enforced at the fundamental level). This means that
so-called ‘knowledge’ paradoxes are also unlikely to occur. It was suggested
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in effect that if time travel was possible there could arise situations where
some valuable piece of information (say a beautiful treatise about the physics
of time directionality) would be brought from the future that would not
have existed before it arrived from that future, but which would nevertheless
become available as a result of the process, so that it can later be brought
back to the present, thereby raising questions as to its origin. But given
that what would be required for such a paradox to occur is a sustained
local decrease of entropy toward the future, then it follows that the creation
of information out of nothing in such a way would be as unlikely as the
possibility that it materializes out of chaos by pure chance alone, which again
is not fundamentally impossible, but merely ridiculously unlikely. Thus, from
my viewpoint, despite the fact that backward causation is allowed to occur it
is not possible for information to be created out of nothing, which certainly
agrees with what I have written concerning the conservation of information
in chapters 2 and 3 of [1].
It is, therefore, possible to understand that even in the absence of closed
causal chains what prevents violations of the classical, unidirectional principle
of causality is actually the global entanglement constraint that restricts the
growth of entropy in the past direction of time and this is clearly a constraint
of irreversibility that is not imposed at a fundamental level, but that emerges
from the particular boundary conditions which apply to the initial Big Bang
state. The frequently encountered remark to the effect that objects can move
in any direction of space, but not in any direction of time (at least when
they are restricted to not move faster than light particles in a vacuum),
is only true in the sense that it is not possible to reverse a macroscopic
system’s thermodynamic arrow of time; it does not mean that an object
cannot propagate backward in time under appropriate conditions. If it was
not for the constraint that is responsible for the diminution of entropy in the
past, all evolution would be symmetric with respect to the direction of time
at all levels and there would be no way for information to flow from either
the past or the future, as all systems would remain in a state of thermal
equilibrium (if that was possible) and no record making process would ever
be allowed to take place. Only under such conditions would it be possible
to directly appreciate the fact that the future is not fundamentally different
from the past.
What is important to understand is that not only would entropy be
observed to decrease in the future during a hypothetical time travel phe-
nomenon (which would require it to increase in the past), but the process
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would remain observable all along as an entropy diminishing process taking
place forward in time, even after a hypothetical time travel paradox would
have been produced. Indeed, an observer which would be evolving backward
in time from a thermodynamic viewpoint would still be causally influenced
by the events taking place at the moment of unidirectional time which would
appear to him as the present, so that he would again observe the same se-
quence of events (even though from a different perspective) as when he was
evolving as a normal observer, but in the reverse order. Therefore, it would
be impossible to assume that the process did not occur, once it would have
actually exerted its influence on the past. It just cannot be assumed that the
future would be changed at the precise moment when a time travel paradox
would have occurred if this change does in effect arise as a consequence of an
influence of the future on the past.
What makes the paradoxes themselves impossible, however, is not the re-
quirement of entropy growth in the past, but the very same constraints that
would forbid the occurrence of a contradiction from a fundamental viewpoint,
as when elementary particles are propagating backward in time without be-
ing involved in anti-thermodynamic evolution. In this particular sense it is
true that the problem of time travel can be fully resolved only in a quan-
tum mechanical context, but as I previously indicated (and for reasons that
will be discussed only later) this does not mean that one must invoke the
hypothetical splitting branches of a many-wolds interpretation of quantum
theory. In any case, it is now possible to appreciate that what makes time
travel itself impossible is not the fact that it may allow forbidden contradic-
tions to occur, but really the improbability of observing processes for which
entropy decreases in the future.
But, even if one was allowed to travel back in time as a result of a phe-
nomenal fluctuation, one would not be allowed to alter one’s own future
when one would resume normal forward in time evolution, even if that is
unexpected from our everyday viewpoint. Even under such conditions there
would necessarily occur events that would enforce global consistency and this
would happen despite the fact that under normal conditions we seem to be
free to modify the future at will. It is simply the fact that we are used to
experience the future as unknowable in advance that explains that it appears
doubtful that we would not be able to alter the course of reality3. We usually
3In order to understand how global consistency can be obeyed even under such circum-
stances it may help to notice that if knowledge about some future was to become available
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have no factual knowledge about the future and this is why we never run into
the possibility of making a decision that would alter a known fact about the
future. The global consistency requirement appears to have unexpected con-
sequences merely because we are not used to experience a reality in which we
would have available information about what has not yet occurred. We are
accustomed to observe that present actions exert an influence on the prob-
ability that such or such a future occurs, but this is only a reflection of the
fact that there exist correlations between the past and the future which are
the result of both forward and backward in time propagated influences and
it does not mean that the future is not unique. It is merely the fact that all
possibilities are usually allowed for the future, while only a subset of them is
allowed for the past (as a result of the constraint of entropy diminution) that
justifies the impression we all share of being able to exert a certain control
over the future which does not apply for the past.
From a fundamental viewpoint the future is not different from the past
(even if it cannot be determined in advance) and we do know that the past
cannot be changed from what it already is. If we are not used to remember
the future and if we are never confronted with the limitations to free-will
which exist as a result of the global consistency requirement it is simply due
to the fact that information does not usually flow from the future toward
the past. This is probably the most important lesson that can be learned
from the study of hypothetical time travel experiences in the context of time-
symmetric causality: we are causally related to one unique past. But this is
also true for the future. We live in an unpredictable universe and while it
is certainly true that what we choose to do now has an effect on what will
happen tomorrow, based on the most rational explanation of both classical
and quantum mechanical phenomena it is necessary to recognize that we are
causally related to only one such future and even if we were to obtain in
advance knowledge about what this unique future actually is, events would
have to unfold in such a way that the consistency of history would remain
inviolable.
to a given observer, a prediction of her actions would have to take into account the fact
that the prediction itself can influence the outcome.
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5 Advanced waves and time asymmetry
Since Maxwell introduced his electromagnetic wave equations more than a
hundred fifty years ago it has been known that there exist both retarded and
advanced solutions to those equations (this is equivalent to say that Maxwell’s
equations do not distinguish the future from the past). The retarded solutions
describe the propagation of positive energy electromagnetic waves leaving a
point source and spreading into a growing volume of space as time passes.
The usually rejected advanced solutions, on the other hand, would describe
the propagation of electromagnetic waves of opposite energy sign leaving
a point source and spreading into a growing volume of space in the past
direction of time. This is usually described as the hypothetical phenomenon
of a spherical and concentric positive energy light wave converging on a point
source in the future direction of time4. From this equivalent viewpoint it is
obvious that the advanced solutions represent a kind of process that cannot
occur, as from the unidirectional time viewpoint one never observes light
waves, or indeed any kind of waves, converging on a ‘source’ just to be
absorbed by this source.
But while this observation reassures our commonsense expectations, the
fact that the phenomenon described here never occurs, while there is no a
priori reason why it couldn’t happen, still constitutes a profound mystery
from a theoretical perspective. It is usually recognized, in effect, that if a
valid theory describes a certain phenomenon and there is no good motive
to assume that this phenomenon should be forbidden, then its occurrence is
compulsory. It is not enough to argue that what prevents the hypothetical
phenomenon of a radio wave produced by multiple sources in the environ-
ment converging in perfect spherical symmetry and with perfectly correlated
phases onto a transmitter where it would be absorbed, is the unlikeliness
of the phenomenon, because as I emphasized in chapter 3 of my preceding
report this is precisely what we ‘observe’ to occur in the past direction of
time and this evolution is clearly not the outcome of the singular nature of
present conditions. Given arbitrary initial conditions what we should expect
to observe are waves that would be diverging in the past, just like they do
4The positive value of the energy of this converging wave, which allows the ‘source’ to
gain energy as a result of the absorption process, arises from the fact that, as I explained in
[1], a negative energy photon propagating backward in time is always observed as a positive
energy photon propagating forward in time, while a negative energy photon propagating
forward in time would not even be allowed to interact with ordinary matter.
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in the future, because this is in fact the most likely evolution when only the
present conditions are fixed, even if from the unidirectional time viewpoint
such a process would appear unlikely.
If it is considered natural for certain electromagnetic waves to spread
outward in the future, despite the fact that this means that they converge
on their source in the past, then it should naturally be expected that certain
electromagnetic waves would spread outward in the past, even if that means
they would converge on their source in the future. Therefore, what remains
unexplained is the asymmetry of the situation in which waves do not spread
outward in the past while they do so in the future of some arbitrarily chosen
initial state. The problem discussed here is all the more significant given that
it is not restricted to Maxwell’s theory. Indeed, there exist advanced solutions
to all relativistically invariant wave equations, including the equation that
describes the propagation of electrons in quantum field theory.
Once again this is a problem that Feynman visited, but apparently failed
to solve. What he and John Wheeler proposed was a theory [5] that would
have allowed advanced electromagnetic waves to be produced on an equal ba-
sis with retarded waves, but to be canceled out through destructive interfer-
ence, as a consequence of the difference in opacity that seems to characterize
the far past and the far future of our universe. According to this model, re-
tarded and advanced electromagnetic waves are always produced together in
equal proportions and propagate in the future and the past respectively. But
when the retarded wave is absorbed in the future the absorbing process itself
triggers the emission of an additional retarded wave of identical amplitude
which is completely out of phase with the original retarded wave, thereby
erasing all traces of this additional retarded wave. At the same time the ab-
sorber also produces an advanced wave and if certain conditions are met this
advanced wave only serves to strengthen the retarded wave produced by the
source through constructive interference, while it also conspires to cancel out
the advanced wave originally emitted by the same source through destructive
interference, which may allow to explain the fact that it is not observed. The
problem is that this theory requires that there is more absorption in the fu-
ture than in the past, while that would appear unlikely in the context where
the universe is expanding in the future direction of time.
Other theories based on similar assumptions (see for example [6, 7, 8]) and
which tried to overcome the problems encountered by Feynman and Wheeler
through various alternative hypotheses (for example by assuming that the
Big Bang acts as a reflector of all advanced radiation) have apparently also
31
failed to produce a satisfactory solution to the problem of advanced waves. It
seems that whenever it is not independently assumed that for some unknown
reason a fundamental asymmetry exists in the interaction of matter with ra-
diation that would differentiate the far past from the far future, the desired
outcome is never obtained. In other words, the only way to reproduce the ob-
served time asymmetry that characterizes wavelike processes in our universe
using such a model is by postulating that some asymmetry exists which is
responsible for reducing or increasing the amount of interference that takes
place either in the past or in the future. But given that no convincing expla-
nation exists that would justify this assumption, then it is apparent that it
merely amounts to assume the very outcome we would like to explain. From
the difficulties encountered with this kind of approach it has become pretty
clear that it is not possible to explain the absence of advanced waves as being
a mere consequence of hypothetical interference effects.
I was only able to understand what explains the absence of advanced
waves when I began considering the quantum aspect of this hypothetical
phenomenon. Indeed, I already knew that backward in time propagation
was possible for elementary particles and therefore it seemed to me that
what was not allowed was not really backward propagation itself, but merely
the spreading of a backward propagating wave into an increasingly larger re-
gion of space. I also knew that there was a requirement, imposed by the con-
straint of global entanglement which I had recently uncovered, that backward
in time evolution be such that it gives rise to a continuous decrease of grav-
itational entropy in the past. But, as elegantly explained by Olivier Costa
de Beauregard [9], there is a certain equivalence between entropy increase
and wave retardation which is implied by Planck’s definition of entropy and
which arises from the quantized nature of electromagnetic radiation. Thus,
in a quantum mechanical context, entropy necessarily rises when an electro-
magnetic wave spreads into a larger volume of space, because at any given
time the photons associated with an expanding wave front can be detected
anywhere on its growing surface. In fact, given that from the viewpoint
of relativistic quantum field theory any wavelike phenomenon is associated
with the propagation of some elementary particle, it follows that entropy
increase is always associated with wave retardation, while the observation
of advanced waves would always imply that a decrease of entropy has taken
place in the future direction of time. From my bidirectional time viewpoint
this is equivalent to say that entropy would need to increase in the past for
an advanced wave to spread as it propagates backward. But this is precisely
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what is forbidden by the constraint which I previously identified as being
responsible for thermodynamic time asymmetry.
What is also unexpected from a thermodynamic viewpoint is the fact
that from the unidirectional time viewpoint the existence of advanced waves
would seem to allow work to be generated out of nothing, when radiative
energy would converge on a ‘source’. But the existence of advanced waves
would also make possible the transmission of information from the present or
the future toward the past. It is natural to expect, therefore, that this kind
of process should be prevented from occurring by the same condition that
explains thermodynamic time asymmetry. It must be clear, however, that
simply invoking the classical (unidirectional) principle of causality does not
allow to solve the problem of the absence of advanced waves, because, in the
above discussed context, saying that there always exists a unique preferred
direction in time for the propagation of effects merely amounts to restate
the problem of advanced waves (which is also known as the problem of the
electromagnetic arrow of time) without explaining why such a restriction
is indeed observed to apply. In fact, the previously discussed phenomenon
of time travel, as I have redefined it, would be one particular instance of
backward in time communication of the kind that would be allowed by the
existence of advanced electromagnetic waves and therefore a solution to the
problem of advanced waves would definitely rule out time travel.
Now, I mentioned in section 3 that the causal structure of spacetime is
not incompatible with the concept of backward in time causation, given that
with every event is associated both a future and a past light cone, which
reflect the existence of a speed limit imposed on the propagation of causal
signals in either the future or the past. But it should also be clear by now
that there is a difference between the kind of backward in time causation
that may occur as a consequence of the propagation of an elementary particle
backward in time and the kind of causality we experience in a purely classical
context and which is known to operate only forward in time. Thus, while
it is not observationally forbidden for an electron to propagate backward in
time, an explanation of cosmological time asymmetry based on the global
entanglement constraint would not allow this propagation to occur in such
a way that the area over which the electron could potentially be found to
be at an earlier time would be growing continuously along with the two-
dimensional boundary of the past light cone. But this is precisely the kind of
evolution that an advanced wave would describe from a quantum mechanical
viewpoint and therefore what explains that advanced waves are absent is the
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constraint of global entanglement I have identified in section 3.9 of [1], which
enforces a continuous decrease of entropy in the past, as a consequence of the
requirement that there exist causal relationships between all the elementary
particles which are present in the expanding universe.
Our failure to observe advanced waves must not, therefore, be interpreted
as an indication that backward in time propagation, or backward in time
causation are forbidden, but rather as evidence that only a small subset
of potentially available states is available as ‘final’ conditions for backward
propagating particles. This means that the statistical predictions obtained
using quantum theory for the evolution of a large number of identically pre-
pared physical systems are not valid in the past direction of time and this
is what explains that electromagnetic waves, as particular instances of wave
functions, are never observed in their advanced form.
In such a context it becomes apparent that the only true virtue of the
Feynman-Wheeler absorber theory (aside from the fact that it was one of the
first models which actually took the problem of advanced waves seriously)
is that it sought to deduce the absence of advanced waves from boundary
conditions imposed on the universe at large, instead of requiring that time-
asymmetry be imposed at a fundamental level, which could only be satisfied
by assuming that backward in time propagation is impossible. In any case,
even if absorber theory had conveniently solved the problem of advanced
waves, this solution would have remained problematic, because it would not
have allowed to explain the origin of thermodynamic time asymmetry in a
more general context (when quantum interferences are absent). From my
viewpoint the fact that there also exist advanced solutions to Dirac’s rela-
tivistic equation for the electron allows to confirm the validity of the con-
clusion that the absence of advanced waves does not preclude backward in
time propagation, because, while it is not possible to assess whether a given
photon propagates forward or backward in time, in the case of electrons
it is possible to differentiate a forward in time propagating particle from a
backward in time propagating particle, given that from a unidirectional time
perspective such an electron is observed as a positron with its positive electric
charge. Therefore, if we do observe positrons it means that the irrelevance
of advanced solutions cannot arise from the unphysical nature of backward
in time propagating particles and must in effect be the outcome of the global
entanglement constraint.
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6 Early interpretations
To begin the portion of this report that deals with quantum aspects of reality
more specifically I would like to first describe what constitutes the distinctive
characteristic of the revised interpretation of quantum theory I will propose.
What I had already understood, even before I was able to solve the problem
of advanced waves, is that the processes that constitute the essence of our
experience of reality are all mirrored by similar processes which obey the
same observable macroscopic conditions, but which take place once again in
the opposite chronological order in a portion of history that must be assumed
independent from the viewpoint of local causality. The hypothesis that his-
tory does not occur only once, but must happen a second time in the reverse
order may appear arbitrary and unnecessary given that we know of only one
history, but, as I will explain, this proposition is actually made unavoidable
by some of the most fundamental principles of physics and also reflects the
basic mathematical structure of quantum theory. Even though I was not
motivated only by the desire to produce a time-symmetric theory when I
began developing this original approach, the final outcome does share a cer-
tain property of time symmetry with some early interpretations of quantum
theory which are based on the hypothesis that there must be an equivalence
between initial and final conditions.
Given that most of those early time-symmetric interpretations constitute
more or less elaborate (and more or less inappropriate) quantum versions
of the original absorber theory discussed in the preceding section, then one
may say that absorber theory is their common ancestor. In this respect it
is apparent that those time-symmetric quantum theories also share some of
the above discussed weaknesses of the original, classical theory. I believe
that part of what explains that this kind of approach is usually considered to
have failed to produce a consistent interpretation of quantum theory, despite
the many advantages it offers (and which will be discussed below), is the
fact that absorber theory itself is considered a failure. As a result, many
generations of physicists were inoculated against time-symmetric approaches
in general, even though a few well-informed specialists have recognized that
the requirement of time symmetry is essential to a consistent interpretation
of quantum theory. But it is also clear that this is not the only reason
why the early attempts at formulating a time-symmetric version of quantum
theory did not succeed, because, as I came to understand, they also contain
hypotheses and constructs that make them inconsistent and inadequate as a
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representation of quantum reality.
One of the first interpretation of quantum theory that sought to accommo-
date the requirement of time symmetry was that proposed by John Cramer
[10] as an outcome of his work on the problem of advanced waves. As such, it
contains hypotheses which are very similar to those of the original absorber
theory which I have identified as problematic. But its most important defect
in my opinion is that, despite the fact that it is proposed as an alternative
time-symmetric model, it actually involves a fundamental time asymmetry
that is incompatible with this basic requirement. What Cramer proposed,
basically, was that a kind of ‘handshake’ process takes place whenever a quan-
tum particle is emitted by a source and then propagates a certain distance
before being absorbed by a detector. We may consider, for example, the
traditional double slit experiment in which a particle must go from source
to detector by passing through the slits. It is known that an accurate esti-
mation of the probability for such a process to occur must take into account
the existence of interferences between the individual probability amplitudes
associated with each of the paths through which the particle is allowed to go
whenever both slits are open.
What Cramer’s handshake process involves is the emission of a classical
wave acting as an ‘offer’, which is assumed to be sent by the source forward in
time and which is allowed to propagate without constraint (it is assumed to
go through both slits all at once), followed by the production of another such
wave that would constitute its ‘confirmation’ and which would be sent by the
detector backward in time (toward the initial emission event) upon absorp-
tion of the offer wave. The most problematic aspect of this description from
my viewpoint is the fact that the confirmation wave must follow an evolution
that is restricted to be compatible with the macroscopic constraints which
would have existed if the particle (not the offer wave) had been restricted
to follow the unique classical path it is assumed to actually have taken as it
propagated forward in time (the confirmation wave only comes back through
one of the two open slits)5.
It is difficult to see how the advanced wave could be submitted to macro-
scopic constraints which differ from those that apply to the retarded wave
in the context where the observed macroscopic conditions of the experiment
5In fact, Cramer assumes that this handshake is actually repeated several times for any
single quantum process and is responsible for the transfer of energy and other conserved
quantities which take place during the process, but we may ignore this problematic aspect
of the handshake process if it simplifies the discussion.
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are fixed once and for all. But what is even more incomprehensible with this
interpretation is that the evolution of the ‘confirmation’ wave is actually re-
quired to reflect the fact that the particle took a certain path (say the upper
slit), while the evolution of the ‘offer’ wave would not be allowed to reflect
the same fact (passage through both slits would initially be allowed). This
is how time asymmetry is reintroduced in the model as a means to allow a
unique, classically well-defined history to correspond with the process, de-
spite the fact that the statistics of this quantum process can only be explained
by assuming that the particle is not restricted to follow a unique path. Of
course, even if those problems did not exist, there would still be a difficulty
associated with the fact that this approach requires the existence of both
classical waves and classical particles (constrained to follow unique trajecto-
ries by those classical waves), while it is known that both concepts (which
are shared by certain classical hidden variables theories) are problematic in
quantum field theory.
I believe that the source of the problems affecting Cramer’s transactional
interpretation of quantum theory is to be found in the fact that it assumes
that the retarded and advanced waves are actually propagating in the same
portion of history, because this is why it needs to be required that the quan-
tum particle submitted to the constraint of those classical waves goes through
only one slit, corresponding to this unique history, which in turn requires a
certain fundamental temporal asymmetry to be introduced in the theory, in
violation of the time-symmetric nature of its equations. Also, the fact that,
as a particular instance of (quantum mechanical) absorber theory, Cramer’s
framework appears to require genuine wave emission and absorption to take
place in the course of all quantum processes, may be problematic, because
there are situations where quantum measurements are performed without in-
teraction. Those difficulties are more significant than the additional problem
that would arise in the context where it is not obvious from the viewpoint
of Cramer’s theory when it is exactly that the handshake would be initiated
while the particle is propagating along its classical path.
Indeed, if the handshake was to be completed when the particle reaches
one of the two open slits, then the process would always be that which we
expect to occur when one is allowed to observe through which slit the parti-
cle goes and under such conditions the particle would follow a quasiclassical
trajectory (interferences would be absent), which is contrary to observation.
Thus, there may be a difficulty associated with the apparent arbitrariness of
the choice of which macroscopic conditions are necessary to trigger a hand-
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shake (do we have to wait for an observer to become aware of the outcome
as John Von Neumann once proposed?). But this is in fact the same quan-
tum measurement problem as may affect a more traditional interpretation
and therefore we are allowed to assume that any solution to this problem
that would be proposed in a more conventional context would also apply to
the transactional interpretation. This is an important point, because this
difficulty is sometimes proposed as an argument against all time-symmetric
approaches to quantum theory, while when it is properly understood it no
longer stands out as a problem that is specific to time-symmetric models. Of
course it would not be appropriate either to assume that Cramer’s theory is
equivalent to standard quantum theory, as its author suggested, because or-
dinary quantum mechanics does not explicitly involve advanced waves, while
they are required to exist by the transactional interpretation. In fact, when
the inadequacy of the boundary conditions that give rise to the destructive
interference effects that would allow advanced waves to go unnoticed is rec-
ognized, the theory no longer even agrees with observation, which certainly
makes it different from standard quantum mechanics.
What I’m suggesting that we retain from those alternative, semi-classical
interpretations is the notion that the squaring of the wave function which al-
lows to obtain the probability of a process is made necessary as a consequence
of the fact that, somehow, two histories are involved in any quantum process.
I believe that this is what explains that it is merely by multiplying the prob-
ability amplitudes associated with each of those paired processes that we can
obtain (under appropriate conditions) the probability for the entire process
to occur. Indeed, the squaring of the wave function (which is necessary to
obtain the probability of a process) involves taking the complex conjugate
of the probability amplitude associated with one history before multiplying
it with the probability amplitude associated with another history and it is
known that taking the complex conjugate is equivalent to reversing the di-
rection of time for those equations that describe the changes taking place in
the quantum state of a system.
Therefore, one of the most basic aspects of the mathematical framework
of quantum theory already contains in embryonic form the requirement that
each process be described as a history that unfolds forward and then back-
ward in time for some mysterious reason. This otherwise puzzling require-
ment has been transformed by modern interpretations into a condition, im-
posed (without any real justification) on certain pairs of minimally coarse-
grained histories, that they provide the probability of occurrence of a ‘consis-
38
tent’ history, but in the process it seems that the most important aspect of
this requirement, which is the fact that the two histories forming such pairs
take place in opposite directions of time, was lost and with it the important
insight we should have learned from early time-symmetric interpretations of
quantum theory.
At this point it is important to mention that a more pragmatic approach
to achieve symmetry with respect to the direction of time in quantum me-
chanics had already been proposed by Aharonov, Bergmann and Lebowitz
[11] (see also [12] for a more recent review) long before Cramer introduced
his transactional interpretation. Unlike the transactional interpretation this
formulation of quantum mechanics really is mathematically equivalent to
the standard theory, but it does not seek to explain the time asymmetry of
boundary conditions and merely suggests that two state vectors are required
to describe the state of a quantum system. One state vector contains all
the information obtained from past measurements (as in the standard inter-
pretation) and the other contains all the information that will be obtained
concerning the same system in the future. Between measurements those two
state vectors follow a ‘unitary’ evolution toward the future and toward the
past respectively6. What this means is that there is no longer a preference
for the past over the future in determining the current state of a system (a
system can be submitted to both pre- and post selection, although the post
selection is only apparent after a future measurement has actually been per-
formed). Of course there is a natural reluctance to recognize that it might be
possible for a state vector to be determined by what ‘happened’ in the future
instead of what happened in the past, but this is merely a consequence of the
previously discussed prejudice toward a unidirectional conception of causal-
ity which we inherited from our thermodynamically constrained experience
of reality and does not rest on any rationally formulated argument.
It must be clear that despite the equivalence between the two-state vec-
tor formalism and standard quantum theory, it has been shown that post
selection, or the effect of a future measurement on the past state of a system,
is not an optional feature of quantum theory, but arises even in the sim-
plest and most conventional of quantum mechanical experiments. Indeed, in
6I use the term ‘unitary’ to denote the deterministic evolution of the wave function or
state vector that takes place in the absence of a change in the observational constraints
applied on a quantum system, because using the term ‘deterministic’ would be misleading
in the context where I will argue that the evolution of the system itself always takes place
randomly.
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certain interferometer experiments which bear enormous resemblance to the
classical double slit experiment and which will be discussed in section 9, the
choice of performing either a measurement that determines through which
path a photon went on its way to the detector, or a measurement that reveals
the quantum interferences attributable to the presence of two possible paths
can be delayed to long after the particle has actually traveled most of the
distance to the detector and it does in effect influence what the particle did
back when it was just leaving the source. The reality of such post selection
effects has therefore been experimentally confirmed and contrarily to what
is sometimes suggested it is not possible to assume that no post selection
occurs as long as we reject a realist interpretation of quantum phenomena
(because it is not possible to reject such an interpretation, as I will explain
later). Thus, somehow, the path taken by a photon can be influenced by a
measurement that takes place long after the actual process is over7. Only a
time-symmetric approach to quantum theory that recognizes the existence
of a backward evolving state allows to explain those facts while remaining
within the confines of the principle of local causality.
Now, even though some of the originators of the two-state vector formu-
lation of quantum theory are hesitant to assume the reality of the backward
evolving state that enters the formalism, it is clearly possible to assume that
we are indeed dealing with a distinct state that evolves somewhat indepen-
dently from the forward propagating state, but which is subjected to the
same macroscopic experimental conditions. What I’m proposing is that in
order to go beyond early time-symmetric models one must in effect recognize
that a whole history unfolds backward in time, whose elements are not in
causal contact with those of the history that unfolds forward in time. Indeed,
I believe that in order to accommodate the requirement of time symmetry it
is not enough to assume that semi-classical waves are propagating backward
in time in the same portion of history, because, as I have already explained,
advanced waves are forbidden to exist by the constraint of global entangle-
ment that gives rise to time asymmetry in our universe. The problem here
usually is that, even though two kinds of Schro¨dinger equation appear to
exist which would allow to describe the propagation of the wave function in
7It should be clear that I’m not suggesting that post selection would allow information
to flow from the future, or that it would allow one to change an observable fact from the
past which has already been established. For reasons I have already mentioned, backward
causation, as would occur in the context of a consistent time-symmetric interpretation of
quantum theory, is incompatible with both of those conclusions.
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either the future or the past, only the equation that describes the evolution
of the retarded portion of the wave function is retained given that retarded
waves are the only ones which are allowed to evolve without constraint and
this is why it is usually considered appropriate to take into account only the
state vector that evolves forward in time in order to obtain the probability of
a whole process, even if this process may actually involve a pair of histories
occurring in opposite chronological orders.
But once it is understood that this limitation is not a fundamental prop-
erty of the wave function itself, but arises as a consequence of the requirement
of diminishing entropy imposed on all past evolution by the global entangle-
ment constraint that applies to the initial Big Bang state, then the two-state
vector formalism becomes not only acceptable (as it does not require the
existence of advanced waves), but actually essential to accommodate time
symmetry in a quantum mechanical context. In fact, given that the direc-
tion of time in which any process unfolds is a relatively defined property, the
state vector that is determined by future measurement conditions (the post-
selected state vector) could also be considered, as a matter of convention,
to be that which was determined by past conditions, while the state vector
which would otherwise be assumed to be determined by past measurement
conditions (the ordinary state vector) may be considered as that which actu-
ally evolves back in time ‘after’ having been determined by future conditions,
as long as the other state vector is in effect assumed to be that which evolves
forward in time. Therefore, we would not be better off by assuming that
only past conditions can determine the evolution of the state vector, because
this could also be understood to mean that only future conditions can deter-
mine the same evolution, which would be an even worse conclusion from a
conventional perspective.
I may add that an explanation of thermodynamic time asymmetry of
the kind I have proposed in section 3.9 of [1] does not only render plausible
the hypothesis that every quantum process is complemented by a backward
evolving counterpart, but actually seems to require the existence of two his-
tories evolving in opposite chronological order, because otherwise it would
be difficult to explain what enforces the then unique, classical history, which
we are free to consider as evolving toward the past, to take place with con-
tinuously decreasing entropy. But once it is recognized that there necessarily
exists at least one history that unfolds from the past toward the future (as
one needs to assume in the context of a time-symmetric interpretation), then
it becomes possible to explain the thermodynamic arrow of time as being the
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consequence of the initial condition of low gravitational entropy imposed on
the initial Big Bang state by the global entanglement constraint, because the
evolution of at least one state vector is then determined by past conditions.
In fact, this is a general requirement that would apply to all processes in
the context where global consistency is required, because from a quantum
mechanical viewpoint the consistency of past events with future events can
only be fulfilled when those future events are also allowed to influence past
events, as I will explain in section 12.
Once this is understood it is easy to see how a relativistically invari-
ant model based on the sum-over-histories approach can be formulated that
embodies the explicit time symmetry of the two-state vector formalism by
assuming that every quantum process involves both a conventional history
(evolving without apparent constraint in the future direction of time) and
a possibly distinct time-reversed history evolving independently (from the
viewpoint of local causality) toward a state of lower entropy in the past di-
rection of time. This is an issue I will discuss more specifically in section 8,
but before I can do that I must first explain why it is that a model involving
two unique, but partly unobservable histories unfolding in opposite directions
of time (instead of two wave functions propagating in opposite directions of
time) is not merely possible, but actually constitutes an essential require-
ment of a fully consistent realist interpretation of quantum theory, despite
the fact that what is usually assumed to be required in order to obtain the
appropriate statistics is that all possible paths are followed all at once in one
single portion of history for any given process.
7 The constraint of scientific realism
It has often been argued that the counterintuitive aspect of quantum theory
is not a real problem and merely indicates that there is a limit to what one
can intuitively understand. It would then be incorrect to assume that the
fact that there appears to be something incomprehensible with the current
interpretation of the theory is due to the inadequacy of this interpretation.
I would like to suggest, however, that this argument is invalid. In order
to see what is wrong with this long-standing viewpoint let’s first suppose
that we humans are in effect too dumb to understand quantum theory. The
argument would then be that only some artificial superintelligence from the
future would eventually be able to overcome those limitations and to properly
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understand the significance of the empirically derived mathematical frame-
work of quantum theory. Such a superintelligence would therefore succeed
at gaining a proper understanding of physical reality in a way that is simply
impossible for us to achieve due to the inherent limitations of our primitive
intellect. But what does that mean in concrete terms?
When you carefully think about this question it becomes obvious that
the only thing that could happen is that this superintelligence would then
have developed a better interpretation of quantum theory, because if the
current mathematical framework is in effect appropriate to describe physical
reality, then the only progress that could be achieved would have to arise
at the level of interpretation. You do not have to be superintelligent to
understand that and yet this is precisely what we fail to take into account
when we suggest that the problem we experience while trying to make sense
of quantum theory merely reflects the fact that it is not possible for our
brains to understand the theory. I believe that the lack of intelligibility of
our current understanding of quantum theory is not a fantastic new property
of the universe which we happen to have discovered. It is a failure that
originates in the inappropriateness of the current interpretation and if this
difficulty may be a consequence of the inadequacy of certain concepts we
inherited from our human experience of the world, it is also a problem that
can be solved using our human intellect, as long as we do recognize that there
is indeed a problem and that it deserves our attention. But those who still
doubt the importance of a proper interpretation of quantum theory should
take notice of the fact that without interpretation it would not even be clear
that the theory is about probabilities of measurement outcomes, as this is
indeed an aspect that only came to be understood after the mathematics of
the theory (regarding the Schro¨dinger formulation in particular) had already
been developed.
Now, it must be clear that quantum theory is in effect counterintuitive
and that it cannot be reduced to a classical view of the world by using the
freedom we may have to interpret experimental facts and the current math-
ematical framework of the theory. Physical reality cannot be such as it was
conceived at the epoch of Isaac Newton. Classical waves (which are not
mere manifestations of quantum interference) and classical particles (which
would allow violations of the constraints imposed by the uncertainty princi-
ple) are gone and they will never form part of a consistent theory about the
fundamental structure of reality ever again. But that does not mean that
everything else is possible. What is not allowed of a rational understanding
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of physical reality is inconsistency. The problem is that all known inter-
pretations of quantum theory do contain inconsistencies. Thus, either they
contradict themselves, or else they do not agree with certain facts concerning
that portion of reality which can be directly observed. This is usually under-
stood by well-informed authors who recognize that the best that we can do
in the present context is to pick as our necessarily inaccurate standpoint the
interpretation which may be the least problematic for the kind of problem
we are working on.
What I have come to realize is that while some new conceptual elements
(which have never been considered before) are necessary to formulate a fully
consistent, but straightforward interpretation of quantum theory (which ac-
tually constitutes a more accurate theory), it is also necessary to reject many
of the outlandish concepts that came to be associated with a quantum me-
chanical description of reality. Thus, I believe that the concept of history or
the concept of reality itself must be simplified to once again be allowed to
agree with the most basic empirical evidence, concerning in particular the
uniqueness of facts and the particle nature of physical reality. The problem
here is that it is often believed that the notion of an elementary particle
propagating along a unique trajectory is incompatible with the ‘complexity’
which characterizes the quantum state of a system. But, as best understood
by Richard Feynman, given the right formulation of quantum theory, not
only is it unnecessary to reject the existence of elementary particles, or even
to deny the relevance of the concept of trajectory, but it becomes imperative
to recognize that those concepts actually form the substance of reality at the
level where we are currently allowed to perform experiments.
I think that it is important to emphasize, therefore, that even though
common sense is not always a good guide for judging the validity of a phys-
ical theory, as the development of quantum mechanics itself illustrates, it
would not be wise to conclude from this that more intuitive models are in-
appropriate and are necessarily ruled out by the apparent awkwardness of
experimental facts, or that our direct experience of reality is irrelevant as
a guide for elaborating a consistent interpretation of quantum theory. We
must keep in mind that classical physics itself once involved quite unintuitive
concepts which turned out to be inappropriate, like action at a distance, or
which are fully explainable only in the context of a more adequate quantum
mechanical description of reality, like the principle of least action. Thus, I
believe that, in the end, quantum reality will not be more difficult to visu-
alize than classical reality, but will rather be more comprehensible, because
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it will be more consistent from a logical viewpoint. In any case, I believe
that I’m justified in adopting a more intuitive approach given that the per-
sistent problems which we are dealing with here have to do precisely with
the apparent impossibility to provide a consistent, but also understandable
representation of reality. However, instead of entering into a sterile debate
about which of the ontological or the epistemological viewpoint8 constitutes
a better approach to interpret quantum theory, I will concentrate on explain-
ing what the elements of an empirically accurate approach actually are that
allow to reach consistency with the least amount of arbitrary hypotheses (I
believe one does not need any).
To begin this discussion it would be appropriate to point out that the
most radical of those deficient approaches which were once proposed in order
to make sense of quantum theory is certainly that which is called quantum
logic. It was suggested, in effect, that the logic that applies to physical reality
may not be the ordinary Boolean logic with which we interpret ordinary facts,
but some alternative logic emerging from the apparently contradictory nature
of certain conclusions made on the basis of a strict adherence to the rules
which govern quantum reality. But while it is now recognized that such an
approach would go too far as a tentative to adapt our mode of thinking to
the reality of the quantum world, the fact that at a certain epoch quantum
logic was considered to constitute a viable candidate for a solution to the
problem of interpretation is quite indicative, I believe, of the extent to which
we have deviated from the true objective of science, which is to understand
facts by adapting and generalizing our physical laws and concepts to fit new
experimental facts, in order precisely to avoid having to change the rules of
logic with which we analyze and understand reality.
The best example of such an adaptation is of course the shift to Rie-
mannian spacetime that was brought about by relativity theory as a means
to retain the validity of the concept of space in view of the equivalence of
acceleration and gravitation. Indeed, if we were to reject Einstein’s theory
of gravitation, the only way we could retain the validity of the concept of
8The debate concerning interpretation has always centered around the problem of de-
ciding whether the wave function that allows to derive the quantum statistics of a process
is a real ‘entity’ or whether it merely provides the sum of all knowledge about what a
(real) system is doing, which I believe is pointless, as the wave function definitely is a
‘real’ aspect of reality, but it is an aspect that does in effect concern empirical knowledge.
The approach I will follow may actually be considered to allow a reconciliation of those
two apparently incompatible viewpoints.
45
physical space would be by altering the rules by which we formulate logical
arguments, such as would be necessary to argue that despite all the evidence
the Earth is flat. What the whole history of physics tells us is that it is always
appropriate to use logical coherence as a means to constrain our represen-
tations of reality and as a guide to assess the validity of our assumptions,
while the rules of logic themselves are rather like the rules of the game and
can only be altered at the expense of invalidating most of everything else we
have learned. But the mere fact that quantum logicians were never able to
dispense themselves from the need to use ordinary logic in order to reason
about their own alternative system is quite indicative of the failure of their
approach. I think that this is a particularly good example of the difficulties
which the currently favored interpretations of quantum theory are facing as
they stretch the notion of consistency while trying to adapt to some perceived
requirement of the mathematical framework of the theory, by going so far as
actually allowing for contradictory accounts of factual aspects of the world.
I will return to this question later in this section.
Not so long ago it was suggested that certain difficulties that emerged as
a result of the development of quantum field theory may indicate that the
concept of an elementary particle is no longer relevant to fundamental the-
oretical physics. One of those ‘difficulties’ would have to do with the fact
that, due to quantum uncertainty, particles can no longer be considered to
be localized in space, as would seem to be necessary for the particle concept
itself to make sense. Actually, in a relativistic context it seems that the
very fact that a particle is localized may depend on the state of motion of
the observer which is assessing this fact, given that a particle’s wavelength
varies as a function of its relative velocity. Another aspect of the quantum
mechanical description of reality which would appear to constitute a serious
challenge for the particle concept is quantum entanglement and the demon-
stration that what one particle does may under certain conditions depend
on what another particle is doing at the exact same time in a remote loca-
tion (relative to a given reference system), thereby apparently implying that
only the ensemble consisting of the two particles taken together has physical
significance. Finally, an additional difficulty arises from the fact that, due
to the fluctuating nature of the quantum vacuum, the very reality of a par-
ticle’s existence may be called into question, because, even in empty space,
particles would appear to be present. This problem is particularly severe
in the context of a semi-classical approach where the effects of acceleration
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and spacetime curvature on the quantum vacuum are taken into account and
the presence of real (observable) particles becomes an observer dependent
property.
While I will not immediately address the issue of quantum entanglement,
the conclusion I have reached is that, despite the difficulties mentioned here,
the elementary particle concept is still viable in quantum field theory. In the
reminder of this section I will provide arguments to the effect that a realist
description of physical processes based on the concept of particle trajectory
is still desirable even in the context where quantum interference involving
multiple position states must be assumed to constitute an essential aspect
of reality. What emerges from this reflection is that it might be incorrect to
suggest that particles cannot be localized in any way, because it may well be
that particles in a pure momentum state do follow unique, but unobservable
trajectories in a certain sense which is merely incompatible with the classical
concept of trajectory. In such a context the fact that the ‘wave packet’ which
is sometimes associated with the position state of a particle can be more or
less localized in space, depending on the state of motion of the observer which
measures this position, would not mean that a particle can actually be more
or less ‘real’, because such a variation would merely be a reflection of the
dependence of the macroscopic conditions which constrain the non-classical
trajectory of the particle on the choice of a particular reference system. But
a detailed description of the realist picture of quantum processes that allows
to articulate those considerations will only be provided in section 8. In any
case, I believe that the only real problem here is the general confusion that
surrounds the question of deciding what it is exactly that remains acceptable
about the particle concept in a quantum field theoretical context, because
all attempts at completely disposing of this essential concept have failed to
provide a sensible alternative conception of the nature of physical reality at
the most elementary level.
What I would like to immediately emphasize, though, is that in light of
the developments already introduced in chapter 1 of my preceding report
it is possible to conclude that vacuum fluctuations, far from constituting a
problem for the elementary particle concept, actually allow to provide a more
consistent definition of what a matter particle really is. Indeed, I have ex-
plained in [1] that positive energy bodies must be considered to arise from
an absence of negative energy in the fluctuating vacuum, that is to say, in
the distribution of virtual particles that contribute negatively to the maxi-
mum measure of vacuum energy density (while negative energy bodies arise
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from a similar absence of positive vacuum energy). It therefore appears that
the distinction between real particles and the virtual particles present in the
vacuum is not as significant as one might imagine, given that the presence
of real particles is actually equivalent to an absence of virtual particles in
the quantum vacuum. But it was also made very clear in section 3.7 of the
preceding report that despite the fluctuating nature of the vacuum there is
a clear distinction between matter (or radiation) energy and vacuum energy
which is reflected in the absence of contribution to gravitational entropy by a
uniform distribution of vacuum energy. On the basis of those developments it
becomes relatively straightforward to provide a clear and unambiguous defi-
nition of when it is that matter is present in a vacuum, that would also apply
for accelerating observers or in the presence of very strong local gravitational
fields (such as those present in the vicinity of a black hole) and therefore the
difficulties identified above would now appear to be rather insignificant.
But, in my opinion, one of the most powerful argument that can be used
to support the idea that the elementary particle concept still constitutes
a necessary and viable element of a consistent interpretation of quantum
theory (when it is allowed to obey the limitations imposed by the uncertainty
principle) is the observation that even in the context where it may seem to
be the least appropriate to hypothesize about the usefulness of elementary
particles, it nevertheless turns out that this assumption allows to explain in a
surprisingly simple way certain key aspects of the processes involved. What
I’m talking about is the use of virtual particles as the mediators of elementary
particle interactions. The fact that it would be very difficult to explain
certain properties of those interactions, like their range and their strength,
without assuming that the interactions themselves are actually mediated by
particles, even if those particles cannot have classically well-defined energy
states, is indicative of the usefulness and indeed of the necessity of assuming
that from a material perspective quantum fields actually consists of particles
that propagate between interaction events9.
The problem we may have in relation to this conclusion is that even if
particles do exist as real physical entities, then it would seem that it is not
possible to attribute a unique position state to those particles at all times
9Feynman himself insisted that the concept of an external field becomes relevant merely
in the context where the motion of a particle depends on a probability amplitude to
interact with the particles mediating this field that varies only with the particle’s position
at a certain time, as may arise when a large number of such interactions take place over
a relatively short period of time.
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in the context where it is known that many different trajectories must be
taken into account in order to obtain the right transition probability for
a particle in a given momentum eigenstate. This is why so many people
prefer to assume that the wave function, despite its immaterial nature, may
constitute reality itself; a hypothesis which raises difficulties of its own in
the context where it must be recognized that this reality would be submitted
by the act of measurement to discontinuous changes that may violate the
spirit of relativity theory and the principle of local causality. In any case,
it must be clear that the wavelike nature of quantum processes is simply a
consequence of the fact that the probability amplitudes that must be used
in the calculation of transition probabilities are subject to periodic evolution
and there is no sense in saying that a particle sometimes evolves as a particle
and sometimes as a wave, because the wavelike property is already well-
understood as being a property of processes which always involve particles
and the problem really has to do with the apparent impossibility to attribute
a definite location to those particles under general circumstances.
What I will explain, however, is that we have not yet exhausted all pos-
sibilities and that a realist interpretation of quantum theory that involves
elementary particles can still be formulated that would be compatible with
the current mathematical framework of quantum field theory (if we allow for
a slightly more elaborate particle concept, while still rejecting the contra-
dictory notion of wave-particle duality). I believe that it is indeed possible
to assume that a unique history of some kind is taking place even for what
regards the physical attribute of a system that is not under observation. This
is a conclusion that would obviously contradict the orthodox interpretation
of quantum theory, at least under its original form, given that according to
the conventional doctrine there is no sense in speaking about the state of
some physical attribute when no measurement has been effected to actually
determine what this state is at a given time. But if we recognize that the
elementary particle concept is essential to a consistent interpretation of quan-
tum theory then it seems that we have no choice but to recognize that the
current interpretation of the theory is incomplete, because it does not pro-
vide a clear and unambiguous description of what happens when the position
of such a system is not under direct observation. Of course certain modern
interpretations, such as the consistent histories interpretation of quantum
theory, go some way into providing a more realist picture of quantum phe-
nomena, but they also appear to be incomplete, given precisely that they
allow reality to be described only under particular circumstances, which are
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determined by a certain more or less arbitrary criterion of consistency and
also due to the fact that despite their more appropriate handling of the mea-
surement problem they still fail to explain the emergence and the persistence
of a quasiclassical world, as I will explain in section 10.
In the introduction to this report I mentioned that I believe that it is
essential to adopt a realist interpretation of quantum phenomena if we are
to avoid deviating into a solipsist and idealist view of reality according to
which nothing would really exist aside from your own mind (if that could
ever be found possible). This is particularly important in the context where
the only thing that may be considered undeniable about reality is precisely
that it is real. The problem is that the adjective ‘real’ is usually assumed to
be the characteristic of something that exists as a fact rather than as a mere
possibility and therefore the characterization of quantum reality as actually
being real would appear to exclude the possibility that this reality may not
always consist of observable facts. Thus, it is important to emphasize that
what I have in mind here is the scientific concept of realism according to
which it would be deemed appropriate to seek to describe the actual ways
by which certain physical processes can occur, even when it is not possible
to determine the specific path which is followed in the course of any one par-
ticular process. But in the context of the preceding discussion it would also
appear desirable to apply the criterion of physical reality not to the wave
function itself, as is usually proposed, but rather to the elementary particle
trajectories that enter the sum-over-histories formulation of quantum theory.
The hypothesis would then be that it is appropriate to assume that, even
in between position measurements, elementary particles follow real and to a
certain extent unique (but not classically well-defined) trajectories in space-
time, despite the fact that those trajectories must, as a matter of principle,
remain mere potentialities.
I believe that one of the clearest indication to the effect that quantum
theory is not incompatible with a realist conception of phenomena, even when
what is assumed to be real is not the wave function itself, is the fact that,
despite its probabilistic nature, under appropriate circumstances quantum
theory allows to predict the outcome of certain measurements with absolute
certainty (think about measuring the momentum state of a particle soon
after it was prepared to be in an eigenstate of this observable). If it is pos-
sible, at least under particular circumstances, to tell with perfect certainty
what the state of some dynamic attribute of a quantum system was prior
to measurement, then it may not be definitely ruled out that even when the
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various alternative states available to a system interfere quantum mechani-
cally with one another, the unobserved attribute of the system could exist in
a definite, unique, but unknown state, which would be compatible with the
constraints imposed by a subsequent measurement. Of course this is what is
usually believed to be ruled out by the fact that all possible histories must
be put to contribution in order to derive the right probability for a process
to occur (that which is obtained by repeating the experiment a large number
of times), which appears to be incompatible with the hypothesis that the
system would have occupied one unique state of that unobserved attribute
all along. Thus, despite being intuitively appealing, the hypothesis that a
unique history exists at all levels of description, in the sense that even the
unobserved attributes of a system always exist in a unique state, would ap-
pear to be invalidated by experimental results, given that it does not allow
to predict the right correlation probabilities.
Faced with those difficulties one usually concludes that it is not possible
to retain a realist description of quantum phenomena that would involve el-
ementary particle trajectories if one recognizes that there do arise quantum
interferences involving the multiple spacetime paths which are all at once
available to a quantum system. Thus, what one normally assumes is that
reality simply cannot be unique in any way between measurements and that
the question of what happens to unobserved attributes is simply meaningless
from a scientific viewpoint, as originally proposed by Bohr and Heisenberg
and as apparently required by the existence of quantum interferences. But,
if one recognizes that the uniqueness of history is a fact that cannot be re-
jected, one may alternatively propose that quantum interferences are not
indicative of the fact that multiple trajectories must be taken into consider-
ation simultaneously, but rather arise as a consequence of the existence of
hidden and explicitly non-local, but otherwise classically well-behaved influ-
ences that would determine the course of a conventional history involving
otherwise ordinary objects. Without entering into the details of each pro-
posal it is clear that they are both unsatisfactory, precisely because they both
involve assumptions that contradict one key aspect of physical reality (either
the uniqueness of history as an observational requirement, or the absence of
instantly propagated causal influences as a theoretical requirement). But it
must be clear that, despite what is commonly believed, the first proposal is
just as problematic as its alternative counterpart, even if it was favored by
the originators of quantum mechanics on the basis of the fact that it involves
fewer arbitrary assumptions.
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It always appeared preferable, in effect, to avoid postulating the existence
of classical hidden variables, given that any model based on such a require-
ment would necessarily involve complex mechanisms of an unobservable na-
ture whose validity could never be empirically confirmed. Yet, the argument
that it is the non-locality of the hidden variables models that makes them
unacceptable is not very satisfactory. Indeed, if one recognizes that there
must necessarily be a reality of some kind, then the only known alternative
to assuming the existence of hidden variables would be to consider the wave
function as this reality and this means that explicit non-locality would also
constitute an aspect of the orthodox interpretation, because the wave func-
tion is also a non-local entity which is subject to non-local changes, as would
occur in the course of certain measurements. Thus, it would appear that
the only alternative to an explicitly non-local theory, potentially involving
complicated arbitrary constructs whose validity would remain unconfirmed,
actually amounts to assume that reality is not real. This is obviously a sim-
ple assumption, but I’m not willing to accept that it would be mere scientific
progress to consider it as a valid assumption about physical reality. One must
come to recognize that such a position is not progress, but simple non-sense
of the most scientifically objectionable kind. If a physical reality exists, then
I believe that what is certainly the most basic property that would need to
characterize this reality is that it is, in effect, real. This must be considered
an essential consistency requirement and neglecting it would again amount
to allow a logical contradiction to stand at the basis of our interpretation of
the most fundamental of all physical theories.
Therefore, I suggest that one of the crucial points that cannot be ne-
glected in trying to produce a consistent interpretation of quantum theory is
that the unique outcome of measurements is indicative of the uniqueness of
the history that takes place in between measurements, even for what regards
those dynamic attributes that are not subjected to direct observation. The
existence of definite causal relationships between all elements of the universe
must be understood to actually require that every element of this physical re-
ality is indeed involved in only one such history in any one particular universe.
The right interpretation must therefore emerge from a combination of two
apparently incompatible requirements which are provided on the one hand
by this condition of uniqueness of history and on the other by the necessity to
allow quantum interferences to occur between the many distinct possibilities
that may exist for the unobservable aspects of this unique history, even as
may affect a single quantum process that is not repeated many times. It is
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the description of reality we are considering that must adapt to those two
requirements if we are to avoid having to alter the rules of logic to accom-
modate their simultaneous fulfillment. But I do agree with Copenhagenists
that this must not be achieved by postulating the existence of arbitrary, hid-
den influences propagated at superluminal velocities, because from all that
we know the principle of local causality provides as real a constraint on our
description of physical reality as the existence of quantum interferences.
In fact, I have come to understand that the debate between Copen-
hagenists and classical hidden variables theorists is not as meaningful as
one might assume, because the only hidden variables models that may allow
to retain agreement with observational data are those that postulate that the
hidden influences would remain unobservable and indeterminate as a mat-
ter of principle, even when they evolve deterministically (ignorance of the
exact state does not arise from a practical limitation that could eventually
be overcome, as in conventional statistical mechanics). Thus, even though
such classical hidden variables models would contradict the orthodox pos-
tulate of objective indefiniteness, the fact that the hidden variables could
never become part of experimental knowledge means that those models do
not require a rejection of the concept of objective chance and would not allow
to circumvent quantum indeterminacy (associated with unpredictability). It
would therefore appear that it is really just the naive classical definiteness
of the state of the non-local object which is assumed to govern the behavior
of quantum particles that is problematic with those hidden variables mod-
els, given that it necessarily requires the existence arbitrary mechanisms of
a conspiratorial nature to achieve agreement with observational data. The
real problem for current (classical) hidden variables theories would then be
that instead of enhancing the domain of validity of the quantum mechanical
state, as an improved realist interpretation of quantum theory should enable
to achieve, they just allow to perhaps reproduce the empirically confirmed
predictions of the theory through some unnatural and complicated contor-
tion of reality that make them even less appealing than the currently favored
traditional approach.
But before I elaborate on what kind of physical reality might agree with
the two basic requirements identified above (uniqueness of history and local
causality) it is important to mention that the requirement that there exists a
unique reality is different from Einstein’s proposal that reality should be in-
dependent from whether or not a certain parameter is being observed, which
assumes more than just a unique reality and which is irreconcilable with
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the mathematical framework of quantum theory. We must recognize as an
established fact that quantum reality is not independent from experimental
conditions, even if it might be possible to assume that conjugate physical
attributes like position and momentum can simultaneously possess unique
(even though partly unobservable) values in a certain sense, because, as I
already explained, this unique reality must also give rise to quantum inter-
ferences among multiple states and it is only the physical attribute that is
under direct observation at a given time, or in the course of a certain pro-
cess that is free of interferences. Assuming that reality is independent from
experimental conditions would require that quantum interferences be absent
altogether, which is certainly not compatible with any plausible interpreta-
tion of quantum theory.
If the values taken by conjugate observables cannot be determined at
the same time with an arbitrarily high degree of precision it is precisely be-
cause the macroscopic constraints necessary to determine the exact state of
those physical attributes cannot be realized all at the same time for the same
process, while it is those macroscopic constraints (associated with the exis-
tence of records) that determine which physical observable is not subject to
quantum interferences (for reasons I will discuss in section 12). Thus, even
though I believe that it is necessary to assume that a unique reality actually
exists, regardless of whether it is being observed or not, I also think that it
must be recognized that this reality does not evolve independently from the
macroscopic physical conditions necessary for an experimental determination
of its actual state. Furthermore, it should be clear that the hypothesis that
there exists a unique reality of some sort does not impose on quantum par-
ticles (say negatively charged, positive energy electrons propagating forward
in time) that they be distinct individually, even when they possess the same
static attributes. What we must ask ourselves, therefore, is what the unob-
servable reality actually is if it does not conform to a classical representation
in terms of simple, identifiable objects. Quantum theory, from the viewpoint
of its current interpretation, is not so much an answer to the problem of the
fundamental nature of reality, as a constraint that must be obeyed by any
realist description of physical phenomena.
At this point it is necessary to mention that I do know that from the
viewpoint of someone who has been introduced to quantum mechanics in
the conventional way, the requirements discussed above may appear irrecon-
cilable, as the formalism of the theory itself seems to be indissociable from
the Copenhagen interpretation, while the traditional definition of a quantum
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state would appear to be totally incompatible with a realist interpretation
that would involve a unique history. It is only when one begins studying rel-
ativistic quantum field theory, that one is introduced to Feynman’s method
and the sum-over-histories formalism, at which point one has already been
conditioned to believe that it is not possible to visualize quantum processes
as involving unique histories of some sort, while in fact this is precisely what
the sum-over-histories approach suggests and from a certain viewpoint even
requires10. In this particular sense I was lucky, because I first learned of quan-
tum theory by reading about the problem of interpretation and Feynman’s
original approach, while I became familiar with the conventional formalism
of quantum mechanics only later on, which means that rather than being
critical of the reality of Feynman’s histories, I was rather critical of the con-
ventional interpretation. I believe that this uncommon course is what allowed
me to see more clearly how it can be that each independent elementary par-
ticle process consists of a unique (even though partly unobservable) history,
despite the fact that there always arises interference effects between the mul-
tiple histories which are allowed by the macroscopic experimental conditions
of the process. What I would like to explain, therefore, is why it is necessary
to assume that the multiple unique histories depicted in Feynman’s diagrams
correspond more than is usually recognized to the actual reality behind all
quantum phenomena.
I believe that it is merely the fact that no truly acceptable realist in-
terpretation of quantum theory has ever been proposed that motivates the
widespread belief that the multiple histories described by Feynman diagrams
do not relate to anything actually occurring (must be considered purely fic-
titious) and merely constitute useful computational apparatus, despite the
obvious similarity between the processes so described and the actual reality
we experience. It has become very clear to me that what this formalism pro-
vides is nothing but a description of what is actually going on which we are
not able to directly observe concerning some dynamic physical attribute of
a quantum system. Even ignoring the arguments provided so far concerning
the relevance of the concept of elementary particle in quantum field theory,
10It is important to note that even a conventional formulation of quantum mechanics
like Heisenberg’s matrix mechanics can be interpreted as involving a summation over a
series of intermediate unobserved or ‘virtual’ processes and it is significant that some of
the originators of quantum theory were in effect open to such an interpretation (perhaps
because they were not told by others how they should interpret their own theory) even
though they did not see how it could be made truly viable.
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I think that one must recognize that it is very unlikely that such an essential
concept as the individual paths entering a sum-over-histories formulation of
quantum theory could happen to be intuitively significant simply by chance,
without being related to what actually goes on in between measurements
of the observable concerned. Perhaps that instead of insisting that our ex-
perience of reality is not a reliable guide for judging the value of certain
hypotheses concerning unobservable aspects of this very same reality, we
should instead try to figure out how the phenomena that cannot be directly
observed can be described in a way that would agree more with what we do
know about physical reality.
It is remarkable in this regard that while Feynman himself believed that
quantum reality involves particles and only particles, he also said that there
is no way to explain or to understand what happens to those particles, even
during the most simple of quantum processes, because it is not possible to
assume that a particle in a given momentum state goes one way or another
in space, so that it may be preferable to give up trying to create a model
of what is actually happening. I believe that this shows how deeply the
philosophy behind the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum theory has
become ingrained in our conception of reality, because if one person might
have been allowed to understand what is the reality behind all quantum
phenomena it should certainly have been Feynman and it is clear that his
failure is in part attributable to the fact that, despite his remarkable insights,
as all physicists of his generation he adhered to the notion that a realist
representation of quantum phenomena is not possible. But if those difficulties
have been allowed to persist to this day it is merely because we still do
not understand the profound meaning of quantum strangeness and remain
ignorant of the fact that quantum phenomena can be visualized.
What remains to explain, therefore, is how it is that one and only one
of the histories which can be depicted using Feynman diagrams may corre-
spond to what really happens in the course of a specific quantum process11,
11I must mention that I’m aware that a method called ‘unitarity’ is often used as a
shortcut for the determination of quantum probabilities that constitutes a modification
of Feynman’s original approach, but this alternative technique does not require assuming
that the original sum-over-histories formulation of quantum theory is not fundamentally
the most accurate and it remains that the summation over all possible histories is more
representative of what really goes on at a fundamental level, even if from a practical
viewpoint it may be even less appropriate than the alternative approach for performing
certain calculations under particular circumstances.
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despite the fact that it is not possible to attribute to a quantum particle
the properties of a classical object and in particular to simultaneously deter-
mine both its momentum and its position with an arbitrarily high degree of
precision. For that purpose it is necessary to point out that there is some-
thing highly problematic with the conventional viewpoint provided by Bohr’s
complementarity principle. What Bohr suggested, in effect, is not just that
the conditions necessary for the measurement of a certain dynamic attribute
is incompatible with those necessary for the measurement of its conjugate
counterpart, but really that the concepts of momentum and position, for
example, constitute mutually exclusive representations of a quantum object
(like an elementary particle) and that it does not even make sense to try to
apply them simultaneously. If one was to hold on to such a viewpoint, then,
clearly, a realist description of phenomena based on the sum-over-histories
formulation of quantum theory would become impossible to achieve.
But, in fact, there is absolutely no reason to assume that the indefiniteness
of the state of some unobserved attribute of a quantum system cannot be the
consequence of a mere incompatibility between the macroscopic conditions
necessary for the measurement of one dynamic attribute and those necessary
for a measurement of its conjugate counterpart. When one understands the
true nature of the constraints which allow decoherence to take place and
to rapidly eliminate quantum interferences for the physical attribute that
is subjected to measurement (an issue I will address only in section 12),
it appears quite plausible that quantum indefiniteness actually arises as a
consequence of this practical (but fundamental) limitation. Therefore, it is
not a priori impossible for a quantum particle which is known to be in a
pure momentum state to follow a unique, but observationally undetermined
trajectory in space and only the existence of quantum interferences involving
multiple distinct trajectories would appear to contradict this conclusion.
There is certainly something true in Heisenberg’s statement to the effect
that the progress made through the elaboration of quantum theory was ob-
tained at the price of having to abandon the possibility of visualizing natural
phenomena in a way that is directly comprehensible in the context of our
conventional way of thinking. However, I would insist that what is inappro-
priate is not the requirement that it should be possible to visualize physical
reality, but the requirement that this reality in effect be similar in every way
to what it appeared to be before experiments began revealing the existence
of quantum interferences between alternative potential histories. In order to
progress toward this legitimate objective of visualizing quantum reality we
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may again consider the classical double slit experiment. What can be learned
using this simple, but very general experimental arrangement is that despite
the fact that we are always dealing with discrete, localized particles, inter-
ferences, similar to those which can be observed when what is propagating
is a classical wave, must be assumed to occur whenever a particle is allowed
to propagate between a source and a detector through more that one pos-
sible path without giving rise to the formation of a permanent record that
would indicate through which trajectory the particle actually went. Even
though such interferences become apparent only in the statistical distribu-
tion of measurement results, which is known to depend on the differences
between the length of the possible paths along which a particle can propa-
gate before its position is detected, the interference must be considered to
take place even in the course of a single process involving the propagation of
one unique particle (because such processes also obey the rules of quantum
theory). The problem, then, is to figure out how it is possible for a localized
particle to give rise to those interferences involving distinct potential paths
if, as a particle, it must necessarily propagate in space by going through a
definite, yet unobservable trajectory.
Stated in such a way this aspect of the problem of interpretation appears
at once very simple and quite irresolvable. But it took me a very consider-
able amount of time to simply realize that this is in effect how the problem
must be stated, as this is not how most people see things. Indeed, it is not
usually assumed that the particle, as a particle, must necessarily go through
a single trajectory or through any trajectory at all, as this would immedi-
ately appear to give rise to an unavoidable contradiction, because ‘obviously’
a particle cannot go through one trajectory and produce interference effects
which involve multiple distinct trajectories. Anyone arguing that this is not
necessarily the case would merely be a nostalgic of classical reality that does
not accept the ‘undeniable’ strangeness of reality unveiled by the observation
of quantum phenomena. Such an approach to the problem of interpretation
would necessarily have to deviate into classical hidden variables and non-local
causality. But in fact, that is not the case. Not only is it possible to visualize
what is going on when one acknowledges the validity of those premises, but
this is the only way to arrive at an interpretation of all quantum phenom-
ena that does not involve any arbitrary and undesirable assumptions that
would either conflict with the observed uniqueness of experimental facts, or
contradict one another (as when one speaks of a ‘probability wave’ going
through both slits all at once, which then ‘becomes’ a particle when its posi-
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tion is detected), therefore implicitly or explicitly requiring an alteration of
the conventional rules of logic.
It is important to understand that while it is usually believed that logical
contradictions may arise when one insists on requiring a realist interpretation
of quantum theory, those contradictions are merely a consequence of holding
on to a conventional, or naive conception of reality, according to which it
might be possible to obtain simultaneous experimental knowledge about the
state of all physical attributes of a quantum system. Indeed, it is usually
believed that one cannot assume that all dynamic attributes of a system could
be in a unique state at all times without assuming that a precise knowledge of
the state of those dynamic attributes would be available (which would violate
the uncertainty principle). But, once one recognizes that only the second
assumption is inadequate and could give rise to factual contradictions, while
an absence of knowledge concerning the state of some dynamic attribute that
is not subjected to measurement may actually allow one to assume, without
contradiction, that this attribute is in what would appear to be two unique,
even though possibly different states all at once (in a certain sense which will
be clarified later), then it becomes possible for a realist interpretation to be
formulated that is not logically inconsistent.
In the present context it would therefore appear that the fact that a purely
phenomenological model of reality (such as that which constitutes the core
of the orthodox interpretation of quantum theory) may appear to be better
suited than a realist model for explaining certain observations is merely a
consequence of the fact that a realist model cannot be applied to quantum
phenomena as they are traditionally described, but only becomes appropriate
in the context of a time-symmetric description of those phenomena. Follow-
ing Einstein, I believe that one must be ready to take an intuitive leap and
to derive, based on available experimental data, general postulates that may
not always be immediately confirmed through direct observation, but which
allow to better model the reality underlying those empirical facts. For what
regards the problem of the interpretation of quantum theory this intuitive
leap would actually consist in assuming that the particles involved in the
description of elementary quantum processes are in effect real and that they
are taking part in one unique history of some kind. Once this is recognized
to be a legitimate and necessary requirement, the difficulty would then con-
sist in understanding how such a realist description of reality could be made
compatible with both the observational constraint imposed by the existence
of quantum interferences and the theoretical constraint of a time-symmetric
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conception of causality.
I think that one cannot be satisfied with assuming that what explains
the existence of quantum interferences is the ‘fact’ that a particle doesn’t
follow a unique path and actually propagates from emission to detection by
simultaneously following, at once, all possible trajectories. I believe that
the notion that all the available paths are actually followed together in the
course of any single quantum process occurring in a given universe actually
constitutes one of those strange aspects of quantum reality (as it is usually
conceived) which are not merely unexpected, yet unavoidable, but which re-
main strange because they actually conflict with certain factual aspects of
reality. What is quite amazing is that even though such a notion is only
slightly different from the usually rejected viewpoint according to which a
particle may go partly through one slit and partly through the other (in a
double slit experiment), it is sometimes considered to provide an appropriate
depiction of quantum reality. But if one recognizes that such a representation
is indeed incompatible with a realist interpretation of quantum phenomena
that would not reject the empirical evidence for the uniqueness of histori-
cal facts, it remains that one must take into account, in the determination
of transition probabilities, any possible trajectory which is allowed by the
macroscopic conditions which are in effect while those transitions are taking
place. In order to accommodate this fact what is sometimes assumed (as I
briefly mentioned in section 6) is that a single unique process may actually
always involve two interfering histories which, for some reason, would share
the same observational conditions. But, it remains to explain what justifies
this assumption (which would still appear to conflict with the uniqueness
of historical fact) and why it can be expected to give rise to the kind of
classically well-defined reality we do experience.
It is certainly true that one of the criteria that allows one to judge the
validity of an alternative conception of reality involving unobservable theo-
retical constructs is its usefulness for producing accurate predictions of ex-
perimental phenomena, but this is precisely why the currently favored in-
terpretation must be rejected. Indeed, I believe that if the notion that all
histories occur all at once in the same universe is incompatible with the ex-
perimentally derived uniqueness of historical facts (in the context where the
tentative solution to the quantum measurement problem that is provided by
a ‘many-worlds’ approach is recognized to be ineffective, as I will argue in
section 10), then it must be rejected in favor of a conception of reality that
does not require this uniqueness to be a mere illusion. The problem, how-
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ever, has always been that it would appear that the only realist alternative to
such an interpretation would require assuming that the wave function itself
is the reality, because in the context where quantum interference is possi-
ble for unobserved attributes, this mathematical object (the state vector in
general) does not merely provide a probability distribution for the position
of a particle in a definite momentum state, but may involve superpositions
of position states with complex-number weighting coefficients, which means
that position may sometimes appear to constitute an inappropriate element
of physical reality (of course the same is true for momentum under distinct
experimental conditions). But, while this is not necessarily inadequate from a
mathematical viewpoint it remains unsatisfactory from a physical viewpoint,
especially in the context where this wave function can be subjected to discon-
tinuous changes that would violate the principle of local causality whenever
the potentialities involved are actualized, as I previously mentioned.
I believe that it is merely the fact that we fail to correctly visualize what
is going on in between position measurements (for instance) that makes it
look like physical reality cannot involve a unique history of some kind and
needs to be replaced by some weird picture which actually deviates from a
conventional representation to the point where reality itself looks unreal, in
the sense that the proposed picture is not only incompatible with observable
aspects of reality, but also with the logical consistency which is known to
apply under more general circumstances. What holds the key to a better
understanding of quantum reality is the acknowledgement that what can be
known about a quantum system does not allow one to tell everything about
what it does, even though, as a matter of principle, no better knowledge is
available. Such a standpoint is the only alternative that is available when
one considers it inappropriate to assume that dynamic attributes simply
do not exist when they are not those concerning which direct observational
knowledge is available.
Although the approach I favor may at first seem problematic, it is ac-
tually much simpler to apply than its logical alternative, because the idea
that a dynamic attribute does not exist when it is not subject to observa-
tion cannot be adapted to the case where such an attribute is only known to
an intermediary level of precision, because, clearly, either an attribute exist
or it doesn’t, while it is undeniable that the state of any attribute can be
determined with more or less precision by the appropriate measurement, as
long as an inversely proportional uncertainty applies to its conjugate coun-
terpart. If at least it was possible to speak of certain quantum systems as
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definitely being observed, while other systems would not, then it might per-
haps make sense to assume that what is measured is real and what is not
measured doesn’t exist, but in fact there is always something that is known
with arbitrarily high precision about a physical system as long as it remains
causally related to the rest of the universe (this is what is implied by the
linearity of Hilbert space) and it is merely the conjugate dynamic attribute
of this system which is then undetermined, so that if one chooses to follow
the orthodox approach one is forced to somehow ascribe both reality and
absence of reality to the same physical system, which again constitutes a
logical contradiction.
Thus, despite what one is usually encouraged to believe, it seems nec-
essary to assume (particularly if one wants to avoid having to consider the
possibility of a reality created through observation) that two systems pre-
pared in the same quantum state may evolve differently at the level of the
dynamic physical attributes whose states are not determined by the macro-
scopic conditions of an experiment. I believe that this is what explains that
a subsequent measurement of those originally undetermined attributes may
produce outcomes that differ from one system to the other and if this is
correct it would mean that it is inappropriate to assume that it is the act
of measurement itself that introduces randomness into our description of
quantum phenomena. The more consistent approach I will propose therefore
allows physical systems which are described by the same wave function to ac-
tually be different at a certain unfathomable level, even if the wave function
still provides the most complete description of what can be experimentally
determined about a quantum system.
From that perspective it becomes apparent that there is something very
problematic with the conventional interpretation whenever post selection is
involved in the determination of which physical attribute of a system is ac-
tually measured (as would occur in the context of the delayed choice exper-
iments discussed in section 6). Indeed, if one assumes that only measured
attributes are real then it would mean that what is real at the present mo-
ment depends on what choice will be made in the future regarding which
attributes are to be measured. This is so embarrassing that it is usually
considered to support the view that quantum theory is not about reality at
all, but about the outcome of measurements, while in fact what the reality of
post selection illustrates is rather the awkwardness of the conventional inter-
pretation of quantum theory in the context of which it would be impossible
to explain the outcome of all measurements without assuming that certain
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influences do exist that can propagate faster than is allowed by the principle
of local causality. Once the necessity of a realist approach is recognized, all
that one must avoid is taking the easy way out and postulate that there exist
hidden variables of a classical kind that would require explicit violations of
local causality as a consequence of trying to reproduce in too simplistic (but
actually quite complicated) a way the interference effects between multiple
position states.
In order to achieve a realist description of quantum phenomena that does
not contradict other essential aspects of reality it is necessary to first un-
derstand that the most significant difference between the sum-over-histories
formulation of quantum theory and the statistical mechanics of classical sys-
tems with a large number of independent degrees of freedom has to do with
the existence of the quantum phase that gives rise to interferences among
the different possible histories involved and which is attributable to the use
of probability amplitudes instead of classical probabilities as elements of the
summation process. From that viewpoint what needs to be explained is how
it is possible for a particle to follow a path along which all of its conjugate
dynamic attributes have unique values at all times, despite the fact that the
many trajectories which can be followed by the attribute that is not directly
observed would seem to interfere with one another, as if no definite trajectory
was ever followed. At this point it may still appear justified to reject this
possibility, but once the requirement of a time-symmetric description will be
taken into consideration, it will appear that it is as clearly inappropriate to
refuse to admit the existence of those unique trajectories, as it would be to
refuse to recognize the existence of elementary particles themselves. John
Von Neumann was certainly right when he claimed to have demonstrated
that the ordinary reality of everyday objects cannot apply to quantum par-
ticles if those objects are to obey the principle of local causality. But, as I
will explain, that does not necessarily mean that we need to reject the notion
that particles always follow a unique trajectory of some kind (in the space of
their unobserved attribute), if we allow for this trajectory to remain unknown
under all conditions and to conform to the requirements of a time-symmetric
conception of causality.
If the sum-over-histories formulation really constitutes a fundamentally
different formulation of quantum theory that cannot be derived from earlier
formulations by a simple mathematical transformation, as is usually under-
stood, then one cannot reject the possibility that it is only by considering the
reality it describes for what it is that we can begin to understand quantum
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theory. From that perspective it is certainly incorrect to argue, as many au-
thors do, that quantum theory is only about the probability of measurement
results and does not tell us anything about what goes on in between mea-
surements. If the most adequate and generalizable of quantum mechanical
formalisms does involve a certain description of what happens in between
observations, then it would seem that it is merely our failure to understand
why it is exactly that this description is relevant from a physical viewpoint
that motivates our rejection of this realist picture of phenomena as not being
indicative of anything true. In any case, one must keep in mind that the
widespread opinion that what the sum-over-histories formalism indicates is
that all paths are followed all at once in the course of any single process is
not an unavoidable conclusion and that it cannot be claimed that no other
choice exists for a realist description of quantum phenomena. What I will
explain is that it is still possible, in effect, to assume that a quantum particle
must merely be allowed to take any of the available paths, but that it does
not actually go through all paths in the course of one single process. It is not
true that we are confined to contradictory assessments of reality and that it
is necessary to assume that quantum theory is about particles and yet that
it is not about unique particle histories.
What I would like to emphasize is that it is not the hypothesis of a
unique and variable (but unobservable) history which is incompatible with
experimental facts, but rather the usually preferred hypothesis that simi-
larly prepared systems always evolve in identical ways in between measure-
ments. Indeed, it is clearly the measurement results which are characterized
as unique and variable, while it is merely our current assumptions regarding
what remains unobservable which may turn out to be inappropriate. Yet,
it must be clear that I’m not claiming that the mathematical framework of
quantum theory is incomplete, because I do recognize that it is not possible
to provide a more accurate description of the state of a system than is al-
lowed by the uncertainty principle, so that even if it is real, the exact unique
history of an unobserved dynamic attribute remains a mere potentiality for
any specific process. As I mentioned above, experimental knowledge of both
the exact momentum and the exact position of a particle is not allowed by
the basic structure of quantum theory. In the language of the consistent
histories interpretation of quantum mechanics one would say that the simul-
taneous determination of a particle’s momentum and position can only take
place on decoherent ‘branches’ of history, which from my viewpoint actually
means that it cannot occur at all, because this would require distinct macro-
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scopic constraints to exist together simultaneously (for the same system) and
if one wants to preserve the character of uniqueness of physical reality, then,
obviously, one cannot argue that one set of mutually exclusive macroscopic
constraints exist at the same time as a different one.
In a more conventional interpretation one may seek to accommodate the
uniqueness of measurement results in light of the existence of quantum in-
terferences between the multiple possible histories by postulating that all
histories actually occur all at once in the same universe, but that it is pre-
cisely the decoherence effect that allows observed reality to appear unique,
given that it requires the interferences between different states of a dynamic
attribute to vanish very rapidly upon a measurement of this physical at-
tribute. But it is a positive development that from the viewpoint of a model
such as the one I will propose, decoherence can only achieve the goal of giv-
ing rise to a quasiclassical world if we do indeed require the existence of a
unique history of some kind, as I will explain in section 12. In such a context
it would appear that once the dust has settled, no valid argument actually
remains that would support the validity of the hypothesis that all histories
are followed at the same time in the same universe as different coexisting
and interfering ‘branches’. Thus, by assimilating what I believe to be the
only appropriate interpretation of quantum phenomena, we will go from a
situation where it is necessary to assume that either there is no reality at all
between measurements, or else that all histories are followed all at once, to a
situation where it is no longer possible or necessary to embrace such logically
inconsistent viewpoints and where we are allowed to once again conceive of
a universe as involving one single and unique history of some kind, which
in effect constitutes an essential element of the definition of what a universe
actually is.
What emerges from those considerations is that it is the very notion that
decoherence merely allows to eliminate the interferences between many coex-
isting ‘branches’ of history that makes quantum entanglement problematic,
given that it requires the existence of explicitly non-local influences to en-
force the selection of one branch over another following measurement, while
this is in effect a global phenomenon. I know that many people do not
agree with that, because they assume that the multiple branches of history
are causally independent from one another, as if they actually consisted of
different universes. But the problem, once again, is that there is a logical
contradiction here, because we cannot assume that we are dealing with truly
independent branches, while those branches would nevertheless be assumed
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to exist in the same universe (so that they can interfere with one another).
A lot of crazy things have been said concerning why those two assump-
tions may not be incompatible with one another, but in the end one must
recognize that the simple truth is that there is a contradiction and if the
branches interfere prior to a measurement, then there must exist non-local
influences propagated faster than the relativistic speed limit to enforce the
global consistency of measurement outcomes at multiple remote locations in
the presence of quantum entanglement, when it is assumed that all possible
histories are indeed followed together in the absence of measurement. Thus,
it is not absolutely true that the non-locality associated with quantum en-
tanglement cannot be used to demonstrate that a realist picture of quantum
phenomena might be more viable than one of the alternative interpretations,
as Einstein tried to achieve.
It is telling, therefore, that it is quantum entanglement which is usually
assumed to forbid a realist description of quantum phenomena. Indeed, the
violation of Bell’s inequality by the results of multiple different experiments
which have actually been performed on pairs of entangled elementary par-
ticles proves that a naive concept of reality according to which all dynamic
physical attributes are in a unique classical state at all times could not be
considered valid unless this reality explicitly involves non-local influences.
In fact, what was shown by the experiments in which a violation of Bell’s
inequality occurs is that reality is in effect non-local, but that does not
necessarily mean that explicitly non-local influences must exist that would
propagate faster than the relativistic speed limit, because this property may
instead be a simple reflection of the fact that the basic structure of reality is
richer than we usually assume, particularly with regards to time directionality
and causality. Given that quantum entanglement is made manifest through
quantum interference, the non-locality that is discussed here is not different
from that I have already identified as emerging whenever one assumes that
the wave function itself constitutes physical reality. I believe that what this
actually means is that it is not the uniqueness of history which is problem-
atic, but the notion that quantum non-locality must necessarily involve a
violation of the causal structure of spacetime which is otherwise imposed by
relativity theory.
I have already emphasized in the discussion about time-symmetric causal-
ity from section 3, that backward in time causation is not forbidden by rel-
ativity theory. But it should be clear that backward causation, even when
it is restricted to operate in accordance with the principle of local causality,
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may actually give rise to non-local correlations. The important point here
is that the existence of such correlations would not allow faster-than-light
communication, given that the backward propagated influences are also sub-
mitted to the constraint of diminishing entropy in the past that is imposed
by the constraint of global entanglement and in such a context information
is only allowed to flow from the past toward the future and never in the
opposite direction. Amazingly, this is precisely the property that is observed
to be obeyed by the non-local correlations which have been experimentally
demonstrated to occur in the course of certain quantum phenomena, as a
result of entanglement. I believe that this is not just a coincidence, but
that it actually confirms what I have said concerning the time-symmetric
nature of causality and the crucial role played by this property in a quantum
mechanical context.
If this is the true origin of quantum non-locality, then it would mean that
the only non-local influences which are ruled out are those that would occur
through a violation of the principle of local causality attributable to faster-
than-light propagation (which would allow faster-than-light communication
and therefore also the flow of information from the future toward the past),
while the non-locality that follows from backward in time causation would
actually be a fact which we were traditionally allowed to ignore only because
it does not allow signals or information to be communicated instantaneously
(due precisely to the origin of this non-locality) and therefore can only be
revealed through subtle correlations of otherwise random outcomes of mea-
surements performed on carefully entangled quantum systems. What should
be clear, in any case, is that the observed absence of backward in time signal-
ing need not be a consequence of the inadequacy of a realist time-symmetric
interpretation of quantum theory, as it can also be a consequence of the effec-
tiveness of the constraints which were identified in section 3.9 of [1] and that
give rise to the thermodynamic arrow of time under more general circum-
stances. Only if this was not possible would the backward in time causation
that may be involved in giving rise to quantum non-locality be allowed to
violate the principle of local causality that is enforced by relativity theory. It
is not appropriate to conclude that the experiments which have revealed the
non-local nature of quantum phenomena have proven that those phenomena
are irreconcilable with any commonsense interpretation of the theory. What
must be abandoned is not scientific realism, but the traditional interpretation
of quantum theory which forces us to reject the principle of local causality
and to return to a conception of reality that would involve instantaneous
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action at a distance.
It is important to note in this regard that it is the locality assumption
that would allow one to conclude, based on the results of certain recently
performed experiments [13] involving multiple entangled photons, that there
may coexist many mutually incompatible accounts about what constitutes a
known, or observationally confirmed fact. Those experimental results, which
involve the violation of certain inequalities similar to, but distinct from the
conventional Bell’s inequality, were initially assumed to support the claim
that reality is a relative notion (and therefore that it may not be objective),
which would appear to confirm the relevance of the relational interpretation
of quantum theory. But once we recognize that non-locality is not optional
and that it was actually shown, by even more straightforward methods, to
itself constitute an unavoidable aspect of reality, then the inappropriateness
of the radical conclusions which were drawn based on the results of the above
discussed experiments (regarding the lack of objectivity of observationally
derived facts) becomes all the more obvious, even aside from the fact that
they would (once again) have given rise to logical contradictions. Thus, it
should be clear that the assumption that the experimental results obtained
in one part of such an experimental setup cannot influence, or be correlated
non-locally with those obtained in a remote part of the same setup is incorrect
and it is only when we are not willing to take this aspect into consideration
that those experiments seem to imply that reality is not objective and that
the truth of certain experimentally established facts which happened in the
very same universe may be an observer dependent aspect of reality. I believe
that this only shows how important it is to recognize that locality is not a
property of physical reality, even if causal influences are always constrained to
propagate slower than the relativistic speed limit imposed by their associated
light cone, either forward or backward in time.
What I have tried to make clear in this section is that it is highly prefer-
able to adopt a realist interpretation of quantum phenomena, because all al-
ternative proposals involve logical contradictions at one point or another and
those difficulties are always attributable precisely to a rejection of scientific
realism. What is unsatisfactory, however, is the absence of a realist inter-
pretation that would agree with the multiple specific constraints imposed by
the mathematical structure of quantum theory, like non-locality or quantum
interference (more generally). I believe that if the orthodox interpretation
of quantum theory is still preferred by most researchers in the field despite
the fact that it requires rejecting scientific realism, it is because something
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essential is missing from all known realist interpretations that could make
one of them acceptable. The problem to which I will now turn, therefore, is
that of explaining in an intuitively satisfactory, but logically consistent way,
without rejecting as mere illusion the uniqueness of historical facts, why it is
that the probability amplitudes associated with the many trajectories avail-
able to a quantum particle interfere with one another when its position state
is not under direct observation, as if the particle actually followed several
different trajectories all at once in the course of one single process. It is here
that it will finally be shown that despite what is usually believed this is not
an impossible task.
8 Time-symmetric quantum theory
It is quite amazing that one single requirement allows to satisfy all at once
both the condition of scientific realism in face of quantum interference or state
superposition and the principle of local causality in face of quantum entangle-
ment. This requirement is that of time-symmetric causality. There should
be no doubt, indeed, that the only way one can avoid having to conclude
that there exist non-local influences propagating faster than the relativistic
speed limit in the context of a realist description of quantum phenomena
is by assuming that certain causal influences actually propagate backward
in time. But it is usually believed that such backward causation would be
even more problematic than explicit non-locality. Yet, it is difficult for me
to understand what could be worse than an outright rejection of relativity
theory and the principle of local causality, or what could be more difficult
a task than rebuilding quantum physics from the ground up while trying
to provide a consistent classical hidden variables theory that would allow to
match all empirical constraints by postulating explicitly non-local influences.
But what is even more significant is that, as I have explained in sections
3, 4, and 5 the alternative of a time-symmetric conception of causality, far
from being undesirable, actually constitutes an essential development in the
context where there can be no fundamental distinction between the past and
the future at the most fundamental level of description.
What must be understood is that backward in time causation is not nec-
essarily problematic, even if the finality it involves may appear unnatural
from the viewpoint of our conventional, unidirectional experience of time.
First of all, in a universe where entropy cannot grow in the past, backward
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in time causation would not allow us to tell the future in advance. But, as
I already explained, it is also clear that backward causation does not allow
one to change a known fact from the past. Classical causality, or the pair-
ing of the distinction between causes and effects with the thermodynamic
distinction between past and future only comes into play at a macroscopic
level where time asymmetry emerges from the constraint imposed by the
presence of negative energy matter on the initial Big Bang state at which
global entanglement must take place. In other words, our experience of clas-
sical, unidirectional causality is not necessarily incompatible with backward
causation, as long as the effects which are propagated backward in time do
not give rise to the kind of backward in time signaling that would require
entropy to grow in the past.
Now, I previously mentioned that what quantum entanglement appears
to allow is precisely the kind of non-local correlations that would arise from
such backward in time propagation of effects, which is required to occur with
ever decreasing entropy in the past and which, for that reason, is not allowed
to give rise to faster than light communication, as would ordinary non-local
influences of the classical, hidden variables type. A consistent interpretation
of quantum theory would be one that naturally agrees with this limitation
in all situations, rather than merely require it based on the fact that no
violations of the principle of local causality have ever been observed to take
place in the course of any measurement on entangled systems.
If this is correct then we need to ask how it is exactly that such backward
causation is allowed to take place in the context where the only particles we
know about that do propagate backward in time are antimatter particles,
while it has never been shown that such particles are necessarily involved in
the experiments which reveal the existence of non-local correlations. What
I have come to understand is that, in fact, such time-symmetry is precisely
what the mathematical structure of quantum theory naturally requires, as
my discussion of the two-state vector formalism from section 6 emphasized.
Indeed, as I previously explained, a mathematically equivalent formulation
of quantum theory is possible that involves two state vectors, one of which
provides the state of a system as determined by past measurements, and the
other the state of the same system as will be determined by future mea-
surements. In between measurements those two state vectors evolve in a
conventional ‘unitary’ manner, in the future following a past measurement,
and in the past preceding a future measurement. Of course, this is not a
realist representation of quantum phenomena, as we are still dealing with
70
wave functions, but at least it shows that a formulation can be provided
that allows to reproduce all the predictions of quantum theory (sometimes
more naturally than even the standard theory) while taking into account the
requirement of a time-symmetric description of quantum reality (whatever
this reality turns out to be).
One clear advantage of such an approach is that it allows the time-
symmetry that is implicit in the original theory to be preserved even when
non-local correlations exist and the order in time of two measurements per-
formed on a pair of entangled particles is dependent on the state of motion
of an observer. Indeed, when the chronological order of two measurements
taking place at space-like separated events is an observer dependent prop-
erty, a process of state vector reduction which may appear to be triggered
by a measurement performed on one entangled particle from the viewpoint
of a certain observer, would appear to be triggered by the measurement per-
formed on its entangled counterpart for a different observer. But it would
be problematic to have to choose one or the other of two such measurements
as being the cause of the outcome of the other measurement if it was not
also possible to assume that it is this other measurement that is the cause
of the outcome of the first one, because, in such a case at least, there is no
objective criterion that would allow one to tell which event is the cause and
which is the effect. Yet, from the viewpoint of the conventional approach it
would appear that it is necessarily the event that happens first that is the
cause of the other event, even if this first event actually happens later from
the viewpoint of a different observer. In the context of a time-symmetric
formulation of quantum theory, however, the fact that future measurements
are allowed to influence the present state of a system means that a certain
reciprocity is allowed between the measurement that influences and the mea-
surement that is influenced (both measurements exert an influence on the
outcome of their remote counterpart). In other words, it is no longer nec-
essary to assume that there exists an absolute distinction between a cause
and its effect from a purely quantum mechanical viewpoint and this actually
allows to avoid the contradiction that would otherwise emerge when we are
dealing with measurements performed at space-like separated locations on
entangled systems.
What one must retain is that if it was not for the existence of backward
in time causation, then a clear distinction would need to exist between the
causes of state vector reduction and their effects, even when we are dealing
with entangled particles, but given that in such a case this distinction would
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be an observer dependent property, then it would appear that the spirit of
relativity theory would be violated, even if it would be impossible to say
exactly what distinguishes the cause from its effect, because from a tradi-
tional viewpoint this distinction would indeed be required to exist. The fact
that in all known situations where non-local correlations may arise, backward
in time signaling is not allowed to occur, clearly shows that unidirectional
causality is not involved in the determination of the outcome of the second
of two measurements performed on a pair of entangled particles, because if it
was involved then there would be no reason not to expect backward in time
signaling to occur, at least in some reference systems. From such a viewpoint
it would appear that the prevalent belief that causality must always oper-
ate forward in time is motivated by expectations similar in nature to those
which originally motivated the formulation of the Lorentz transformation
(the contraction of physical objects in motion relative to absolute space),
because imposing a unidirectional conception of causality in the context of
quantum non-locality amounts to postulate a property of reality which, even
if it did pertain to the physical world, would be required to have absolutely
no distinguishable effect on it.
Now, even though the two-state vector formulation of quantum mechan-
ics represents a step forward, the fact that it still does not provide a realist
picture of quantum phenomena that would fully accommodate the particle
concept and the requirement of a unique history of some kind means that it
cannot be the final answer to the problem of interpretation. Clearly some-
thing essential is still missing and it is only after much questioning and while
trying to figure out how the two-state vector formalism could be generalized
to agree with the sum-over-histories formulation of quantum theory that I
was able to obtain a truly consistent, realist picture of quantum phenom-
ena. I have become convinced, in effect, that the bold intuitive leap which
I previously suggested one must be ready to take to achieve a more realist
interpretation of quantum theory actually consists in recognizing that what
we are dealing with here is a set of two unique histories (involving unique
particle trajectories) unfolding in opposite directions of time without directly
interacting with one another in any way.
In such a context what matters is not really the direction of propagation
in time of the particles involved in those processes, but an overall direction
of time that only differs in a relationally defined way, such that if the two
histories were to be otherwise identical they would still differ in that the
direction of propagation in time of all the particles involved would be opposite
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for those two histories. But in fact it is not possible to differentiate in any
absolute way initial causes from final ‘causes’ and it is only the difference
between the directions of time in which the two histories unfold that has
physical meaning and this relationship must be preserved even when the
processes actually occurring in the course of those two histories differ in
ways not forbidden by the macroscopic experimental conditions imposed on
those processes.
The important point here is that the path followed by a quantum system
in the space of its unobserved dynamic attributes must in effect be allowed to
differ for the retarded and the advanced portions of a process (the ordinary
process and its time-reverse counterpart). What really happens, therefore,
to a photon on its way to a detector in the double slit experiment (see figure
1) is not that it passes through both slits all at once, but that it has the
possibility to pass through any one of the two open slits in both the retarded
and the advanced portions of the same process (when the actual trajectory
remains observationally undetermined), which therefore requires that both
paths be taken into account in the determination of transition probabilities
for any given process, even though a photon only ever goes through one
particular slit in the retarded portion of history and then again through one
particular (but possibly different) slit in the advanced portion of history. It
is simple to verify that those assumptions allow to reproduce the predictions
of the standard theory in any specific and possibly more complex situation
(I will explain below why this should indeed be expected).
It is merely the fact that we do not observe the actual trajectory followed
by the photon that makes it necessary to consider both possibilities all at once
for any single process, given that under such conditions this trajectory can be
different for the retarded and the advanced portions of the process. But this
does not necessarily mean that the trajectory is actually different for the two
histories, only that it can be and, as I will explain below, this is sufficient a
motive for requiring that both trajectories be considered to contribute to the
estimation of transition probabilities. Any one history still involves a particle
following a unique, unobservable trajectory, only, each process involves both
a retarded history and an advanced history (a pair of histories taking place
in opposite directions of time) and which are only required to share the same
macroscopic experimental constraints. Those histories are therefore allowed
to differ in all aspects which are not constrained to a particular subset of
possibilities by the observable ‘macroscopic’ conditions (the paths can differ
as long as no permanent record of those differences ever becomes available)
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Figure 1: The four possible combined retarded and advanced histories of
a double slit or simple interferometer experiment, with one source S and
one position detector D, when the actual trajectory of the quantum particle
remains unknown. The direction of the arrows corresponds to the flow of
time. When the actual trajectory of the particle is subject to experimental
determination only the first two combined histories remain possible and the
two trajectories no longer interfere, as the retarded and the advanced histories
must be the same for any complete process.
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and this is why the many different possible paths available to a quantum
system interfere with one another and must therefore be taken into account
in the determination of the probability for the complete process (comprising
those two histories) to occur.
It is remarkable that if it was not for the fact that probability amplitudes,
unlike conventional probabilities, involve periodic variations which can inter-
fere constructively or destructively, then it would be impossible to deduce
the existence of the advanced portion of a process (which may actually be
any one of the two histories), because it is the periodic or wavelike aspect of
probability amplitudes which allows the retarded and advanced portions of
history to interfere when the dynamic attributes involved are not subjected
to direct experimental determination. The greater consistency of the view-
point proposed here is apparent in the fact that it is no longer necessary to
assume that when the path followed by a particle is not observed the object
actually behaves as if it was a different entity (a classical wave), because
the interferences which are made conspicuous in the statistical distribution
of measurement results can be explained without requiring one to assume
that the particle behaves differently when its position is not observed. What
changes when a different dynamic attribute is submitted to direct observa-
tion is merely the macroscopic conditions imposed on a process, while the
particles involved still follow unique, but unknown, and possibly different
trajectories in the retarded and the advanced portions of history that unfold
in the space of the unobserved attribute.
It is only when a particle is constrained by the experimental conditions
to follow a certain definite path (when a record of the actual slit through
which the particle went is available) that interferences are absent for the dy-
namic attribute involved, because in such a case the particle must follow the
same path during both the retarded and the advanced portions of history. It
would therefore be incorrect to maintain that it is not possible to visualize
what occurs to a photon as it propagates from source to detector in a dou-
ble slit experiment when its trajectory is not observed. It is not nonsense to
speak of the passage of the photon through one particular slit, even when this
trajectory remains experimentally undetermined, as long as one recognizes
that the actual trajectory can be different for the retarded and advanced
portions of the process. From this viewpoint what looks rather absurd is
the conventional assumption that an elementary particle whose trajectory
is undetermined follows at once all possible paths. When it is properly un-
derstood, quantum theory is no longer as unsettling as it used to be (this
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comment will become even more apposite when other essential aspects of this
approach are discussed which allow to justify its inevitability).
From the viewpoint of the interpretation of quantum theory proposed
here there would no longer arise logical contradictions in the description of
the state of a system when a certain dynamic attribute of the system is in
a state of superposition (which is always the case for at least one physical
attribute). We may consider for example an electron whose spin has been
measured to be up along the horizontal axis. Under such conditions the spin
of this electron along the vertical axis must be considered undetermined.
But it is well known that this cannot be understood to mean that the spin of
the electron is either up along the horizontal axis and up along the vertical
axis, or else up along the horizontal axis and down along the vertical axis,
as one might consider appropriate from a classical perspective. Whenever
one tries to experimentally confirm the apparently indisputable validity of
this legitimate hypothesis the results one obtains show that it cannot be
true. It may therefore appear that whenever an electron is in a definite state
of spin relative to the horizontal axis, its spin state along the vertical axis,
if it is real, must be such that it cannot be described without violating the
conventional rules of logic, because it would seem to be allowed to point along
two mutually exclusive directions all at once, which from a realist viewpoint
does in effect constitute a contradiction.
But once it is understood that two independent histories are involved in
any single process then it becomes clear that what the results of the discussed
experiments mean is not that the vertical spin of the electron is in no state
at all (which would require rejecting the possibility of a realist description
of quantum phenomena), or that it is at once in all possible states (which
would require rejecting the conventional rules of logic), but merely that while
its vertical spin state in the retarded portion of history can be either up or
down, the same vertical spin state can also be either up or down in the
advanced portion of history, which means that four different combinations
of states are allowed, thereby contradicting the hypothesis that this vertical
state can only be either up or down and nothing else for any single process,
or at any single time (which actually consists of two different times that must
simply correspond with one another for the retarded and advanced portions
of history, as I will later explain).
It is therefore possible to assume that the spin of an electron along any
axis is always in a unique, but unobservable state in any one portion of his-
tory, even though it is not in a unique state for any process (when a process
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is adequately considered to involve both a retarded and an advanced por-
tion), as experiments confirm. Thus, if those experiments with electrons, as
well as more decisive observations of the same kind, do show that quantum
strangeness is unavoidable, it would be incorrect to assume that what they
demonstrate is that a realist interpretation of quantum theory is impossible
and that there cannot be an unique reality of some kind behind the observed
phenomena. Indeed, the contradictions which are encountered in the con-
text of a conventional realist interpretation are only made apparent in the
statistical distribution of measurement results and always concern physical
attributes which actually remain unobserved, while it is precisely at this
level that the alternative interpretation proposed here differs from the con-
ventional theory. But given that this realist interpretation of quantum theory
allows non-local correlations to arise from backward in time causation, even
in the absence of non-local influences, then it also appears inappropriate to
argue, as is often done, that only a rejection of scientific realism (the idea
that there must exist an ‘objective’ reality between measurements) may al-
low to avoid the conclusion that quantum non-locality is a real phenomenon
that arises from instantaneous action at a distance. Quantum non-locality
is not an illusion, but action at a distance can be avoided, even in a realist
interpretation (I will return to this question in the following section).
It is the fact that, traditionally, time-symmetric interpretations of quan-
tum theory involved classical wavelike phenomena that made them undesir-
able as realist interpretations. But once the dual nature of the state vector
is understood to be a consequence of the existence of two actual histories in
which particles propagate once through any of the available paths and then
again through any of those same available paths, but in the opposite direction
of time, then the time-symmetric nature of quantum reality becomes a more
significant asset given that it allows to reproduce the statistics of quantum
measurement processes and to explain interference effects involving distinct
paths while naturally providing a picture of quantum reality that satisfies
the requirements of scientific realism. Of course the reality unveiled here is
not classical, because it involves probability amplitudes instead of classical
probabilities and it requires the existence of an unobserved counterpart to
every conventional process (because we really experience only one of the two
portions of history at any single time). But then, what we are dealing with
is quantum reality and not classical reality and only consistency provides an
unavoidable criterion for judging the validity of any representation of reality.
If quantum strangeness itself cannot be avoided then there must certainly
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remain some unexpected element in any empirically accurate model. In fact,
it appears that it is the remaining ‘incomprehensible’ aspects of quantum re-
ality that make the theory truly consistent in a way that would be impossible
classically and, as such, they are certainly not undesirable.
As I explained in the preceding section, consistency merely dictates that
physical reality must in effect be real and therefore unique in some particular
way, but it does not a priori constrain this reality to conform to some precon-
ceived criteria of appropriateness we may believe should apply, that would be
based on an experience of physical reality which is restricted to a subset of
experimental conditions, namely those where quantum interference and time
symmetry are usually unapparent. What’s more, I’m not suggesting that two
processes are taking place in parallel that could differ from one another in an
observable way, in violation of the uniqueness of historical facts, but merely
and precisely that there is a counterpart to history which, even if possibly
distinct from its time-reverse version at the level of intricate details, would
nevertheless remain identical from the viewpoint of its observable macro-
scopic features, even though it would still be required to exist in order to
explain certain observable features of reality (the interferences). Therefore,
what constitutes a decisive advantage of the time-symmetric interpretation
of quantum theory proposed here (over the usually favored approach accord-
ing to which all paths are followed together all at once in one single portion
of history) is that it naturally agrees with the observation that all results of
quantum measurements are in effect unique, so that it is no longer neces-
sary to try to provide an independent explanation (such as the hypothetical
splitting process of a many-worlds interpretation) for why all potentialities
are not actualized all at once, as would appear to be required if all histories
actually occurred all at once, as is usually assumed.
It seems that the error that is made in the context of most current in-
terpretations of quantum theory is that we fail to recognize that if we were
to take into account the existence of the advanced portion of every quantum
process it would simply no longer be necessary to assume that all paths from
either the retarded or the advanced portion of history are somehow being
followed all at once, because the simple fact that the advanced portion of
the process can be different from the retarded portion while still obeying the
macroscopic constraints of the experiment, is sufficient to guarantee that it
is only when all possible paths are taken into consideration that the right
predictions concerning the probability of occurrence of the whole process will
be obtained. Those considerations are also valid in the case where we are
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dealing with an entirely predictable outcome involving one single event (like
the non-arrival of a photon at a detector located in one of the dark regions
of an interference pattern), even if such a time-symmetric process cannot
involve all interfering paths all at once (but merely two of them), because in
the context where probability amplitudes are involved it is possible for the
probability of one single event to be null, or for the event to be absolutely cer-
tain given that the presence of phase interferences allows a complete history
(composed of a retarded and an advanced portion) to contribute negatively
to the final probability of a process and as I will explain below this actually
allows all the different alternatives to contribute to the probability of one
single process.
Another advantage of such a realist time-symmetric interpretation is that
it allows to enforce the global consistency of factual aspects of the world in
a way that is particularly significant in the case of entangled systems. In-
deed, if one is to assume that the retarded and the advanced portions of
history share the same macroscopic conditions (a hypothesis whose validity
will be justified in section 12), then the result of a measurement performed
on one of two entangled particles must be compatible with both the experi-
mental conditions of this measurement and those of any measurement that
may eventually be performed on the other particle, because in any refer-
ence system (from the viewpoint of any observer) there is as much causal
influence from the first measurement on the second, as there is from that
second measurement on the first, due to the existence of both forward and
backward propagated causal influences. What is apparent here, therefore,
is that a quantum mechanical description of reality involves some form of
causal circularity of the kind that would arise if time travel was a possi-
bility. But, as I mentioned in section 4, the only problem that may arise
in the context where such closed causal chains would be considered a pos-
sibility does not have to do with the absence of free-will that they would
perhaps render manifest (which is significant merely from the viewpoint of
our conventional, unidirectional experience of time), but with the hypothesis
that global consistency (the idea that all facts must agree with one another
under all circumstances) could be violated. What remains to understand,
therefore, is how it is exactly that this requirement is enforced at the level
of time-symmetric quantum mechanical processes.
It should be clear, first of all, that quantum theory does appear to be
the appropriate framework for implementing global consistency, as it already
allows to appropriately handle the closed causal chains occurring as a re-
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sult of the existence of antiparticles as negative energy particles propagating
backward in time. Thus, the usual approach to estimating the probability
for a process to occur, which amounts to sum up the probability amplitudes
for all possible ways by which a process can occur and then to take the
square of this complex number, appears to allow global consistency to be
predicted, only, it is not completely clear why, in effect, such an annoying
procedure allows to produce consistency in the context where backward cau-
sation would be assumed to constitute an unavoidable aspect of a quantum
mechanical description of reality. To understand what is going on, it is nec-
essary to first recognize that a complete quantum process (one to which can
be attributed a certain probability) actually consists in the combination of
a retarded history unfolding from a given past state toward a given future
state through one particular unobservable path forward in time, followed by
an advanced history unfolding from the same future state toward the same
past state through another particular and still unobservable path backward
in time, or vice versa (as it may be the advanced history that is ‘followed’ by
the retarded history backward in time).
Thus, it is essential that the two possible segments of history, which are
unfolding in opposite directions of time, be combined to actually give rise to
one complete time-symmetric process to which can indeed be assigned a defi-
nite classical probability (instead of a mere probability amplitude). It would
then be by adding the probabilities for all such combined, time-symmetric
processes which are compatible with the observable past and future exper-
imental conditions that we would obtain the final correlation probability.
Now, even though such a procedure can be shown to produce transition
probabilities equivalent to those of the conventional approach under simi-
lar circumstances, the problem is that it is not always possible to obtain
meaningful results from such a procedure, unless one limits the scope of
the questions that can be asked concerning the history of a system and its
environment by adopting a suitable coarse-graining. It is only under such
conditions (when certain details are ignored about the processes which are
described) that classically meaningful probabilities can be obtained for vari-
ous alternative histories.
In the context of the conventional, modern interpretation of quantum
theory (the consistent histories interpretation) what this would be assumed
to mean is that when described with a maximum level of detail certain histo-
ries are simply nonsense and cannot be considered to actually occur as real
physical phenomena. This would be the case, for example, of the history of
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a photon as it goes from source to detector in the conventional double slit
experiment, when the particular path taken by the particle is not subjected
to direct observation, because it seems that one cannot define a classically
meaningful probability for any such a history. But I believe that this self-
imposed and somewhat arbitrary restriction concerning what can be con-
sidered real of reality itself is not appropriate and arises merely because we
do not understand the profound significance of those apparently inconsistent
probabilities, which only emerges when they are considered in the context of
a fully time-symmetric conception of reality.
It must be clear that what I find problematic about the formalism of con-
sistent histories is the restriction that is usually imposed regarding what can
be meaningfully described of quantum reality, not the logic of the conclusion
made in the context of the conventional interpretation of quantum theory
concerning what can be classically described of quantum reality (which his-
tories can be assigned classically meaningful probabilities) and under which
circumstances. What I’m trying to explain is that the criterion of decoher-
ence which is imposed on families of coarse-grained histories in the context
of the consistent histories interpretation of quantum theory is not really a
criterion for assessing what is consistent of reality, but merely a criterion for
assessing what is classically well-defined of this reality. I believe that it is in-
correct to argue that common sense logic (conventional logic) is increasingly
less adequate for describing reality when we consider increasingly smaller
scales, even though it is certainly true that the probability that various al-
ternative histories interfere with one another rises as those histories are being
described with an increasing amount of detail (using a finer coarse-graining).
Clearly either conventional logic applies or it doesn’t and one cannot try to
justify how nonsense could be made acceptable by relying on the confused
notion of complementarity (the apparent freedom to describe the same reality
with mutually incompatible concepts).
The problem with this conventional interpretation of quantum strangeness
is that it would cease to provide a logically consistent picture of reality12
precisely on the scale where the unconventional phenomena we may want
to understand are occurring (the quantum scale). But this difficulty arises
merely when we fail to understand that conventional logic applies not to
12It must be clear that my use of the term ‘consistency’ does not have the meaning
it has in the context of the consistent interpretation of quantum theory where it refers
merely to the classical definiteness of a history.
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the observed phenomena themselves, but to the unobservable, unique reality
which consists in each of the two portions of history that unfold in opposite
directions of time for every process on any scale. The fact that conventional
logic still applies on the classical scale, even from a more traditional view-
point can therefore be understood to result not from the fact that reality is
only consistent on such a scale, but from the fact that the two time-reversed
portions of history must always be the same on such a scale (for reasons I
will explain in section 12).
Anyhow, what is usually considered undesirable of the probabilities that
may sometimes be obtained for a combined pair of histories is that they can
assume negative values, or normalized values larger than one. I believe that
one can only begin to understand why the existence of negative probabilities
in the intermediary stages of the estimation of a final transition probability is
not catastrophic when one recognizes that it is precisely the circularity of all
quantum causal chains (that follows from the existence of an advanced por-
tion to every quantum process) that enforces the consistency of the present
with a given future (while the retarded portion enforces the consistency of
this future with the known present, as is usually understood). In the context
where one must take into account the existence of quantum interferences it
appears necessary, in effect, to impose on the quantum phase that it returns
to a value that is as close to its initial value as possible after a complete,
time-symmetric process has occurred (once forward and once backward in
time) if this unobservable parameter is to have any physical significance. Of
course this initial value can be any arbitrarily chosen one, as only changes to
the phase and the amplitude of the wave function, occurring as a result of the
evolution that takes place during the retarded and advanced portions of a
process, are significant. In other words, if the phase was originally pi radiant
it cannot end up being 2pi radiant (if the amplitude of the wave function re-
mains unchanged) after a complete time-symmetric process has taken place,
otherwise a contradiction would have occurred, as those two phases are the
perfect opposite of one another and therefore correspond to two maximally
distinct unobservable initial conditions (of the phase itself) which can only
belong to two mutually exclusive instances of physical reality.
In the present context, probabilities larger than one merely constitute
another facet of the same problem, because, as Feynman pointed out [14],
a greater than one probability for a given process to occur is equivalent to
a negative probability that the same process will not occur. What I’m sug-
gesting, then, is that whenever the probability for a process to occur in one
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specific way is negative one must assume that if the process would occur in
this specific way it would diminish the chances that the observable macro-
scopic conditions which would have actually given rise to it existed in the first
place, thereby making the sum of probabilities for all the possible ways the
process could occur smaller than it would otherwise be, given that it would
make the initial conditions themselves less likely to have occurred (because
the probability that the process would occur in such a way would decrease the
likelihood that the process may occur in any possible way instead of increas-
ing it as is usually the case). Thus, when a pair of minimally coarse-grained
histories (composed of both a retarded and an advanced portion) has a neg-
ative probability of occurrence, this can be interpreted as diminishing the
chances that the process involved may occur by following any possible path
(even those for which there is no destructive interference). Likewise, when
the probability for an individual pair of minimally coarse-grained histories
to occur is larger than one, this can be interpreted as decreasing the chances
that alternative initial conditions existed, which is another way to say that
it would actually increase the chances that the actual initial conditions that
gave rise to this history did indeed occur.
Thus, one cannot just speak about a reduction or an increase in the
probability that some future outcome is realized when some past conditions
are observed, but also about a reduction or an increase in the probability
that a given set of initial conditions could be observed to occur whenever a
given set of future conditions are satisfied. Those additional contributions
to the conventional measures of transition probability are dependent only on
the degree of compatibility between the unobservable initial quantum phase
and the quantum phase that is obtained as a result of the phase change that
occurs in the course of the whole time-symmetric process (the combination
of a retarded and an advanced history). From this viewpoint, therefore, a
process is allowed to influence the very probability that certain boundary
conditions necessary for its occurrence may be found to exist, not just in
the future, but in the past as well. In the context of a time-symmetric
interpretation of quantum theory it should actually be expected that such
effects would arise given that there is necessarily as much influence of the
future on the past as there is of the past on the future, which forbids the
initial macroscopic conditions to be determined independently from what
happens in the unknown future.
What transpires therefore is that when the retarded and advanced por-
tions of the history of a given unobserved physical attribute are such that
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they require changes to the quantum phase that would not allow it to return
to its initial value (as would occur when the phases associated with the two
possible paths in a double slit experiment interfere destructively), then one
must assume that the probability that those very initial conditions themselves
could be observed to occur is reduced in proportion to the magnitude of this
contradiction and given that those initial conditions have ‘already’ occurred
then the pair of minimally coarse-grained histories with which is associated a
negative probability would merely contribute to reduce the probability that
the process is actually observed to take place following any possible paths
forward and backward in time.
As a result, even though the probability that a given history is observed
to occur must in effect be a positive number smaller or equal to one, any
unobserved portion of history that contributes to determine this final proba-
bility could have a negative probability of occurrence, or a probability larger
than one and still be describable as consistently as any other portion of his-
tory. The proposed interpretation, therefore, does not require to reject as
meaningless the histories with which are associated negative probabilities,
as those time-symmetric processes can be interpreted in a realist way and
do not differ fundamentally from other time-symmetric histories (occurring
once forward and then backward in time), given that they do contribute in
a meaningful way to establish the final, positive transition probabilities for
a given sufficiently coarse-grained (macroscopic) history to occur.
It is merely the fact that negative probabilities can only arise when quan-
tum interferences are actually present, while in general interferences are only
apparent when the actual path followed by a quantum system is not sub-
jected to direct observation, that explains that we appear to be justified to
assume that negative probabilities cannot arise and must be physically mean-
ingless, because it is true that the validity of theoretical estimates regarding
the probability that such individual portions of history occur cannot be con-
firmed through direct observation, as a matter of principle. Once again, it
is merely the fact that our experience of reality is limited to the portion of
it that is directly accessible to our senses that explains that we have never
experienced negative probabilities and that we view them with suspicion, as
if the histories they characterize could not be real. What I have explained is
that this self-imposed limitation concerning the scope of a realist description
of quantum phenomena is not necessary and once this is understood, then all
the histories that contribute to establish the statistics of quantum processes
can be given the status of physical reality as required.
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Thus, the occurrence of negative probabilities in the context of the realist,
time-symmetric interpretation of quantum theory I’m proposing should not
be considered a problem all by itself, because it can be assigned a clear
meaning as long as those negative values do not show up in the final results of
the estimation of a transition probability for an observed history. In fact, even
from a purely formal perspective, the proposed approach may be considered
more adequate than the traditional method, given that it always involves
only the summation of real probabilities (real but possibly negative numbers)
instead of probability amplitudes (complex numbers with no independent
physical meaning).
In any case, it is now apparent that the most important weakness of
early time-symmetric quantum models (such as Cramer’s transactional the-
ory discussed in section 6) is that they required assuming that the advanced
waves which are part of a complete ‘handshake’ process propagate backward
in time in the same portion of history as that in which the retarded waves
propagate forward in time, instead of occurring as part of an independent
segment of history, which would forbid any interaction with the processes
taking place in the retarded segment13. It is important, therefore, to under-
stand that even though the retarded and advanced portions of history share
macroscopic experimental conditions and even though their durations also
correspond to a certain extent, they do not take place simultaneously (even
in the opposite order) in the same segment of history (how this can actually
be made reasonable will be discussed in section 12). It is precisely the fact
that we are dealing with two different portions of history that allows the
principle of local causality to be observed despite the fact that the model
proposed allows non-local correlations to arise, because, in effect, the par-
ticles which are propagating in one of those two portions of history do not
interact with those which are propagating at the corresponding moment in
the time-reversed portion of history. As a result, this alternative approach
allows to do away with the advanced waves as real classical waves and this
means that, contrarily to the early time-symmetric models, the interpreta-
tion of quantum theory proposed here is not a particular instance of classical
13For those reasons the time-symmetric interpretation of quantum theory proposed here
cannot form the basis of a solution to the problem of advanced waves, because in the
present case we are not dealing with advanced propagation as it could be observed to occur
in the same portion of history and this shows again that the problem of the absence of
advanced waves must be considered independently from the problem of the interpretation
of quantum theory.
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hidden variables theory.
This is certainly a suitable characteristic of the proposed model because,
as I previously mentioned, it is now understood that in order to reproduce
the results of certain experiments in which quantum entanglement is involved
(the EPR-type experiments which will be discussed in the following section),
classical hidden variables would need to violate the principle of local causality,
which would require the existence of complex and highly unnatural mecha-
nisms. I believe that a similar unnatural coordination of influences, now
affecting experimental conditions, would be required if we were to assume
instead that quantum non-locality is an illusion attributable to what has
been called absolute determinism, or the idea that every choice of measure-
ment is determined in advance as a consequence of deterministic evolution.
It is clear to me, indeed, that from a physical viewpoint this latter proposal
merely constitutes the same classical hidden variables theory in disguise, be-
cause in the absence of non-local influences the puzzling predetermination
which it requires would remain unexplained and this means that the hypoth-
esis would simply be inadequate.
What adds to the difficulties facing all such interpretations is that it
was experimentally demonstrated not so long ago [15] that the classical hid-
den variables hypothesis is in fact incompatible with the results of certain
measurements that can be performed on a single quantum object, for which
entanglement is irrelevant. Basically, what those experiments are designed
to achieve is a measurement of five pairs of attributes of a photon that is
in a state of superposition of three position states. When the experiments
are performed it emerges that the statistical distribution of measurement re-
sults is incompatible with what is allowed in the case where classical hidden
variables (of the naive realist kind) determine the outcome of those measure-
ments, because the choice of which pairs of attributes are to be measured
affects the outcome of the measurements. What those results were immedi-
ately assumed to imply is that what is not measured of a quantum system
cannot be considered to exist independently. But it must be clear that, in
this particular case, just as in the cases where quantum entanglement is in-
volved, what has really been demonstrated is not that there cannot exist a
unique reality in between measurements, but that this unique reality cannot
be of a classical kind (it cannot involve only a unique retarded history for
the unobserved physical attributes).
I have already explained, however, why reality cannot be uniquely char-
acterized, in the classical sense, in between measurements and those devel-
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opments clearly show that it is not necessary to reject the hypothesis of a
unique reality for the retarded and advanced portions of a process, regardless
of whether a physical attribute is being measured or not. In the case at hand
it seems that what is happening is that the different possible measurements
are affecting the constraints which are exerted on the unobserved retarded
and advanced portions of history and are thus allowed to give rise to different
patterns of interference for some related physical attributes, as also occurs
in the case of entangled systems (more about this in the following section).
But the conclusion that there is no reality independent of what is revealed
by measurements is not made unavoidable by those experiments, even if it is
certainly true that this reality cannot be classical and must be conceived of
in accordance with the requirements of time-symmetric causality.
It is also the fact that reality is not classical, even though it is unique
in a certain sense, that allows to explain the otherwise puzzling thought ex-
periments proposed by Yakir Aharonov, Jeff Tollaksen, Sandu Popescu and
their colleagues [16]. Those experiments involve sending three electrons on
two possible paths in an interferometer and then effecting some post selec-
tion (see section 6) on some of the electrons to influence their past states
backward in time and in the process give rise to quantum correlations be-
tween the states of the electrons involved. What is remarkable here is that
according to quantum theory even if you send three electrons at a time in the
interferometer, no two electrons will ever appear to have gone through the
same arm of the interferometer during any single trial, as if it was possible for
three electrons to simultaneously go through two possible paths without any
two electrons ever going through the same path. But the paradox associated
with such a thought experiment only arises when we fail to understand the
fact that the trajectory of the electrons is only unique in the sense discussed
above.
What would be proved by those experiments (if they were actually per-
formed) is merely that when none of the particles are directly observed to
follow one path, then no pair of particles can in effect be determined to follow
the same path classically, that is, for both the retarded and the advanced
portions of the process. But this does not mean that a given pair of particles
may not be following the same unobservable paths during either the retarded
or the advanced portions of the process, as long as those trajectories actually
remain unobserved, which is precisely the outcome of the condition imposed
on the final state in the experiments discussed here. No three particles can
go through two different paths without two going through the same path,
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only, particles can go through no specific path during the complete time-
symmetric process and obviously if no particle goes through a single path
from a classical viewpoint, then no pair of particles can go through a single
path either (from the same viewpoint), even if from a realist time-symmetric
viewpoint there are always at least two particles following the same unique,
but unobservable path either forward or backward in time.
Finally, it is also important to mention that even though the energy signs
of the particles present in the advanced portion of history considered here are
well-defined relative to the energy signs of the particles present in the retarded
portion of history, in the sense that any positive energy particle that is ob-
served to be propagating forward in time would be related by the observable
macroscopic conditions to a negative energy particle propagating backward
in time (those assumptions will be justified in section 12), this does not mean
that all the particles present in the retarded portion of history would have
positive energy signs, while those present in the advanced portion of history
would have negative energy signs. In fact, in each of the two corresponding
segments of history there may be both positive and negative energy particles
propagating in any direction of time and all that we can assess is that the
positive energy particles which are observed to propagate forward in time
in one of the two portions of history must have negative energy as they are
observed to propagate backward in time in the corresponding time-reverse
portion of history. It should be clear, therefore, that there is no correspon-
dence between the particles present in the advanced portion of history that
is required to exist by the time-symmetric formulation of quantum theory
discussed here and the unobserved negative action particles whose properties
were described in chapter 1 of [1] and which actually propagate in the same
segment of history as ordinary positive action particles, even though they
also have their own counterparts in the advanced portion of history, as any
other matter component.
9 Quantum entanglement and non-locality
Before I get onto the quantum measurement problem and share the most
significant insights I have gained while working on the problem of the inter-
pretation of quantum theory I would like to return to the important question
of the viability of a realist description of quantum phenomena in the context
of the existence of non-local correlations. It is possible, in effect, to apply
88
the interpretation which was developed in the preceding section to provide
a realist and yet locally causal description of the processes taking place in
the course of an experiment of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen type involving
pairs of entangled photons. What I will explain is that the experimentally
confirmed violation of Bell’s inequality does not make unavoidable the con-
clusion that instantaneous action at a distance must be an integral aspect
of any realist interpretation, in the sense that we are still allowed to assume
that no influence can propagate faster than the relativistic speed limit in the
course of the retarded and advanced portions of history, when those histories
are conceived as taking place independently at two different epochs. The fact
that I’m allowed to actually explain the existence of non-local correlations
in such a way is significant, because, contrarily to what is often believed,
quantum non-locality is not only unexplainable from a classical perspective,
it is not explainable at all in the context of the conventional interpretation
of quantum theory.
To help visualize the phenomenon of quantum non-locality we may con-
sider, for example, a simple interferometer experiment where the source, in-
stead of emitting one photon in one direction, would emit a pair of entangled
photons which would be allowed to travel in opposite directions along one or
another of two possible trajectories in each of which they would meet a mirror
that would direct them toward a unique detector that would allow to deter-
mine either the presence of interferences between the two paths available to
a given photon (by simply detecting the arrival of the photon), or the exact
path a photon took on its way to the detector (through a measurement of
the photon’s angle of impact). What’s particular with such an interferometer
experiment is that when we choose to measure the angle of impact of one of
the two photons we also inevitably determine which path the other photon
took in its own otherwise independent part of the experiment, so that even if
we try to measure interferences between the two paths available to this other
photon we do not observe any. This correspondence is made unavoidable by
the fact that when the angle of impact of the first photon is determined, the
angle of impact of the second photon must be the exact opposite of that of
the first photon in order that momentum be conserved in the initial state.
Thus, it is only when we choose not to determine the exact path taken by
any of the two photons that we are in effect allowed to observe the presence
of interferences between the two paths available to each of them.
From this perspective it is apparent that when we are dealing with en-
tangled systems (when the phases associated with the propagation of two
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otherwise independent systems have become entangled as a result of local
contact) the choice of whether to measure an angle of impact or the presence
of interferences between multiple paths is not made locally, but constitute a
global property of the experiment, because whenever an angle of impact is
measured for one of the entangled photons it is no longer possible to measure
interferences between the multiple paths available to the other photon. All
that must be understood is that what enforces the global character of this
choice of measurement is the existence of an advanced portion of history.
Indeed, whenever we choose to determine the exact path taken by one of the
two photons, the result of any measurement performed on the other photon
must reflect that choice, because the effect of the measurement performed
in the future on the first photon propagates backward in time (through the
advanced portion of the first process) to the initial entangled state and then
forward in time (through the retarded portion of the second process) to af-
fect the measurement result performed on the second photon, even when
this measurement is separated from the measurement performed on the first
photon by a space-like interval. It must be clear that this backward cau-
sation does not determine what the result of one particular measurement is
whenever a measurement is performed on the other particle (this is the out-
come of conservation laws), it only determines if interferences can actually
be observed at any of the two detectors.
Indeed, you may recall my earlier discussion regarding the fact that in
the context of the proposed realist time-symmetric interpretation of quantum
theory it becomes possible for the observable macroscopic conditions imposed
on a quantum process in both the past and the future to be influenced by
the very process itself. What I have explained is that those conditions should
allow the quantum phase to get back to a value as close to its initial unobserv-
able value as possible after a complete time-symmetric process has occurred
(once forward and once backward in time) if the conditions necessary for the
process to happen are to themselves be allowed to have occurred in the first
place. When the outcome of a complete time-symmetric process along one
possible trajectory results in a final phase that is interfering destructively
with the initial phase, then negative probabilities arise (with an amplitude
determined by the phase shift involved) which contribute to decrease the final
measurable probability that the observed process actually occurs by follow-
ing any of the possible trajectories available to it, because the probability
that the (initial and final) conditions necessary for the process to occur in
such a way are satisfied is then itself reduced.
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But it is exactly in such a way that non-local influences are conveyed
between the two particles forming an entangled pair in the experiments dis-
cussed above, because under such conditions interference effects observed at
one location (on one particle) depend on the experimental conditions ob-
served at a different location (on a different particle), simply because the
phase changes which arise in the course of those processes are occurring as a
result of the boundary conditions applying on the complete time-symmetric
process and not just on some portion of it associated only with one or an-
other particle. What those experiments (during which a violation of Bell’s
inequality is observed to occur) have revealed is that it is possible to demon-
strate the existence of such non-local correlations which cannot be attributed
merely to the conditions imposed by conservation principles on the total mo-
mentum (or polarization state) of the two entangled photons in the context
where they are created by pair in the initial state (which merely requires that
one photon goes through the upper path when the other goes through the
lower path).
In any case, as soon as the angle of impact of a photon is measured at one
or the other detector in the experiment described above, then it is no longer
possible to measure interferences between the two possible trajectories for
any of the two photons, because the retarded and the advanced trajectories
are then exactly the same in all possible cases and for each photon, which
means that there is no phase change for a complete time-symmetric process.
If it seemed impossible from a conventional viewpoint to assume that the
photons propagated along a unique trajectory prior to such a measurement, it
is because the measurement is what determines whether interferences will be
observed or not for both particles and when interferences are indeed present
the trajectories of the two photons are no longer well-defined from a classical
viewpoint, which has always been interpreted to mean that there is nothing
we can say of reality under such conditions. But what emerges from the
more consistent perspective adopted here is that it does appear possible to
assume that each photon follows a unique, causally independent trajectory
as it propagates toward its detector, from the moment when it is emitted by
the source and right up to the moment when a measurement is performed on
it, contrarily to what would appear to be allowed according to the orthodox
interpretation of quantum theory, only, it turns out that in certain cases
(when interferences are present) this unique trajectory can be different for
the retarded and the advanced portions of the propagation process, so that
it cannot be argued that the photons are always in a classically well-defined
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position state as they propagate toward their detectors.
What happens, therefore, is that the presence or the absence of quantum
interferences between the multiple trajectories available to one of the two
entangled photons as it propagates toward its detector is determined by the
choice of which measurement is performed on the second photon in the fu-
ture, as a consequence of the existence of the backward in time propagating
influences attributable to the advanced portion of the history of this sec-
ond photon. Thus, the trajectory of the first photon must already be either
classically well-defined or quantum mechanically superposed right from the
moment when the particle emerges from the initial entangled state, in or-
der that those conditions actually agree with the observational constraint set
by any measurement that could be performed on the second photon in the
future. Any measurement performed on the first photon itself must, there-
fore, agree with the constraints set by the choice of which measurement is
performed on the second photon in the future. But, given that there is also
an advanced portion of history that is experienced by the first photon, then
the classical or superposed nature of the trajectory followed by its entangled
counterpart as it propagates in the future toward its own detector is also
required to agree with the choice of measurement that is to be performed on
the first photon itself in the future.
As a result, even if the experimental conditions that determine which at-
tribute will be measured by the detectors are changed once the photons have
already been emitted, the initial retarded and advanced states will already
be such as to reflect that future change and will evolve in accordance with
those altered conditions, because the initial retarded states of the two en-
tangled photons are influenced by the choice of measurements performed at
each detector in the future (through the advanced portion of the processes).
Thus, the whole experimental setup with which the photons will interact in
both the past and the future determines what is allowed to happen to both of
them, even as they just leave the source in the forward propagating version
of history, before they interact with a detector. It should be clear, therefore,
that the measurement that is performed on any one particular photon cannot
alone and in every circumstance determine what happens to both photons,
as one must assume from a conventional viewpoint, because unidirectional
causality is not involved in conveying the influence that propagates along the
advanced portions of the processes, from each future measurement back into
the initial entangled state.
There is no additional complexity involved here (no information carrying
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signal needs to be sent backward in time). Each measurement determines the
state of a photon at the moment when this measurement takes place, but this
choice of measurement also influences the state of the photon as it reaches
the source in the advanced portion of history, just as when a past state
influences a future state, only now backward in time and without entropy
increase. But, given that in the above discussed experiments this past state
is an entangled state which results in the two photons sharing a common
phase, then it follows that the past state of the first photon is also causally
influenced by the choice of measurement performed on the second photon in
the future, in a way that is not that different from the usual manner by which
influences are propagated forward in time, except that information cannot
be carried by the effects so produced, given that entropy cannot rise as the
causal influences propagate in the past direction of time. This is all made
unavoidable in the context where the retarded portion of history experienced
by any of the two photons must share the same observational constraints as
apply to the advanced portion of history that is also experienced by any of
the two photons (for reasons I will discuss in section 12).
What this shows, is that instead of insisting that the wave function may
not be real, or that it merely represents the state of knowledge of one par-
ticular observer which must be actualized on contact with information from
another, previously independent observer (as one postulates in the context
of an interpretation of quantum theory such as ‘QBism’), we should instead
recognize that the wave function does provide our best account of the exact
quantum state of a system at any time, but that there are two such states (as-
sociated with two actual histories), one of which is evolving forward in time
and the other of which is evolving backward in time. In such a context the
fact that the wave function may sometimes appear to be a subjective prop-
erty, dependent on whether information concerning the conditions of a future
measurement to be performed on a system is available or not, can be seen
to be a mere consequence of the fact that we cannot know in advance what
the backward in time evolving state is before we obtain information about
that future measurement, even though it already affects the present state of
the system. The adequacy of this viewpoint appears to have been confirmed
by the fact that the process of actualization of quantum potentialities is now
understood to be the consequence of concrete changes that take place in the
environment with which a system becomes correlated under very specific con-
ditions (those responsible for triggering decoherence), thereby contradicting
the hypothesis that it might be a subjective phenomenon.
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In any case, what must be understood concerning the interferometer ex-
periment discussed above is that the unique trajectories of the entangled
photons are only required to be made identical in the retarded and advanced
portions of history for the two photons when it is the angle of impact of the
photon that is measured at one or the other of the two detectors and not
the interferences. Indeed, even if what happens at the source is influenced
through backward causation by what occurs at the detectors, if the two de-
tectors are set to determine merely the presence of quantum interferences,
the measurement performed by the second detector cannot determine the
trajectory that was not determined by the first one and neither is the mea-
surement performed by the first detector allowed to determine the trajectory
that was not determined by the second one, given that neither of those two
measurements allow to determine through which slit one of the photons went
on the way to its detector and this must be reflected in the unobservable
and interfering nature of the trajectories of both photons as they propagate
between the source and the detectors in the retarded and advanced portions
of history.
Thus, if one of the two photons in an EPR experiment of the kind de-
scribed above is found to have traveled along one particular path as a result of
the choice of measurement performed on it, then both photons will propagate
along one particular path during both the retarded portion of history (away
from the source) and the advanced portion of history (toward the source). It
is only when none of the two photons in an entangled pair is experimentally
determined to have traveled along one or another of the two possible paths
(as a result of the choice of measurement to be performed on both parti-
cles) that it can no longer be assumed that the trajectory of both photons is
classically well-defined and in such a case interferences between the multiple
possible trajectories would indeed arise. This does not mean, however, that
the two photons would not have unique and corresponding trajectories (when
one photon goes through the upper path, the other photon must necessarily
go through the lower path) in both the retarded and the advanced portions
of the process, merely that those trajectories would remain unobservable and
could be different for the same photon in the two portions of history. For
any type of EPR experiment it is only the attribute of a particle that is cor-
related to that of the other particle by the conservation principles applying
on the initial state (which in the example discussed here would always be the
one-parameter angle of impact associated with the momentum direction of
the photon) that must necessarily be classically determined for one particle
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when it is so determined for the other particle.
As I mentioned above, what justifies the widespread belief that the un-
observed attribute of the photons in an EPR experiment were in no state at
all before at least one of the two measurements was performed is simply the
fact that when neither detectors are set to measure the correlated attribute,
interferences between multiple intermediary states can arise which cannot be
classically described. But once we recognize the influence exerted by the ad-
vanced portion of the processes involved, then it once again becomes possible
to consider that the photons follow unique trajectories at all times in both
the retarded and the advanced portions of any one particular history, even
when it is not the correlated attribute (the angle of impact) which is mea-
sured at any of the two detectors. This is certainly appropriate given that it
is not possible, in general, to tell which of two measurements (on one or the
other photon) determines the time at which the intermediary states could
be considered to no longer interfere and to actually become real14. The only
requirement, therefore, is that there is always a correspondence between the
trajectories followed by the two photons in both portions of history (such as
if one photon goes through the upper path, then the other must go through
the lower path), as we are in effect dealing with correlated states, but unless
it is the state of the correlated attribute that is actually measured at one
of the two detectors it is not possible, as a matter of principle, to tell what
those corresponding trajectories really are in any particular case. What’s
interesting is that once the validity of this viewpoint is recognized it follows
that the idea that the concept of a localized particle may no longer be valid
in the presence of quantum entanglement and that it should be replaced by
a holistic concept of reality at a fundamental level is no longer justified and
actually loses most of its appeal.
At this point it is necessary to mention that I’m perfectly aware of the
fact that Murray Gell-Mann (among others) once argued that the idea that
EPR-type experiments imply a certain form of non-locality is merely a distor-
14This is easier to understand in the context of EPR-type experiments involving pairs
of linearly polarized photons where it is merely the difference between the angles of polar-
ization which are measured by the two detectors that determines if there are interferences
or not. The fact that in the experiment describe above one of the detectors may appear to
be privileged in determining the presence or the absence of interferences at both detectors
when only one of the detectors measures the state of the correlated attribute should not
be considered to undermine the validity of the hypothesis that the classical definiteness of
the trajectories is in general determined by the configuration of both detectors.
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tion of reality, because (so he argued) what occurs when the angle of impact
is measured for one of the two photons is merely that we find ourselves in
one particular ‘branch’ of history where both photons happen to follow a
definite trajectory. What is problematic here, however, is not merely the
fact that such an explanation would depend on the validity of the contradic-
tory notion that a photon goes at once through all available paths (in many
‘branches’ of the same history until a ‘splitting’ process takes place and all
potentialities are actualized all at once, but presumably no longer interfere
with one another), the real difficulty has to do with the fact that from such a
viewpoint unnatural coincidences would still be observed that would remain
unexplained, because the choice of which measurement is to be performed
on one of the two photons affects the outcome of measurements performed
on the other photon in a given ‘branch’ of the universe’s history and it is
not possible to explain how even such a coordination of measurement results
would occur in a certain branch of history where the global outcome would in
effect be observed. The truth is that this rejection of quantum non-locality
is equivalent to the absolute deterministic view discussed in the preceding
section, given that it requires one to assume that it is possible for preexist-
ing correlations to exist which are not attributable to any locally propagated
causal influence. It is quite ironical, therefore, that is was suggested that this
viewpoint constitutes an alternative to classical action at a distance, because,
as I previously explained, in the context of a realist interpretation absolute
determinism is actually a form of classical hidden variables theory.
It is now possible to be more specific regarding why it is that we would
not be justified to assume that local causality is violated when a state vector
is reduced in a more general context, as when a photon is emitted by a source,
whose propagation is described by an expanding spherical wave function, and
its presence is detected in one particular location, thereby affecting the wave
function over the entire volume. I believe that if the conclusion that the prin-
ciple of local causality is violated under such conditions is not unavoidable,
even when we acknowledge the fact that the wave function always provides
the most accurate description of the state of a quantum system, it is because
this phenomenon can be described using the same realist, time-symmetric ap-
proach which I used to explain the origin of quantum non-locality as it arises
in the case of entangled systems and which involves two histories (indepen-
dent from the viewpoint of local causality) unfolding in opposite directions
of time.
What happens is that the spreading wave function allows to accurately
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describe the results of any measurement that would reveal the existence of
interferences between the multiple paths through which a photon might have
traveled as its position remained unobserved and this requires that the wave
function does indeed provide the most accurate account of the situation be-
fore a position measurement is performed, but only as long as such a mea-
surement is not, in effect, performed, because under such conditions the
retarded and advanced portions of the propagation process might take place
along different paths. However, if a position measurement is effected at some
point (before an interference measurement is performed on the same photon),
then the trajectory of the photon can nevertheless be considered to have been
unique and well-defined (to a certain extent) all the way back to the emission
process given that in such a case the advanced portion of the process enforces
the right trajectory (that which agrees with the future measurement) to be
followed as a result of its backward in time causal influence.
Now, given that what I’m proposing is a time-symmetric interpretation
of quantum theory, it is important to mention that in such a context there
must exist a time-reverse analog to ordinary quantum entanglement which
can be shown to actually give rise to non-local correlations arising from post
selection (the phenomenon discussed in section 6 by which the future state
vector in a two-state vector formulation of quantum theory is allowed to
influence the evolution of a quantum system backward in time). Thus, even in
the apparent absence of ordinary quantum entanglement established through
local contact in the past, it should be possible to observe the existence of non-
local correlations of the same type as arise in a more conventional context
when it is a future state that is entangled in a certain way as a result of
post selection. From my viewpoint the fact that those correlations do not
allow faster-than-light communication can once again be explained as being a
consequence of the fact that the constraint of global entanglement discussed
in section 3.9 of [1] requires entropy to decrease in the past for all macroscopic
processes which are occurring in the same universe, which means that no
causal signal can propagate toward the future and then backward in time to
a distant location, as a result of post selection, even if causality does operate
both forward and backward in time at a more fundamental level.
But, despite what one might be tempted to believe, the possibility that
such future entanglement may arise does not mean that every measurement
result obtained at the present moment must be correlated to every other
measurement result obtained at remote locations as a result of post selection,
because contrarily to the situation we have in the far past, most elementary
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particles present in the remote future are not in contact with one another at
any point and therefore, even if those effects do exist, they should not be as
commonplace as the effects arising from ordinary, past entanglement. In fact,
the very significance of the cosmological constraint of global entanglement
is that every particle of matter or radiation in the universe must have been
entangled with at least one other particle, which was itself entangled with
another particle, and so on, in the maximum density state of the Big Bang.
But no such a condition exists for the future (especially in the presence of
negative energy matter, for reasons I have explained in section 3.9 of [1]) and
given that we would be justified to expect that no low-gravitational-entropy
Big Crunch will ever occur, then it would seem appropriate to conclude that
future entanglement is not as essential a requirement for the universe as the
existence of a globally entangled state from which all matter emerged in the
past.
It is now possible to reflect back on the traditional positions regarding
the significance of EPR-type experiments. If we consider first of all the or-
thodox view and Bohr’s position, it amounted to consider that the detection
of the angle of impact of one of the two photons (that which happens first)
is the only cause of the reduction of the state vector (we would now say
the decoherence process) that takes place at one or the other detector. The
problem with this viewpoint is that if the wave function is considered to be
a real entity, then instantaneous action at a distance appears to be required,
which is why the orthodox interpretation retreated into its idealist position,
according to which it simply does not make sense to speak about a reality
behind observed phenomena (which may allow to avoid the conclusion that
this reality is non-local). The position held by Einstein and the advocates of
a realist approach was that this rejection of scientific realism is not accept-
able and that quantum theory must simply be wrong or incomplete, given
that it appears to require instantaneous action at a distance when the conse-
quence of a measurement on one of the two photons spreads to its entangled
counterpart. Basically, then, one position required assuming that there is no
reality, while the other required assuming that there is no entanglement. I
believe that both positions were inappropriate in some way, but also accurate
in a distinct way15. Clearly quantum theory and quantum entanglement are
15It has been argued by some of the originators of the consistent histories interpretation
of quantum theory that Einstein was misguided in trying to uphold a certain requirement of
scientific realism to which the conventional interpretation of the theory does not conform,
because it must be the theory that determines what is true of reality, even when it appears
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there to stay, but what I have tried to explain is that scientific realism is not
optional either and can be accommodated without requiring instantaneous
action at a distance, when time-symmetric causality is recognized to be an
essential aspect of this physical reality.
10 The quantum measurement problem
It is usually recognized that the two main conceptual difficulties with which
we are faced when trying to formulate a consistent interpretation of quan-
tum theory are the existence of non-local correlations and the absence of an
objective criterion for judging when it is that the multiple interfering poten-
tialities characterizing the state of some unobserved dynamic attribute of a
quantum system are actualized to a given definite value, as happens when a
measurement of this attribute is performed. In the preceding sections I have
offered a viable solution to the problem of quantum non-locality in the con-
text of a realist interpretation of quantum theory based on the requirement
of time-symmetric causality. But while progress was achieved in the last few
decades in identifying the conditions necessary for the decoherence process
to occur, it remains that we haven’t yet been able to determine exactly what
is responsible for the persistence of quasiclassicality that is observed to char-
acterize the evolution of quantum systems when they become entangled with
their environment following a measurement.
The currently favored approach proposed for solving the quantum mea-
surement problem plays a role that is much the same as the late nineteenth-
century approaches for solving the problem of the origin of thermodynamic
time asymmetry through the use of statistical methods. Indeed, at some
point Boltzmann thought that he had solved the problem of the origin of
the arrow of time, because he had achieved significant progress in identifying
its true origin. But as we now understand it appears that he had not really
provided a satisfactory explanation and that the remaining difficulties had
not even been clearly identified. Today it is widely believed that the problem
to require contradictory descriptions of it to be valid together at the same time, as when
we are trying to determine which of two measurements is responsible for determining the
state of a pair of entangled particles. But I believe that it is rather this position which
is misguided and this precisely because it constitutes an attempt at limiting what can
be consistently described of reality based on practical limitations which are attributable
merely to the inadequacy or the incompleteness of the proposed interpretation.
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of quantum measurement has been solved by the recent advances achieved
in identifying the conditions necessary for the phenomenon of decoherence
to occur, while in fact this is not entirely correct, precisely because the con-
sequences of thermodynamic time-asymmetry on quantum evolution haven’t
yet been properly assimilated. This is the problem I will attempt to circum-
scribe in this section and to which I will be able to provide a satisfactory
solution in section 12. This will allow me to confirm, once again, that a realist
approach, according to which there must exist a unique reality of some kind,
independently from whether or not a system is being observed, is not incom-
patible with the empirical evidence that singles out quantum measurement
as the necessary condition for the factual definiteness of reality.
Traditionally the quantum measurement problem had to do with the dif-
ficulty we were experiencing in trying to identify the exact nature of the
conditions that give rise to the actualization of quantum potentialities. In
fact, the linearity of the equation that describes the evolution of the state
vector made it difficult to understand how it could be that quantum inter-
ferences are in effect allowed to vanish for the dynamic attribute of a system
under observation, so that they can give rise to a definite set of outcomes
to which meaningful probabilities can be ascribed. Thus, there appeared to
be a conflict between observations, which indicate that quantum potential-
ities are actualized to definite non-interfering outcomes following what we
call a measurement, and the theory itself, which seems to require quantum
superposition of states to persist indefinitely. From a conventional perspec-
tive it would appear that when each possible outcome of a quantum process
becomes correlated with one possible state of a measuring device, if the quan-
tum system was in a state of superposition of the observable concerned at
the time when this correlation was established then the whole measuring de-
vice should also be found in a state of superposition following the moment
at which the interaction took place.
One of the earliest attempt at solving this measurement problem became
the actual justification for the conventional interpretation of quantum theory
according to which interferences arise because all possible histories occur
all at once in the same universe as different ‘branches’ of history. What
was proposed by Hugh Everett III is that there is no actualization process,
but that the superposed macroscopic states of a measuring apparatus which
result from its correlation with the interfering states of a quantum system are
themselves occurring simultaneously in parallel versions of history, while for
some reason a ‘splitting’ occurs following measurement, which is responsible
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for the fact that the multiple branches of history no longer interfere with
one another. The difficulty with this proposal, however, does not have to do
only with the fact that it would involve logical contradictions in the context
of a realist interpretation of quantum phenomena (a particle could be in one
location as well as in another, in the very same portion of history), it also
has to do with the fact that if all branches are followed together then there
is no a priori reason why there could not be branches where a measuring
device is in a state of superposition of macroscopic observables. But it is also
contradictory to suggest that no actualization process takes place, while it is
recognized that a splitting of branches is required to eliminate interferences
following a measurement.
Nevertheless, the idea endured and was later revived when it was dis-
covered that under specific conditions the phenomenon of decoherence must
give rise to a diagonalization of the reduced density operator in the basis
of the attribute under measurement, which would appear to legitimate the
splitting hypothesis. But, if there should be no doubt that the discovery of
decoherence itself was a step in the right direction, this does not mean that
the hypothesis that there may exist many continuously ‘splitting’ branches
of history in the very same universe has been confirmed. Indeed, given that
decoherence does not require the existence of those multiple branches of his-
tory, it appears that the only value that there might be in Everett’s original
proposal is not in providing a solution to the quantum measurement problem,
but in allowing one to avoid having to explain the uniqueness of measurement
results.
Indeed, it is usually recognized that the only adequate purpose of the
multiple branches hypothesis would be to allow one to avoid having to pos-
tulate the existence of distinct dynamical laws that would apply only during
processes that can be qualified as measurements, given that when all possi-
ble histories occur all at once it may not be necessary to explain why it is
that one unique measurement result is actualized among the many different
potentialities, even in the context where one would consider it necessary to
assume that the different histories are happening all at once in the absence of
measurement (given that they are known to interfere with one another under
such conditions). Thus, it is argued that when all the superposed states of
some physical attribute are assumed to be actualized together in different
splitting ‘branches’ of the same history, there no longer needs to be a cause
(of unknown origin) that would give rise to the one particular outcome that
is actually observed following measurement. But I do not find this argument
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very useful, because what it would really mean is simply that we need many
distinct causes for the many different outcomes, instead of one single cause
for the one outcome that is actually observed.
Anyhow, given that I have already argued, based on more general con-
siderations, that it is not really necessary in order to explain the existence
of quantum interferences to assume that all histories are followed all at once
in the course of each and every quantum process, then it would appear that
it is preferable to recognize that the unique reality we do observe during
measurements is a reflection of the uniqueness of the non-classical (time-
symmetric) reality that exists in between measurements, instead of trying
to argue that there must be a multiplicity of measurement results, which
we do not observe, that would correspond with a multiplicity of histories,
which we cannot observe, in between measurements. Thus, what must be
clear is that the uniqueness of measurement results is not less, but rather
more problematic when one assumes that all trajectories are followed all at
once when a physical attribute is not subject to measurement, which is a
hypothesis that is actually necessary only in the context of this many-worlds
interpretation itself. But what’s even more significant is that, as I will ex-
plain below, it appears that decoherence is not sufficient to predict that what
was measured remains in a definite quasiclassical state for which interferences
between macroscopic attributes of a measuring device are absent and there-
fore it seems that we should still expect that in some of those hypothetical
branches, macroscopic state superpositions would develop at some point.
What I find most difficult to accept regarding the many-worlds interpre-
tation, however, is the fact that we are required to believe that the unique
character of reality that we do observe on a classical scale is just an illusion,
while we are also expected to assume that the hypothesis of a multiplicity
of coexisting branches of history, which has never been directly confirmed
by any observation, is valid under all circumstances. In other words, we are
required to assume that what we see is not the true reality, while what is a
mere hypothesis that cannot yet be observationally confirmed must be con-
sidered true, even though it is clearly incompatible with what we do know
about reality. It must be clear that it is not possible to assume that the
existence of interferences between the multiple paths available to a quantum
system simply means that in between measurements a system goes through
one path in one universe and through another path in another universe, be-
cause if that was the case then we should not in fact observe interferences in
any one particular universe, because by definition universes must be assumed
102
independent from the viewpoint of causality.
But, it is also difficult to conceive that following a measurement an ob-
server present in one of the multiple branches of history would not be al-
lowed to perceive what happens in the other branches, while those branches
would under ordinary circumstances be allowed to interfere with one another,
thereby implying that they actually exist all at once in the very same uni-
verse. Here, again, a lot of silly things have been said to try to justify how
it can be that those two requirements do not contradict one another, but
in the end one must recognize that this constitutes a basic inconsistency of
the many-worlds interpretation of quantum theory that invalidates it as a
solution to the problem of quantum measurement. It is merely because this
objection is so simple that it has avoided the attention of the most knowl-
edgeable experts, who usually prefer to concentrate their efforts on more
complex and more challenging issues.
Those criticisms, however, must not be understood to mean that the hy-
pothesis of a multiplicity of universes existing independently from one another
is wrong, because in fact there may be good reasons to recognize the validity
of this clearly distinct hypothesis (which is not dependent on the validity of
the many-worlds interpretation of quantum theory) in the context where the
weak anthropic principle appears to constitute the only possible explanation
for certain otherwise unlikely properties of our universe. Thus, while it may
not be possible to reject the hypothesis that an infinity of causally indepen-
dent universes exist in parallel, it must be clear that the idea that many
interfering branches exist in the same portion of the universe’s history is a
distinct hypothesis which is certainly not as unavoidable. But if a multitude
of realities are to be allowed to interfere with one another so as to explain
quantum state superposition, then they must definitely be present all at once
in the same portion of the universe’s history and therefore cannot constitute
different universes, as is often suggested.
Personally, I always felt that the whole idea that there may exist multiple
parallel branches of history in the same universe, but that it is only when
those alternative branches should become observable (following measurement
of a physical attribute initially in a state of quantum superposition) that they
actually ‘split’ and become totally independent (as a result of decoherence),
therefore precluding a confirmation of their existence, has all the character-
istics of a conspiracy theory and this only reinforces my conviction that the
many-worlds interpretation is not good science. A truly appropriate solution
to the problem of quantum measurement would then need to be based on
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the hypothesis that reality is unique in a certain way, even in between mea-
surements, which is the only way one could avoid having to appeal to the
problematic splitting branches hypothesis in order to explain the uniqueness
of measurement results.
I’m aware, though, that it has been argued by Heinz Dieter Zeh [17] that
the multiple branches hypothesis may be unavoidable if one does not want to
have to modify quantum theory, because this hypothesis allows all possibili-
ties to be actualized all at once as different branches, which is the only way
one can avoid having to assume that a unique state of such an unobserved
attribute existed before decoherence took place, that would merely have been
revealed by the measurement. Indeed, it is known that, for various reasons,
a quantum measurement cannot be considered to simply consist in acquiring
knowledge about the unique preexisting state of an unobserved attribute.
But I have explained in section 8 that the only reason why it is impossible to
assume that a unique reality existed before a measurement was performed on
some unobserved attribute of a quantum system is the fact that we usually
assume a unique reality to be unique in the classical sense, while in fact the
unique reality that would characterize a quantum process (in the absence of
measurement on a certain dynamic attribute) is of a time-symmetric nature
and involves both a unique retarded state and a unique and possibly dif-
ferent advanced state at all times, which guarantees the consistency of past
evolution with any future measurement and which requires all possible inter-
mediary states to contribute to the final probability amplitude, so that the
future measurement does not allow to reveal a unique classical path through
which the system would have propagated16.
It is therefore simply the fact that under such circumstances the future
measurement also exerts an influence on the past state preceding it (as when
a system is submitted to post selection) that forbids one from assuming that
a unique classical state existed in the past, independent from what hap-
16Contrarily to what Zeh suggests in another publication [18], the fact that there would
exist a unique but unknown state prior to measurement of an unobserved attribute does
not violate the condition imposed by the Von Neumann equation (the quantum mechanical
generalization of Liouville’s equation) that ensemble entropy should not decrease during
measurement, because this conclusion would only be valid based on the hypothesis that
the unknown but definite state would actually be a classical (hidden variables) state, while
in a time-symmetric context when information about a measured attribute is obtained,
information concerning its conjugate counterpart is lost, which allows information to be
conserved.
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pened during measurement. But it must be clear once again that this does
not prevent a unique state from having actually existed at all times in both
portions of history and therefore the conclusion that the unique character
of measurement results can only be explained by postulating that all his-
tories are followed all at once (in the same universe) cannot be considered
valid. In any case, if reality was not of the unique time-symmetric type and
the decoherent branches hypothesis was assumed to alone provide a solu-
tion to the quantum measurement problem, then an alternative explanation
of quantum non-locality would have to be found, as it cannot be provided
by Everett’s interpretation and this is an additional difficulty for the con-
ventional approach. Thus, I think that I have explained sufficiently clearly
why it is that the frequently stated conclusion that it is just as difficult to
provide decisive arguments in favor of the many-worlds interpretation, as it
is to provide arguments that would invalidate the idea is not well founded,
because the hypothetical, multiple branches of history are not necessary, or
even adequate to explain quantum strangeness, while they also do not appear
to be required to solve the quantum measurement problem (especially in the
context where it is recognized that the splitting process would not, all by
itself, allow one to avoid the difficulty associated with the non-local aspect
of state-vector reduction).
Now, some theoreticians worry about the fact that decoherence would
seem to be insufficient to solve the problem of the actualization of quantum
potentialities when we are considering the system under observation to be
the universe as a whole (as becomes necessary in a quantum cosmological
context). The problem they see is that in such a case there would be no
outside environment degrees of freedom to effect decoherence, while this is
known to be a requirement under ordinary conditions. What constitutes a
more serious difficulty, however, is that from the viewpoint of the currently
favored approach (the consistent histories interpretation of quantum theory)
decoherence is insufficient to explain the persistence of quasiclassicality not
just in the cosmological case, but even under more general circumstances and
on a much smaller scale, as was first pointed out by Fay Dowker and Adrian
Kent [19]. But this is not just a consequence of the fact that (ignoring my
own contribution) we do not yet have a valid explanation for the irreversibil-
ity that characterizes the processes which give rise to decoherence, it rather
appears to be a basic insufficiency of the current approach, which does not
allow to predict that classical behavior would persist following decoherence,
even when irreversibility is assumed to characterize the evolution of the en-
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vironment degrees of freedom without explanation, due to some boundary
condition of low entropy that presumably apply to the initial state of the
universe at the Big Bang (I will return to this question below). The desired
solution to the quantum measurement problem, therefore, must allow to pre-
dict the emergence of quasiclassicality not just on the cosmological scale, but
also on the much smaller scale of measuring devices, where the conventional
approach is insufficient as well.
In any case, it is my intention to demonstrate that it is not necessary
in order to explain the nature of the outcomes of quantum measurement to
postulate the existence of distinct (perhaps fundamentally irreversible) evo-
lution laws that would apply only during a process that could in effect be
characterized as a measurement. Thus, if I do agree with the most knowl-
edgeable authors that quantum theory, as it is currently interpreted, fails
to explain the persistence of quasiclassicality that is observed to follow any
measurement, I do not believe that what is required in order to address this
difficulty is a modification of the basic mathematical framework of the the-
ory that would need to apply whenever measurements are performed, as was
once proposed. We cannot reject a requirement like that of time symmetry,
whose value has been sufficiently demonstrated, to seek a solution in terms of
fundamentally irreversible physical laws when there is no evidence that such
a choice is absolutely essential for a solution to the problem of the emergence
and the persistence of quasiclassicality. I still believe that it is at the level
of interpretation that the appropriate solution will emerge that will allow us
to solve the remaining difficulties surrounding quantum measurement. As I
will explain in section 12, what the current theory needs is not so much a
modification of its structure, as an extension of its meaning.
It must be recognized, however, that the distinctive feature of all pro-
cesses that can be characterized as effecting a measurement is indeed irre-
versibility. A quantum measurement is nothing but the entanglement of a
particular state of some attribute of a quantum system with some distin-
guishable macroscopic property of its environment whose future evolution is
irreversibly influenced by this particular event. The fact that no quantum in-
terference is ever observed for irreversibly evolving systems indicates that the
non-superposed nature of measurement results is related to the irreversible
character of the measurement process. Thus, decoherence itself (literally the
loss of phase coherence) can only occur when there is entanglement of an
attribute of a microscopic system with some irreversibly evolving (entropy
increasing) processes taking place in its environment (usually involving dissi-
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pation), so that the phase relations that could have given rise to interferences
become delocalized and are assumed to no longer be accessible to observa-
tion, as is already well understood. In fact, the ultimate manifestation of
irreversibility appears to be decoherence itself.
It should not be unexpected, therefore, that all measurements involve the
formation of a record, given that for a record of some past event to form,
entropy must be growing in the future. Indeed, the formation of a record
merely consists in the production of multiple persistent and somewhat inde-
pendent effects in the future, which all emerge as an outcome of one single
identifiable cause in the past and this is undoubtedly a process that is asym-
metric with respect to the direction of time. What this means is that there
is something very tangible occurring when a quantum measurement is per-
formed and therefore, if it is true that our knowledge of a quantum system
changes when quantum potentialities are actualized, it would not be appro-
priate to assume that the changes which are taking place in the course of
a measurement are merely subjective, because following measurement the
observed attribute is no longer unique merely in a time-symmetric quan-
tum way, but acquires the same unique value in both the retarded and the
advanced portions of history.
It is not difficult, in effect, to show that irreversibility is essential for
a measurement to occur, while the mere complexity, or the large number
of independent degrees of freedom of a macroscopic system with which an
quantum system may become entangled, alone is not sufficient a condition
for triggering a measurement. Indeed, it is apparent in the formalism of
quantum field theory that there is a near infinite amount of structure that
must be taken into account in estimating the probability amplitude of any
process, as is apparent in the fact that additional fermion loops and radiative
correction terms arise at every level of approximation on shorter scales. If
we were to consider this small scale complexity to provide the conditions
for quantum measurement to take place then it should be the case that the
world would be quasiclassical down to a much smaller scale, given that all
the complexity that is present at higher energies (and which can only be
ignored as a result of the validity of the renormalization procedure) would
allow measurement to take place long before a quantum system even has
the chance to become entangled with a macroscopic system17. The situation
17I have provided strong arguments in section 3.7 of [1] to the effect that in the absence
of matter there can be no persistent microscopic structure in the distribution of vacuum
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here is similar (but not identical) to what would happen in the case where
a quantum particle is embedded in an environment which is in a state of
static thermal equilibrium, where nothing appears to change. In such a case
the predictions of quantum theory would not merely apply as much for the
future as for the past, they would not apply at all, because there would
be no measurement, that is to say, no irreversible process of amplification
of alternative microscopic states. From this we can only conclude that the
defining characteristic of the processes that allow quantum measurement to
happen is not merely their complexity, but really their irreversibility.
This asymmetry must not be confused with that which also characterizes
the otherwise time-reversible ‘unitary’ evolution that takes place in between
measurements and which is made conspicuous by the fact that the predic-
tions of quantum theory are only valid for future evolution. Indeed, the
impossibility to accurately ‘predict’ the past arises as a consequence of the
fact that only a subset of states can be actualized in the past due to the
constraint of diminishing entropy that exist for this direction of time and
which also applies to classical evolution. It is the fact that no such a con-
straint applies on future evolution that allows predictions of future transition
probabilities to be valid, while predictions of transition to past states do not
apply in general. In section 3.9 of [1] I explained that this constraint arises
from the requirement that there exist relations of causality between all par-
ticles present in the expanding universe, which in the presence of negative
energy matter implies that the initial state at the Big Bang was character-
ized by a condition of minimum gravitational entropy from which all later
irreversibility follows. But while the time asymmetry that characterizes all
measurement processes has the same origin, it is a distinct phenomenon that
usually operates on a much faster time scale and that does in effect give rise
to a reduction of the state vector. Yet, it is appropriate to remark that it
is the global entanglement constraint unveiled in the preceding report that
actually explains the fact that decoherence is allowed to occur, which is nec-
essary (even though not entirely sufficient) to explain the persistence of the
quasiclassical nature of history that follows quantum measurements. In fact,
this is the only explanation of time asymmetry that allows to deduce (rather
energy and this means that no record of what takes place in the vacuum on smaller scales
can exist unless we directly reveal the existence of those processes by entangling them with
irreversibly evolving degrees of freedom which leave persistent traces of their occurrence,
which allows to confirm that the complexity of virtual processes cannot be considered
sufficient as a condition for quantum measurement to take place
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than merely assume) that decoherence always occurs in one and the same
direction of time for all measurement processes (as is required for the logical
consistency of history according to Roland Omne`s [20]), as decoherence itself
does not a priori favor one direction of time over the other.
It is the fact that the wave function associated with the evolution of a
quantum system is itself observed to evolve irreversibly during a measurement
that differentiates this evolution from that which occurs in between measure-
ments. When a measurement takes place and the state vector is reduced, the
time symmetry and the deterministic nature of the evolution of the wave
function no longer applies. But in the context of a realist interpretation of
quantum theory this cannot be understood to mean that it is the evolution
that takes place in the course of a measurement which is alone responsible for
giving rise to the unpredictability of quantum phenomena, as is sometimes
proposed. If the state of a quantum system is unique, in the time-symmetric
sense, before a measurement is performed, as I previously argued one must
recognize, then it certainly cannot be assumed that the randomness of its
evolution is merely a consequence of the events that take place during the
subsequent measurement and it becomes necessary to admit that it is the
unobserved paths followed forward and backward in time by the system as it
approaches or emerges from the event at which a measurement is performed
that is randomly determined and which explains the unpredictability of the
outcome of this measurement. It must be clear, in any case, that the ran-
domness of quantum processes, like their uniqueness, is not an illusion that
emerges from the fact that an observer may be unable to perceive the evolu-
tion that supposedly takes place all at once in multiple branches of history
that would exist together in one single universe, as is sometimes suggested
in the context of a many-worlds interpretation. Randomness is a fact of the
reality we experience that becomes perfectly acceptable in the context of a
time-symmetric formulation of quantum theory where the deterministically
evolving wave function is not reality itself and there exists a unique history
of some kind, even in between measurements.
Thus, if randomness appears to take place only during measurements it is
simply because it is only as a result of processes which can be characterized
as measurements that the uniqueness of reality (in the time-symmetric sense)
is made apparent, while it is only at the level of individual histories that re-
ality may be observe to vary unpredictably. But quantum evolution must be
understood to always be random, even though in the absence of new mea-
surement, or when the macroscopic constraints applying on a system remain
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unchanged, the state vector evolves deterministically. Once again, therefore,
it seems that it is incorrect to assume that a fundamental distinction must ex-
ist between the ‘unitary’ evolution that takes place in between measurements
and the evolution that characterizes a process during which quantum poten-
tialities are actualized and this means that it should be possible to explain the
quasiclassical nature of the evolution that follows a quantum measurement
while remaining within the confines of the current mathematical framework
of quantum theory. The difference between observed and unobserved evolu-
tion is real, but only because the conditions under which there is an absence
of knowledge provide a quantum system with more freedom regarding what
it is allowed to do as it randomly evolves.
It also transpires that the standard account regarding the distinction be-
tween those situations in which a measurement takes place and those in which
the usual ‘unitary’ evolution law applies is somewhat misleading, because in
fact a quantum system is always in a state where at least one dynamic at-
tribute (as unnatural as it may be) is in a classically well-defined state, even
though this means that the conjugate attribute is completely undetermined.
This is a very important fact that is often overlooked and which actually
holds the key to a solution to the remaining issues that prevent the for-
mulation of a satisfactory explanation of the persistence of quasiclassicality.
When a measurement is performed all that really happens is that the state
of a system changes in such a way that an attribute (say position) which was
in a state of quantum superposition the moment before, becomes classically
well-defined the moment after, while its conjugate attribute (say momen-
tum), which was classically well-defined initially, actually becomes quantum
mechanically superposed. In such a context it would certainly be inappro-
priate to argue that a fundamental change occurs in the course of a process
that can be qualified as a measurement, even though it is clear that some
constraint, not present before the process took place, does in effect become
significant for the future evolution of the attribute of the system which is
subjected to measurement (I will have more to say concerning this issue in
section 12).
Now, the modern formulation of quantum theory is usually considered to
be that of consistent histories, which was developed in three steps by Robert
Griffiths [21], Roland Omne`s [22], and Murray Gell-Mann and James Hartle
[23]. From this formalism emerges an interpretation according to which it is
merely the fact that one may choose to ignore certain aspects of reality, and
submit them to a summation process, that allows one to obtain meaningful
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probabilities (which are positive and which add up to one) for the possible
histories of a quantum system which has become entangled with the summed-
over portion of reality. It would then merely be the fact that one may choose
to ignore what goes on in the environment with which a system has become
entangled that would allow one to find the system to be in a mixed quantum
state instead of a pure quantum state for which interferences would be ob-
served. More specifically, what the formalism of consistent histories provides
is a criterion for judging when it is that sufficiently coarse-grained histories
are obtained (by ignoring certain details of the historical description of re-
ality) which do not interfere with one another and which can therefore be
attributed meaningful probabilities. Interestingly, the manner by which this
is achieved is by considering pairs of coarse-grained histories (consisting of
sets of alternative fine-grained histories whose ignored details are allowed to
differ in any possible way) which are subjected to decoherence and between
which there are virtually no interferences. When those conditions are satis-
fied, a meaningful probability for the process so described to occur can be
obtained by applying the usual rule which consists in multiplying the prob-
ability amplitude for a history with the complex conjugate of the amplitude
for the same coarse-grained history. But no interpretation is given for why it
might be necessary to consider pairs of coarse-grained histories rather than
single histories, even though this appears to be required from a mathematical
viewpoint.
I believe that the formalism of consistent histories must be considered
an essential element of an appropriate and fully satisfactory interpretation
of quantum theory, even if only because it constitutes the basis of the only
solution to the quantum measurement problem that would apply even on a
cosmological scale where no external environment degrees of freedom exists
that would, according to a more conventional theory, be required to give
rise to decoherence. It is incorrect, therefore, to argue that the universe
cannot decohere because no environment exists that would be outside the
universe, because if decoherence is an outcome of temporal irreversibility,
then there is enough opportunity for decoherence to occur on a much smaller
scale. Indeed, what the formalism of consistent histories allows is a more
appropriate definition of quantum measurement as taking place continuously
over the entire duration of a process rather than at one particular event, as
becomes possible when the environment degrees of freedom which are left
out of the description of the process evolve irreversibly, thereby allowing
decoherence to arise. One of the advantages of such a viewpoint is that it is
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easier to see how it can be that the simple possibility for an event to happen
allows a measurement to be performed even if this event does not happen (as
in the case of interaction-free measurements), because when something is in
effect allowed to happen we simply are in a situation where one specific set
of macroscopic experimental constraints exists throughout the duration of a
process which would not exist otherwise, while different constraints mean a
different measurement not an absence of measurement.
But while the consistent histories approach is certainly well motivated all
by itself, given that it allows one to avoid having to refer to classical observers
and measuring devices that would not be describable using the formalism of
quantum theory, it appears to be insufficient to predict the emergence of
a classical world (a maximum quasiclassical domain). It is as if decoher-
ence alone was not enough constraining a condition to guarantee an absence
of quantum interferences between all the coarse-grained histories to which
it may give rise, while no criterion currently exists to select as physically
relevant only those future histories which actually describe a quasiclassical
evolution. As was the case with the original many-worlds interpretation of
quantum theory, it is not possible to avoid the conclusion that in the course
of certain otherwise ‘consistent’ histories, a macroscopic measuring device
may end up in a superposition of states after becoming entangled with a
quantum system.
The problem here does not merely have to do with the previously dis-
cussed lack of motive for justifying the application of the criterion of ‘consis-
tency’ that is attributed to families of coarse-grained histories and according
to which certain histories would simply be meaningless given that classically
meaningful probabilities cannot be assigned to them. Indeed, I have already
mentioned that it appears preferable to allow our conception of reality to
adapt to the fact that classical probability theory does not always apply,
instead of trying to limit what may be appropriate of this reality through
some arbitrary condition that only serves to accommodate a criterion of
consistency that should instead apply to a more appropriate, realist, time-
symmetric description. Thus, I believe that it is important not to commit
the error of enforcing consistency at the price of rejecting a realist interpre-
tation of facts, which would simply contribute to perpetuate the difficulties
which are known to affect the description of reality that was provided by the
original Copenhagen interpretation.
What should be recognized as nonsense is not the hypothesis that a pho-
ton follows a unique but unobservable trajectory of some kind in between
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measurements, but the decree that we should not even try to describe reality
in situations where we do not yet know how to make sense of it. This reflex-
ion is especially relevant given that in a quantum mechanical context we are
always dealing with probabilistic inferences, which means that even histories
which we may expect to be ‘consistent’ might in some rare circumstances
turn out to be ‘nonsense’, which is certainly indicative of the arbitrariness of
the restrictions imposed by the consistent histories interpretation of quan-
tum theory on our concept of reality. Therefore, to achieve further progress
regarding the issue of quantum measurement one must first realize that in
face of the experimental evidence from which quantum theory emerged, the
desire to restrict the application of the criterion of logical consistency to as-
pects of reality which behave in conformity with classical expectations is just
as irrational as the desire to uphold determinism.
The additional issue we need to consider, however, is more pragmatic. It
has to do with the fact that in the absence of a stronger and more specific con-
straint there would be histories which could be characterized as ‘consistent’,
but which would not remain quasiclassical as time goes, following decoher-
ence. This is the problem discussed in [19] and which I have mentioned
earlier in this section. As Dowker and Kent explain, predictions only become
possible, within the formalism of consistent histories, once a set of histories,
the physically relevant set, formulated using a specific choice of dynamic at-
tributes and a particular choice of coarse-graining, has been selected whose
elements can then be attributed meaningful probabilities. But in a quan-
tum mechanical context there appears to be total freedom over the choice of
which dynamic attributes are used to specify the exact state of our physical
systems and what elements of reality can be ignored and summed-over, and
this is where the problem originates, because when no criterion exists to limit
those choices, most ‘consistent’ histories do not remain quasiclassical in the
future, even if they were so characterized in the past. Thus, the criterion
of ‘consistency’ appears to be insufficient to predict the persistence of the
quasiclassical nature of history. In fact, it seems that it would not even allow
one to assume that the past itself must have been classical up to the present
moment, despite the fact that the existence of mutually consistent records
of a unique past appears to indicate that this condition was met across the
whole observable universe as far back in time as one can tell. What remains
problematic with the current approach, therefore, is the absence of a crite-
rion within the interpretation itself for choosing the appropriate, physically
relevant set which would allow to describe the quasiclassical world we do
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experience.
What was originally proposed by Murray Gell-Mann and James Hartle
is that if we perceive a quasiclassical world it is because, as observers, we
have evolved to take advantage of only those formulations of history accord-
ing to which the world does in effect remain quasiclassical. The problem is
that it appears that in the absence of a criterion for justifying the selection
of the appropriate, physically relevant set of histories, the above mentioned
results imply that the most likely explanation for the fact that one experi-
ences a quasiclassical world would require one to reject all evidence of past
quasiclassicality and all expectations of future quasiclassicality as being mere
illusions and to satisfy oneself with having ‘explained’ why it is that at the
present moment one experiences what merely looks like a world that could
have been quasiclassical on a global scale during most of its history, even
though that would not be the case. But I have already explained why such
solipsist explanations, which require one to assume that one’s current state
of awareness is all that truly exists (classically), are not acceptable in general
from the viewpoint of scientific realism and if there is one situation where
this criticism would definitely need to apply it is certainly here.
It seems to me that if such an approach is still considered by some to
constitute a valid explanation of the quasiclassical character of reality it is
merely because we cannot see how the remaining issues facing the current
state-of-the-art interpretation of quantum theory could be resolved, so that
we have come to believe that the solution may be that there is no problem
after all, as long as we consider the world in the ‘appropriate’ way. But, if
we really want to explain something, then clearly we must identify the con-
straint that allows to select the physically relevant set of histories in which
quasiclassicality is experienced by all observers, because the only alternative
would be to retreat into a paranoid vision of reality where all that exists
is the impression of a persistent quasiclassical reality, despite the fact that
there would be absolutely no reason for why such an impression should be
experienced (which is the real problem). I believe that what those difficul-
ties illustrate is the incorrectness of the basic assumption that no logically
consistent interpretation exists for the interfering fine-grained histories which
actually constitute the most fundamental elements of the consistent histories
formulation of quantum theory.
It is significant in this context that certain specialists have proposed a
weaker and more general form of consistency conditions [24] that merely
amounts to impose that the probabilities of coarse-grained histories be posi-
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tive while still satisfying the usual probability sum rules. Those generalized
‘consistency’ conditions result in a formalism that is time-reversal invariant
(which from my viewpoint is certainly a desirable property) and which se-
lects sets of histories called linearly positive histories that include consistent
histories as a subset of possibilities. Once this is recognized as a viable ap-
proach, however, one may be tempted to go one step further and simply
allow negative probabilities as well, by considering the most complete sets of
histories that would include all sets of linearly positive histories as a subset.
If such an even more complete generalization was never considered viable it
is obviously due to the fact that negative probabilities cannot be classically
interpreted and therefore appear meaningless and undesirable. Yet, Roberth
Griffiths, suggested that it might be desirable to try to provide an interpreta-
tion of the probabilities which are known to arise when we consider histories
that do not satisfy the ‘consistency’ criterion. Dowker and Kent themselves
insist that there would be no logical contradiction in using an ‘inconsistent’
set of histories if a criterion existed that would allow one to select from it the
physically relevant set and it was found that it allows a logically consistent
description of historical facts on a sufficiently ‘large’ scale.
The problem is that in the current context the ‘consistency’ criterion ap-
pears to be necessary for selecting sets of coarse-grained histories that do not
interfere with one another, as required by observations, while no satisfactory
interpretation exists for negative probabilities. But in the context where
we still need to identify the constraint that allows to choose the physically
relevant set, it cannot be ruled out that it might be this condition which
enables to generate a historical description of reality that naturally satisfies
both the criterion of ‘consistency’ and that of persistent quasiclassicality. I
have already suggested that in the more appropriate context of a realist,
time-symmetric interpretation of quantum theory, logical consistency (in the
general sense) would rather need to be satisfied by the unique retarded and
advanced portions of history. But I also explained that from such a perspec-
tive an adequate interpretation of negative probabilities can be formulated
that would confine them to unobservable aspects of physically allowed pro-
cesses. Thus, if a criterion can be found for the selection of a set of histories
that is not a priori ‘consistent’, but that would nevertheless allow both the
quasiclassical character of reality and the logical consistency of its historical
description to naturally emerge on the appropriate scale, then we may finally
obtain a satisfactory extension of the current formalism that would allow to
solve the quantum measurement problem.
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In fact, there may exist another motive for recognizing that an additional
constraint is necessary to explain the quasiclassical nature of reality that is
observed on a sufficiently irreversible scale. It was, in effect, pointed out by
Roger Penrose and apparently also by John Bell and Bernard d’Espagnat
that the current explanation for the reduction of the state vector through
decoherence is dependent on the hypothesis that it is not possible to reveal
the existence of quantum interferences involving the detailed configuration
of the degrees of freedom of that part of the environment which has become
entangled with a quantum system. But there is presently no valid reason
to assume that such an unlikely procedure could not be carried out at some
point in the future (even without deliberate intervention) and this means
that the current explanation for the disappearance of quantum interferences
following measurement is merely valid based on the assumption that the prac-
tical limitations that may prevent the observation of interferences between
macroscopic states will never be overturned.
Given that the existence of practical limitations to unveil superposition
of macroscopic states through manipulation of the delocalized environment
degrees of freedom has been shown by Roland Omne`s to be necessary for
the validity of the factual definiteness of reality and the applicability of the
conventional rules of logic, it is certainly significant that Omne`s himself has
argued that one cannot definitely rule out the possibility that such an unlikely
evolution could happen, but that given that it would mean that the world
would no longer be ‘consistent’, then he prefers to simply assume that the
low probabilities involved require the decoherence process to be definitive
in principle. In the context of a conventional many-worlds interpretation
we would certainly be justified to assume that this condition needs to be
fulfilled as if it was not the case, then we should be observing all possible
macroscopic states to exist all at once in the same portion of history, which
does not only illustrate the absurdity of the multiple branches hypothesis,
but also the necessity of providing a satisfactory explanation for the absolute
irreversibility of the decoherence process.
Of course we do observe an absence of interferences between alternative
coarse-grained histories past a certain level of irreversibility of the ignored
(summed-over) portions of a process18 and this may appear to confirm the
validity of the assumption that the practical limitations discussed here can-
18It was once suggested that quantum interferences between alternative states are actu-
ally always allowed to occur regardless of the size of the system under observation, or the
degree of irreversibility of its evolution, but that if the existence of such interferences can
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not be overcome. But we must recognize that we have at present no reason,
from a theoretical viewpoint, to assume that such an unlikely reversal of for-
tune could not happen at some point in the future, because even if there is
only an infinitesimal chance that it does, given an infinite amount of time it
should eventually happen and in such a case the consequences would be felt
right now (this is made unavoidable in the context where the time-symmetric
nature of quantum evolution allows future measurements to exert a causal
influence on past evolution). Even if such a phenomenon was to occur only
once on a large scale, we should actually observe its consequences in the fact
that the usual assumption to the effect that there is no state superposition
following measurement would no longer allow our prediction of transition
probabilities to match observations, therefore indicating that the conven-
tional hypothesis is incorrect. The fact that we usually do not observe such
a disagreement means that the assumption that the decoherence process is
in general truly irreversible is appropriate even if it is not at present entirely
justified. A satisfactory solution to the problem of quantum measurement
should therefore allow one to gain confidence that once decoherence has oc-
curred there is no chance that it may somehow be overturned at any time in
the future, which would allow to justify attributing the status of established
facts to measurement results.
In any case, the often encountered statement to the effect that quan-
tum theory has never been proven wrong, which would seem to invalidate
the claim that the currently favored interpretation is incomplete, can no
longer be considered accurate, given that in the context of the developments
discussed above it seems that what the theory predicts is an absence of qua-
siclassicality in both the future and the past and this is clearly in violation
with what we do observe (for the past) and with what we have very good
reasons to expect to observe (for the future). Therefore, a solution to the
quantum measurement problem, the central problem of the interpretation of
quantum theory, cannot merely consist in assuming that elementary particles
acquire reality as a consequence of interaction with another part of reality
(presumably a measuring device) as was originally proposed by the founders
of quantum mechanics and as is still considered appropriate by advocates of
be ignored it is simply because they would be too difficult to reveal in the case of macro-
scopic systems. But it is usually recognized that this is not a valid proposal, because in
fact nothing would be easier to distinguish than interferences between two different states
of a pointer on a measuring device, given that this would necessarily be apparent in the
statistical distribution of subsequent measurement results.
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the relational interpretation of quantum theory.
What I have tried to explain in this and the preceding sections is that it is
not necessary and not appropriate, or even possible to assume that no unique
reality of some kind exists for a quantum system in between interactions with
a measuring device. The difficulty to explain the emergence of quasiclassi-
cality cannot be considered to mean that the theory only allows to describe
how quantum systems interact with the rest of the world, as if this was a re-
quirement of a relational description of reality. In fact, as I will soon explain,
it rather appears that a satisfactory solution to the quantum measurement
problem actually requires considering that a well-defined and in some way
unique, but unobservable reality does exist between measurements. Parti-
cles do not become real through interactions, and the uniqueness of reality
which is observed during measurements is not an effect that propagates as a
result of further interaction, because even if that was considered to be true,
the emergence of quasiclassicality would remain unexplained. It is not our
intuition that this is absurd that is at fault, it is the orthodox interpretation
and the insistence that we should not attempt to describe reality when it is
not observed (which is never truly the case in fact).
What emerges from all those considerations is that, as undesirable as it
may once have appeared, there seems to be something unavoidable with John
Von Neumann’s conclusion that something essential (even though not neces-
sarily fundamental) must differentiate a quantum system from the measuring
apparatus and observer who effect a measurement on this system. Unless we
are to allow for grossly inaccurate predictions, it is necessary to explain what
justifies this distinction. But, even though this difference can be recognized to
have something to do with time irreversibility, and must come into effect fol-
lowing decoherence, its exact nature remains unidentified from the viewpoint
of all known interpretations. What explains that Von Neumann’s conclusion
was never taken seriously is certainly his early proposal that the dividing line
between superposed system and observing system may be determined by the
level at which consciousness occurs, which could perhaps explain that human
observers never experience quantum interferences. Indeed, any reference to
such qualitative aspects of physical reality as a degree of consciousness, or
a level of cerebral development as a possible cause of state vector reduction
is properly viewed with extreme suspicion by any physicist with a minimum
level of cerebral development, while in fact such a reference is not necessary
for the validity of Von Neumann’s conclusion. Once again a perfectly valid
deduction was ignored as a consequence of being associated with question-
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able assumptions which are not essential to its validity. But, if this is the
truth, then it remains to identify what this distinguishing property really is
and why it has the decisive consequences it is observed to have in the context
where the basic mathematical framework of quantum theory is assumed to be
valid under all circumstances. This is the task I will try to accomplish once
I have clarified the role played by time in the most fundamental of quantum
mechanical frameworks.
11 The emergence of time in quantum cos-
mology
When considering possible solutions to the quantum measurement problem
and an explanation for the emergence of a quasiclassical world what one
must first decide is whether quantum theory needs to be replaced by a bet-
ter theory or whether the current framework is adequate to deal with those
apparently insoluble difficulties. What I have been led to conclude is that
quantum theory is indeed incomplete and that it must be supplemented with
new conceptual elements if it is to be made fully consistent with what we
already know of physical reality that currently appears to conflict with its
predictions. But, as I already mentioned, this does not mean that the cur-
rent mathematical framework of quantum theory (under its most appropriate
form) must be rejected, or that the progress already achieved at providing
a better interpretation of the theory has become useless. It is, in effect,
by building on earlier developments towards a time-symmetric formulation
of quantum theory that I will be able to address the remaining difficulties
affecting the consistent histories interpretation and to finally explain the
quasiclassical nature of reality. For that purpose, however, it is necessary to
first examine to what extent time itself can still be assumed to constitute a
meaningful concept in quantum cosmology and to explain how it is allowed
to emerge from a fundamental theory in which it may only be present in
embryonic form. This has been made unavoidable by certain developments
that took place in the field of quantum gravitation which appear to imply
that the notion of a universal time variable may no longer be relevant to
a fundamental description of reality, whether on the Planck scale or on the
cosmological scale.
Even though it was first suggested that time may be irrelevant to cos-
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mology only when the first tentative quantum mechanical descriptions of the
universe as a whole were introduced, the perceived difficulty is actually also
present in classical cosmology. Indeed, it would appear desirable from both a
practical and a theoretical viewpoint to formulate the general theory of rela-
tivity as a dynamical theory which seeks to describe the evolution in time of
the curvature of three-dimensional space, given that such an approach can
be more easily extended to a background independent quantum mechanical
theory. But in a general relativistic context, when it is recognized that all the
meaningful physical attributes of a universe must be defined in a purely rela-
tional way, without reference to any absolutely defined, external parameter,
it transpires that any slicing of spacetime into three-dimensional space-like
hypersurfaces and a time dimension (any particular choice of foliation) is
equivalent to any other. A general relativistic description of the dynamics of
the universe as a whole, therefore, does not allow to identify one particular
dimension from among the four dimensions of spacetime as being that of
time, given that the gravitational field equations remain valid regardless of
the choice of a particular signature for the metric of spacetime. An additional
difficulty arises due to the fact that the universe, as a particular instance of
isolated system, must have an invariant total energy19, which would appear
to imply that no meaningful change can take place on the cosmological scale,
as if time was, in effect, irrelevant.
It seems that a similar conclusion would have to be drawn about the status
of time in canonical quantum cosmology, where the same arbitrariness in the
choice of a particular foliation and the same absence of change to the energy
content of the universe would now apply to the many different histories of
extended three-dimensional space-like hypersurfaces which must be allowed
to interfere with one another quantum mechanically. This is reflected in
the fact that the most straightforward interpretation of the Wheeler-DeWitt
equation (the equation that would allow to determine the wave function of
the universe) requires assuming that it is similar in form to the stationary
Schro¨dinger equation, while time is notoriously absent from such an equation.
It is sometimes suggested that what those difficulties demonstrate is that the
19I have provided arguments in section 3.5 of [1] to the effect that the energy of the
universe (just like its momentum and its angular momentum) must actually be null (even
when space is assumed to be flat on the largest scale) if no characterization of the physical
properties of the universe is to refer to external or metaphysical elements of reality, because
a positive or negative energy for the universe as a whole would allow to identify a particular
direction in time as being of absolute (non-relational) significance.
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hypothesis that time exists as a unique dimension distinct from the other
three dimensions of space is incorrect.
It should be clear, however, that the absence of change on a global scale,
which is attributed to the fact that the universe has a fixed value of energy,
does not mean that time is not a meaningful concept for relating the changes
taking place in one part of the universe with those occurring in another part,
as long as we are actually dealing with different portions of the same uni-
verse, because it is not required of local subsystems that they have invariant
energies as a consistency requirement and therefore change can certainly be
observed to take place on an intermediary scale. In other words, even if we
were to assume that time is irrelevant on a global scale, this could not be
understood to mean that it has no clear significance locally for observers
evolving along a particular trajectory within the universe. What’s impor-
tant to recognize is precisely that, from a cosmological viewpoint, time, as
a dimension distinct from space, has meaning only as a relationally defined
physical quantity which allows to relate various local measures of change,
thereby enabling any particular observer to provide a unique description of
the various processes taking place across the entire universe (or within his
associated causal horizon). Thus, it is an exaggeration to suggest that time
does not constitute a meaningful concept in quantum cosmology, because it
can actually be given clear meaning as a local parameter to which can be
related in various, but well defined ways other such local measures of change
throughout the universe20. But to show that a conventional notion of time is
not irrelevant to our description of reality on the cosmological scale one must
first explain how time is in effect allowed to differentiate itself from the other
three dimensions of spacetime, despite the fact that all four dimensions are
kept on an equal footing and are required to be equivalent from a fundamen-
tal viewpoint by relativity theory. It is regarding this particular issue that I
will contribute the most significant insights.
Two points must be taken into account in order to explain the existence
of a uniquely significant slicing of four-dimensional spacetime into three-
dimensional space-like hypersurfaces that would consistently select one sin-
20In this particular sense, the idea that a null value of energy for the universe as a
whole would be indicative that time does not exist is no more reasonable than the idea
that the null momentum of the universe (relative to the global inertial reference system
determined by the average state of motion of matter in the universe) would be indicative
that space does not exist, which is so obviously inadequate a hypothesis that no one has
ever suggested it could apply.
121
gle dimension as being that of time. First, it needs to be recognized that
there must exist unique relationships of causality between the various local
elements of an extended four-dimensional universe. Second, it must be rec-
ognized that at the fundamental quantum gravitational level it is possible
for the principle of local causality to be enforced by postulating the exis-
tence of an element of directionality in the causal structure of spin foams,
which actually constitutes an embryonic element of time directionality (one
original proposal made along those lines can be found in [25], but this con-
cept arises more naturally in the causal sets approach to quantum gravity).
Once this is recognized then it becomes possible for a metric of spacetime
with a unique signature to emerge that singles out one particular direction
of four-dimensional spacetime as being that which is associated with the
dimension of time across an entire space-like hypersurface (throughout the
universe), because the homogeneity of the initial matter distribution at the
Big Bang arises precisely as a consequence of imposing a constraint of global
entanglement uniformly over that entire slice of spacetime and this constraint
is actually a condition for the existence of causal relationships between all
elements of the universe which are present in this initial state.
Indeed, what distinguishes time from the other dimensions of space in
a relativistic context is merely the choice of a particular signature for the
metric of spacetime, which is imposed on solutions of the gravitational field
equations. But what this distinction provides is merely a separation of space-
time into past and future light cones, which is really a requirement of local
causality. Thus, if the signature of the metric was different and causality
still operated uniformly, but along another dimension of spacetime we would
simply call this dimension time, while the other three dimensions would then
all be analogous to space. In fact, given that general relativity involves local
variations of the light cone structure one may say that what is produced
as a result of spacetime curvature or the presence of local gravitation fields
attributable to the presence of matter are merely smooth local alterations of
the direction in which causality operates. All that is required by the global
entanglement constraint is that at least one spacelike hypersurface exists over
which the embryonic quantum gravitational element of time directionality is
oriented in the same direction of spacetime in all locations, thereby con-
sistently imparting on classical spacetime a unique signature that is shared
throughout the universe.
The point of the above argument is that, in the context of the explanation
I have proposed in section 3.9 of [1] for the homogeneity of the initial dis-
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tribution of matter energy and the existence of the thermodynamic arrow of
time, the direction of spacetime in which causality operates is allowed to be
the same initially over an entire three-dimensional space-like hypersurface,
simply because the constraint of global entanglement is a condition for the
existence of causal relationships between all elementary particles present in
the initial Big Bang state and by its very nature such a constraint must apply
uniformly over an entire spacelike hypersurface, right down to the quantum
gravitational scale (the Planck scale), so that it actually requires the em-
bryonic element of time directionality that is present in the causal structure
of spin foams to be uniformly oriented over the entire spin network initially
and this is what explains that the direction in which time is flowing is still
mostly the same over all of space today (except in the presence of strong
local gravitational fields), as necessary for the emergence of a universal time
variable.
This is a significant result, because when a constraint of global entangle-
ment is imposed on the initial Big Bang state in the presence of negative
energy matter particles, a strong limit is imposed on early fluctuations in
the density of matter, which means that local variations in the light cone
structure that determine how proper time intervals vary over the extended
space-like hypersurfaces are virtually absent, so that time flows uniformly
over all space, as would be the case by default in a Newtonian context. This
argument would therefore appear to provide the basis for a satisfactory solu-
tion to one of the last major unsolved issues still facing the most appropriate
of current tentative quantum gravitation theories, which is the question of
how it is possible for a universal time variable to emerge from the timeless
equations of the theory. Thus, it would no longer be necessary to appeal
to anthropic arguments to explain not only the observed time asymmetry
and the unidirectional nature of causality, but really the very existence of a
universal time variable.
Even though from a classical perspective relativity theory does not a
priori require that there is a preference for one particular dimension of four-
dimensional space over the others, the condition that there should exist causal
relationships between all parts of that undifferentiated four-dimensional re-
ality (between all the events taking place in it) implies that one direction in
four-dimensional space is singled out uniformly as being that along which
causal influences are propagated in the emerging spacetime and this is what
gives rise to time as the continuous and uniformly flowing variable we are ac-
customed to experience on a macroscopic scale. The validity of the hypothesis
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that there does emerge such a singular time dimension in four-dimensional
spacetime is what legitimizes a formulation of quantum cosmology as having
to do with the dynamics of extended three-dimensional space-like hypersur-
faces whose histories can be described as unique trajectories in superspace
(the configuration space of those three-dimensional objects). What is re-
markable is that the viability of such a description is in fact a necessary
condition for the elaboration of a consistent explanation of the quasiclassi-
cal nature of reality which emerges under conditions where irreversibility is
a characteristic of the processes involved, as I will explain in the following
section.
The problem that there was originally with the proposal that quantum
cosmology has to do with the dynamics of extended three-dimensional space-
like hypersurfaces is that the introduction of a fundamental element of causal-
ity in quantum gravitation requires a decomposition into positive and nega-
tive energy solutions, as in conventional relativistic quantum field theory, and
it was not clear how this could be achieved. But progress has been achieved
regarding those issues, as discussed in [25] and it cannot be excluded that
such an approach may even allow the derivation of a global measure of change
that would apply on the cosmological scale (despite the fact the universe has
a null constant value of energy). In fact, I’m deeply convinced that it is be-
cause we are still ignoring the possibilities offered by the generalized, classical
theory of gravitation I have introduced in the first chapter of [1] and which
allows a consistent integration of the concept of negative energy matter into
the general theory of relativity, that we are still experiencing difficulties with
the issue of the decomposition into opposite energy solutions that is neces-
sary for implementing causality into the spin foam formulation of quantum
gravitation. The fact that such a decomposition (which from my viewpoint
is a reflection of the existence of an embryonic element of time directional-
ity) is made unavoidable in the context where local causality itself cannot
be overlooked is certainly a strong enough motive to conclude that those re-
quirements cannot themselves be ignored. But if local causality is, in effect,
a decisive constraint, then time itself necessarily constitutes a meaningful
parameter in quantum cosmology, even on a global scale, because the sepa-
ration of four-dimensional spacetime into three dimensions of space and one
uniformly pointing dimension of time appears to be the defining character of
a world that obeys the principle of local causality in the presence of negative
energy matter.
One must be careful, however, when considering a quantum mechanical
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theory that purports to describe the whole universe, because from a realist
viewpoint it may not be appropriate to describe the universe by using a
deterministically evolving wave function extending over all space. Indeed, by
doing so we would commit the same error as we do in the classical theory of
relating all past and future three-dimensional space-like hypersurfaces in a
predetermined way to some arbitrarily chosen present state, which makes it
look like everything about history is resumed in one single stationary state.
In a more realistic situation the whole history would not be determined from
knowledge of one particular state and following each local measurement the
state of the universe would need to be actualized, which would reveal the
random nature of the history that actually takes place and the absence of
predetermined relationships between the multiple extended three-dimensional
spaces forming a history, which in turn illustrates the relevance of time and
more specifically of causality in establishing the actual relationships. Even
in the context where a unique future is assumed to exist in the same way
a unique past does, there is no rational motive to argue that time, as a
measure of change, becomes an irrelevant notion, because such a conclusion
would only be valid if we ignored the element of randomness that exists from
a quantum mechanical viewpoint (particularly in the context of the existence
of closed causal chains) and if we neglected the constraint imposed by the
necessary existence of causal relationships between all parts of the universe,
which singles out the state of maximum matter density of the Big Bang as
a state of minimum gravitational entropy from which all future evolution is
taking place irreversibly, as I explained in section 3.9 of [1].
In any case, it must be clear that despite what is sometimes suggested, it
is not true that time, or even space do not exist at all in canonical quantum
gravity. Indeed, a certain embryonic notion of space is clearly present in the
structure of spin networks which allows classical space to emerge naturally
when a sufficiently large number of fundamental, discrete elements of struc-
ture are combined according to purely quantum rules. Furthermore, even in
such a context we are still dealing with four-dimensional boundary conditions
and this is certainly indicative of the relevance of time, even if this param-
eter may not explicitly appear in the equations which allow to determine
the correlation probabilities associated with those four-dimensional bound-
ary conditions. Actually, the mere fact that even in a quantum gravitational
context we are still speaking about local changes occurring in the configura-
tion of spin networks means that an additional degree of freedom must, as
a fundamental requirement, be allowed to emerge which relates those local
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changes with one another. The problem that there was originally is simply
that in the absence of a constraint of global entanglement no universal time
variable was allowed to emerge, because no unique direction would exist that
would be associated with this degree of freedom and along which events could
be sequentially ordered into some kind of universal causal chain. When the
most essential aspect of time is understood to be causality, however, then the
most appropriate of the current fundamental theories do allow a certain no-
tion of history to emerge as a result of the fact that causal relationships must
apply uniformly in one particular dimension over at least one extended spin
network configuration in the presence of negative energy matter and for this
reason alone those extended configurations may be considered to constitute
the dynamic elements of quantum cosmology.
However, in my opinion, what would definitely invalidate a truly timeless
quantum theory of gravitation is precisely the fact that such a theory would
be incompatible with the existence of a fundamental time direction degree
of freedom (such as revealed in particular by violations of time reversal sym-
metry T ), while I have shown in chapters 1 and 2 of [1] that such a property
is essential to a consistent description of physical reality in a semi-classical
context. Indeed, once it is recognized that in quantum field theory the prop-
agation of elementary particles may take place along any of two opposite
directions of time, independently from the constraints imposed by thermo-
dynamic irreversibility, then a conflict emerges with the timeless viewpoint
given that if there is no time, then obviously there cannot be a fundamental
direction in time, because any relationship of time directionality must neces-
sarily involve a sequence of events related to one another following a definite
and unique order, even when the classical spacetime structure in which those
events are embedded is assumed to emerge from the combination of discrete
elements.
Given the nature of the arguments which are usually proposed to support
the conclusion that time is irrelevant in quantum cosmology and therefore
may not even exist, it would seem that solipsism is once again to blame
for misleading even some of the most brilliant thinkers into this theoretical
dead-end. Indeed, what a rejection of time would require us to assume is
that there can be change and that all changes can be related to one another
by the use of a reference system we call time, but that this is not enough
to conclude that this reference system is the reflection of something real.
Thus, while we are allowed to recognize the emergence of a certain variable,
distinct from spatial position, which is useful for comparing various local
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measures of change involving one or another physical attribute, and while
the assumption that such a variable exists is undeniably useful and allows to
simplify our description of reality, the fact that it is not possible to directly
measure any changes relative to that additional variable itself and the fact
that this variable may no longer be relevant under the most extreme condi-
tions (on the small scale of distance characteristic of quantum gravitation)
would mean that it cannot be considered a real physical property even under
more ordinary circumstances. All arguments against the existence of time
as a meaningful concept in quantum cosmology involve such an element of
solipsism. Time does not exist because it cannot be subjected to direct ob-
servation, or be the object of some measurement that would confirm that it
is real. But that is just a perfect example of the kind of irrational conclu-
sion one can draw based on such considerations, because what can be more
obvious in fact, from our experience of physical reality, than the existence of
change and the reality of time?
Now, it has been argued that it might be possible for time to emerge as a
mere thermodynamic phenomenon, despite the fact that it would not really
exist from a fundamental viewpoint. What I’m talking about is the concept
of ‘thermal time’ according to which the passage of time would actually be an
illusion attributable to the fact that the irreversible time of our conscious ex-
perience appears to always be associated with heat dissipation, which would
appear to single out one particular physical variable as that relative to which
energy remains unchanged, while in fact there would be nothing significant
from a fundamental viewpoint with a time variable derived in such a way.
But the problem with this proposal is that there is in fact plenty of evidence
for the relevance of a more conventional notion of time at the level of elemen-
tary particles where irreversibility is not a defining characteristic. Of course
the fact that there would be no preferred direction of time in the absence of
heat dissipation is not completely irrelevant to the problem of the existence
of a classical spacetime continuum (given that dissipation is necessary to an
understanding of the decoherent nature of space and time as I shall explain),
but it is not that significant either, because we are not merely trying to
decide whether unidirectional time is a valid concept, but with deciding if
the whole concept of time is in effect irrelevant to a description of physical
reality. However, if thermodynamics was the ultimate explanation for the
existence of time it would not be necessary to wait until we begin to explore
reality on the quantum gravitational scale to witness an absence of time,
because many phenomena are known to exist on a much larger scale that do
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not involve any irreversibility and yet they are still describable using space
and time coordinates21.
It is important to point out that if we were to assume that time really
doesn’t exist, even on a macroscopic scale, we would then be left with hav-
ing to conceive of the present moment as just one independent, stationary
state among many possible states devoid of any causal relationships with
one another. It was in effect suggested by Julian Barbour that such causally
independent, stationary states may not be incompatible with our percep-
tion of the passage of time if we assume that all that we really experience
are instantaneous states of consciousness which might be more appropriately
described as memory states. But the problem here, again, is that even if
such an explanation of consciousness as a state rather than as a process was
possible (which I believe may not really be the case22) you would then have
no explanation for the fact that the present state of the universe in which
the state of your consciousness is contained is one which is characterized by
the existence of a large number of mutually consistent records of a unique
lower entropy past, while such a configuration would not likely be chosen in
a random trial out of all the possibilities which would appear to exist for
an instantaneous present state. The fact that what can be characterized as
long-term records are usually preserved in what appears to be the most stable
structures, while short-term memories are usually preserved in more rapidly
changing structures would also remain unexplained from a timeless universe
perspective.
There were many attempts at trying to explain why such present states
as revealed by our personal experience of reality may not really be unex-
plainable, even when one assumes that all that exists in the universe is an
extended space without any time. But in the end one must recognize that
those proposals are inadequate and that the unlikeliness of the observed con-
21In the context where a satisfactory solution to the problem of the origin of thermody-
namic time asymmetry that is not based on the weak anthropic principle is now available
(this was the subject of section 3.9 of [1]), the fact that the thermal time hypothesis may
appear suitable to an explanation of cosmological time-asymmetry based on a certain in-
terpretation of entropy growth as a purely subjective, observer dependent phenomenon
would no longer constitute a potential advantage of a timeless interpretation of quantum
cosmology.
22Memory, as well as other basic mental faculties, are not really static events, but rather
processes which require a certain duration to be experienced and if there is no duration
what one should expect to experience is not one ever lasting memory, but nothing at all,
which is certainly not compatible with my own experience of reality at least.
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figuration remains a complete mystery unless one is ready to assume that
what one actually observes is not really indicative of the existence of a lower
entropy past, even though there is absolutely no rational motive (even of an
anthropic nature) to legitimate the validity of such a conclusion. Of course
if it had actually been demonstrated without doubt that time does not ex-
ist, then we may have no choice but to assume that everything is such a
strange and deceptive illusion, but this is not true and the only reasonable
conclusion we are allowed to draw from our observations is that the present
state of the universe, regardless of how it is defined, must be related to one
single past history through the existence of unique (but not predetermined)
causal relationships unfolding back in time to the state of low gravitational
entropy that allows to explain the existence, in the present state, of mutually
consistent records of a unique past.
It is usually recognized, in fact, that all that one may reasonably argue
concerning time as a quantum gravitational concept is that it is the continuity
of its flow and the existence of a unique spacetime metric signature which do
not apply at the most fundamental level. Thus, if at some point there was
such a strong desire to do away with time it is perhaps only due to the fact
that we were unable to explain the singular character of time as a dimension
of spacetime, because we did not understand the profound significance of the
existence of a uniform distribution of matter energy at the Big Bang, which
allowed me to explain the near uniformity of the direction of propagation
of causal influences in spacetime and therefore of the flow of time. But the
fact that we did not benefit from the guidance of the generalized theory of
gravitation which I have introduced in the first chapter of [1] also complicated
the task of implementing an appropriate decomposition of the solutions of
the equations of canonical quantum gravity into positive and negative energy
terms, which I believe is the source of the difficulties we still experience in
trying to integrate time and causality into our most fundamental theory of
gravitation. In such a context it was rather convenient to simply assume
that time does not exist at all given that, like space itself, time is not present
in its classical form on the most fundamental scale. But it must be clear
that if time, or more specifically causality, did not exist under any form
at a fundamental level, then what we should definitely not experience is a
dimension of time distinct from the other dimensions of space.
Now, despite the fact that I have criticized Julian Barbour’s suggestion
that our experience of the passage of time may not be incompatible with a
timeless description of reality, I must recognize that he, more than anybody
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else, is responsible for having convinced me of the validity of the concept
of simultaneity hyperplanes, or more generally of space-like hypersurfaces
as the basic building blocks of a dynamical theory of space that would be
relevant to quantum cosmology. The only problem I have with Barbour’s
interpretation has to do with his insistence that those global states of the
universe as a whole should not be related to one another causally (should
not be considered to form a unique causal chain or to take part in a unique
history). But in fact this is not a requirement of a dynamical approach
to quantum cosmology and, as I have explained above, it would rather seem
that there do exist unique causal relationships between those properly defined
global states, despite the fact that there appears to be a lot of freedom in
how spacetime can be sliced into such space-like hypersurfaces.
We may, therefore, retain as valid the concept that the present state of
the universe as a whole, including that of its gravitational field or spacetime
curvature, can be defined over one such space-like hypersurface, which may
be represented as a point in the appropriate configuration space (say the
superspace of canonical quantum cosmology), while the time variable would
enter the picture as the position along the actual trajectory followed by
the global state in this configuration space. This becomes a valid proposal
in the context where we now have a valid explanation for how it can be
that one given spacetime dimension is uniformly singled out as that along
which local causality is allowed to operate (as reflected in the uniqueness
of the signature that must be assigned to the metric of spacetime) and to
constitute a physically significant constraint that is not shared by the other
three dimensions of space, even in a general relativistic context.
To be honest I have to mention that the conclusion that a universe’s
history can always be represented as a path in the configuration space of
three-dimensional space-like hypersurfaces is dependent on the hypothesis
that any solution of the gravitational field equations that contains closed
time-like curves (which would make conventional time travel experiences a
reality) can be excluded. Usually this is recognized to be possible merely if
we assume without reason that the second law of thermodynamics is valid
under all conditions. But given the explanation I have provided in section
3.9 of [1] for the existence of the thermodynamic arrow of time, the con-
clusion that closed time-like curves cannot naturally arise actually becomes
unavoidable. Indeed, under such circumstances the constraint that gives rise
to thermodynamic time asymmetry must always operate in the same unique
direction of time and invariably have as a consequence the diminution of en-
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tropy in the particular direction of time that points toward the initial state
of minimum gravitational entropy of the Big Bang, as a requirement for the
existence of causal relationships between the various elements of the universe.
Therefore, a universe could not even exist as a causally interrelated ensemble
of space-like separated physical elements if it did not satisfy this unidirec-
tionality constraint as a result of the presence of a closed time-like curve for
which the direction of entropy diminution could not be well defined and this
means that such closed time-like curves are actually forbidden. From my
viewpoint it would therefore appear that it is always possible to represent
the universe and its entire history as some monotonic foliation of space-like
hypersurfaces, that is to say, as a path in superspace.
It is, therefore, the existence of a unique direction in spacetime along
which causal influences must propagate that allows histories to be parametri-
zed by a universal time variable (associated with a particular slicing into
space-like hypersurfaces) and that enables a description of the whole uni-
verse and its gravitational field as evolving with respect to this time vari-
able, thereby legitimating the notion of history as consisting in an ensemble
of causally related global states, that is to say, a universal causal chain. What
I have shown is that the absence of a fundamental distinction between time
and the other three dimensions of spacetime, which is an essential feature of
relativity theory, does not constitute an insurmountable obstacle to achiev-
ing this objective, so that we are no longer justified to conclude that time
is altogether absent in quantum cosmology. This is certainly a significant
result for the elaboration of a solution to the problem of the interpretation of
quantum theory, given that the existence of classical space and time is actu-
ally required by conventional quantum theory for the description of histories
in the context where the various macroscopic experimental conditions which
are shared by both the retarded and the advanced portions of a quantum
process must be defined over one unique and classically well-defined space-
time continuum. Thus, spacetime itself must be assumed to be decoherent
under conditions where a history can be consistently defined, which means
that quasiclassicality must already apply to the gravitational field in order
that decoherence be observed at a higher level in the observed attributes of
conventional quantum systems.
This again illustrates the fact that a continuous and spatially uniform
notion of time must be allowed to emerge from a quantum theory of gravi-
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tation23 before ordinary quantum processes can be appropriately described
and conventional quantum theory itself can become a valid representation of
reality with clear and precise meaning at the most fundamental level. The
problem of the emergence of time in quantum cosmology must therefore be
recognized as constituting one particular aspect of the more general problem
of the nature of the conditions necessary for the emergence of a quasiclassical
world. What this means is that in order to obtain a satisfactory interpre-
tation of quantum theory one must first examine in which way gravitation
and the curvature of space could be subjected to the same time-symmetric
description as would apply to more conventional physical attributes under
ordinary conditions. Achieving such an objective will allow me to identify ad-
ditional constraints from which both the decoherent nature of spacetime and
the persistence of quasiclassicality that characterizes all observed aspects of
physical processes can be expected to arise, even in the context where quan-
tum theory is assumed to be valid under all circumstances. What those
considerations will demonstrate is that it is not just general relativity which
is really a theory of the universe as a whole, as is usually recognized, but
that quantum theory, from the viewpoint of its most accurate interpretation,
is also essentially a cosmological theory.
12 Universal causal chain and quasiclassical-
ity
We are now finally in position to examine how it is exactly that quantum
theory can be extended so as to become fully consistent from both a logical
and an experimental viewpoint. It is here that all the progress achieved in
[1] as well as in the preceding portions of the present report in providing a
better understanding of so many aspects of physical theory associated with
time directionality will converge to produce their most significant outcome:
a logically consistent interpretation of quantum theory that is valid at abso-
lutely all levels of description. It is certainly a positive development already
that in the preceding section I have been able to conclude that time is still
23Of course even on the astronomical scale the spatial uniformity of the flow of time
is only an approximation, because the metric properties of space and time are influenced
by the presence of matter and by the inhomogeneities which are present in the negative
energy matter distribution, which means that even from the viewpoint of the approach
favored here there is still no universally valid measure of the passage of time.
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relevant to a description of our universe in a quantum mechanical context.
What I have proposed more specifically is that it is possible to define the state
of the universe (at least for what regards its gravitational field or intrinsic
space curvature) as consisting of a single point in superspace that specifies,
all at once, the ensemble of relationships which exist between each and every
one of its local subsystems over a particular three-dimensional slice of space-
time. From such a viewpoint the role of time emerges quite straightforwardly
as being that of relating those global states of the universe to one another
into some kind of universal causal chain, while establishing the sequential
(chronological) order of events.
What’s remarkable is that the existing mathematical framework by which
this particular approach can be formalized, which originates in the ADM for-
malism [26], allows history itself to be described as one particular trajectory
in superspace [27, 28, 29]. Time, therefore, must be conceived as the global
variable to which are related the multiple local measures of change that take
place as the state of the universe evolves along such a trajectory in super-
space. This allows to fulfill Reichenbach’s vision of time as reducing, under
its most essential form, to a certain concept of causal chain which allows
to establish and maintain the invariant local topological ordering properties
of spacetime, even when its metric properties are subject to local varia-
tions. From my viewpoint, however, it would not be appropriate to consider
a traditional concept of causal chain that would involve irreversibility at a
fundamental level, as Reichenbach contemplated, because irreversibility is a
property that must rather emerge from the particular boundary conditions
which existed at the Big Bang.
In any case, it must be clear that it is the network of local relationships
that varies as we move along a trajectory in superspace, because from the
viewpoint of its total measure of energy the universe, as the ultimate iso-
lated system, would appear to remain in the same state without any change
actually taking place (this is what motivates the unsubstantiated claim that
time may not be relevant to quantum cosmology, as I explained in section
11). It must also be emphasized that what is provided by the concept of
spacelike hypersurface is not a unique and absolutely defined characteriza-
tion of reality, because even when a universal time variable is allowed to
emerge there exist many equivalent ways by which spacetime can be sliced
into three-dimensional spacelike hypersurfaces, which would appear to re-
quire a history of the universe to consists not in a unique trajectory in
superspace, but rather in a given surface in the same infinite-dimensional
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configuration space, formed of the many equivalent trajectories which are
associated with the same unique history of spatial curvature. What must be
clear, though, is that even if many equivalent possibilities exist for such a
trajectory, they all provide alternative descriptions of the same causal chain,
to which corresponds one unique history. Once again, the arbitrariness that
surrounds the choice of a suitable slicing of spacetime must not be considered
to reflect the irrelevance of time for a description of the dynamics of space
on the cosmological scale, as it is merely a reflexion its local and relational
nature.
Now, from the perspective of the developments introduced in the first
portion of this report, it would appear that a quantum mechanical description
of the universe as a whole cannot merely involve adjoining a wave function
to some boundary conditions defined over superspace, under the assumption
that every possible history compatible with those conditions happen all at
once as different branches in the same universe. The purpose of a quantum
cosmology would rather be to estimate the probability of observing a global
state of the universe (a point in superspace with which is associated a certain
matter distribution and a certain curvature of space) when another such
global state has been observed at a certain time in the past, by summing-up
the (positive and negative) probabilities associated with all the different ways
by which those two points can be joined together as a result of the global state
of the universe evolving once forward and once backward in time along two
possibly distinct trajectories in superspace for which even the local curvature
of space could differ, as long as those differences remain unobservable.
Here again we face the mystery of the existence of two interfering his-
tories occurring in parallel, which would appear to merely complicate the
causal chain picture of the universe’s history by actually requiring bidirec-
tional causality to operate in opposite directions along two otherwise similar
portions of history. From a conventional viewpoint, even though this aspect
of a quantum mechanical description of the universe is certainly convenient,
given that it allows to explain quantum non-locality, it nevertheless remains
unexplained. In order to begin to understand why this dual character of
quantum reality is not as arbitrary and superfluous as it may seem, one must
first examine how it is that causality would operate if there was no advanced
portion to the history of the universe.
It only became clear to me what the organizing principle is that allows
to clarify this situation when I began working on the problem of time travel
and closed causal chains. It is at this point that I realized that if the history
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of the universe was described by one universal causal chain freely unfolding
in the appropriate configuration space along the direction corresponding to
unidirectional time, there would need to be external causes that would de-
termine how the universe began to get going along the particular trajectory
over which it is found to have propagated. This is a very important point,
as an external cause is precisely what must be considered forbidden by the
constraint of relational definition of the physical attributes of the universe,
which basically implies that there should be no ‘first cause’ that would need
to be attributed to some external agent that is not part of the causal struc-
ture of the universe itself and that may not be governed by the same physical
laws24.
The reader may recall the problem associated with so-called knowledge
paradoxes that would arise from the viewpoint of unidirectional time when
a time traveler would take a copy of some complex and highly valuable work
of art, which happens to exist in the future, back to a time in the past before
which it did not yet exist, thereby allowing it to be created instantaneously,
without any apparent cause, so that the invention is allowed to exist in the
future, which is necessary if it is to be brought back in time. I have explained
in section 4 that such a phenomenon is not impossible in principle, but is
simply very unlikely to occur, given that it would actually require entropy to
increase in the past direction of time, while the time traveler would be in the
process of bringing back information from the future, which would constitute
a violation of the second law of thermodynamics, because it would involve a
decrease of entropy in the future.
What can be learned from such a thought experiment is that if the phe-
nomenon described here is extremely unlikely, it would not, however, consti-
tute a violation of fundamental time-symmetric causality, because it would
only involve a diminution of entropy that would be apparent from a unidi-
rectional time viewpoint, but would not require a real discontinuity in the
flow of information along the direction in which the time traveler would be
progressing in time. Indeed, as I explained in section 3 it must be recognized
that there is no absolute difference between causes and effects at a funda-
mental level and this means that the future can influence the past just as
much as the past is allowed to influence the future, even in the same por-
24The same inconsistency would arise if the condition of continuity of the flow of time
along a particle world-line which was introduced in section 2.10 of [1] was allowed to be
violated and therefore this constraint can be understood to really be a condition for the
local continuity of all causal processes.
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tion of history (as long as no inconsistency develops), which is what actually
happens when an elementary particle is propagating backward in time (in
which case it behaves as an antiparticle). But if the present state of the
universe was determined by a certain cause (located either in the past or in
the future) that is not itself determined by an earlier or later cause that also
belongs to the universe itself, but that would be necessary to set the universe
on its course in one particular trajectory of the configuration space (with
which is associated one particular structure and one particular information
content), then a real problem would emerge, because under such conditions
bidirectional causality would definitely be violated.
But how could one avoid the conclusion that there needs to exist an
initial input, however remote it may be located in the past (or indeed in
the future), that would causally determine the structure of the spin network
that now exists and that contains the detailed information about the ex-
tended three-dimensional spacelike hypersurface that constitutes the point
along the universal causal chain we call the present? I believe that the truth
is that we have no choice and that we must admit that a certain hypothe-
sis, which may at first appear gratuitous and arbitrary, actually constitutes
an absolutely essential condition that needs to be imposed if our quantum
mechanical description of reality is to be free of logical inconsistencies when
it is applied to a description of the universe as a whole. It is at this very
precise point that quantum theory ceases to be baffling and that its most
incomprehensible aspects become essential elements of a fully comprehen-
sible representation of reality. What emerges from the original perspective
developed in this report is that the history of the universe is nothing but a
closed causal chain of enormous proportions that unfolds in its configuration
space. There is no first cause. The initial impetus that sets the universe
on its course is provided by the universe itself, as all later states of the uni-
verse also constitute earlier states along this closed, universal causal chain.
The universe truly brings itself into existence by providing the cause of its
own present condition as being nothing but a remote effect of this very same
present condition.
Perhaps that you remember my earlier discussion of the closed circuit
analogy from section 2. What I explained is that most electrical circuits
are really closed circuits and if they may not seem so under ordinary circum-
stances it is simply because the circuits are usually extended in one particular
direction and can only be recognized for what they really are by the fact that
the cables in which they are confined are always composed of pairs of polar-
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ized wires which betrays the fact that this unique path that seems to extend
from source to sink is actually formed of the two branches of a closed circuit
in which the current flows in opposite directions. Well, I believe that one
must come to accept as unavoidable that this is what is described by the
quantum mechanical version of the history of our universe. It is a closed
trajectory in superspace that is stretched to universal proportion along the
direction relative to which unidirectional time unfolds, as allowed by the so-
lution I have provided in the previous section to the problem of the origin of
the differentiation between space and time.
What I suggested in the previous section is that the existence of a time
dimension distinct from the other three dimensions of space is an outcome of
applying to the initial maximum density state of the Big Bang a constraint
of global entanglement, as a requirement for the existence of relationships of
local causality on the quantum gravitational scale for the universe as a whole,
which has for consequence that the same unique direction in spacetime is
selected throughout the universe for the propagation of causal signals. But
such a distinction between space and time (which is made apparent by the
unique signature that must be attributed to the metric of spacetime) is what
allows a description of the history of the universe as consisting of a trajectory
in superspace. What a quantum mechanical description of the same reality
allows, then, is for this trajectory to be a ‘polarized’ version of history, in
the sense that it actually consists of two parallel histories which share the
same observable macroscopic conditions and whose corresponding elements
are being propagated in opposite directions of time. But while this pairing
of history and this polarization would remain a complete mystery from a
conventional viewpoint, in the context of the above discussion it becomes
a natural and essential feature of physical reality that should actually have
been expected all along, if only we had recognized that logical consistency is
not an optional requirement.
Indeed, if causality is of any relevance to cosmology it is certainly due to
the fact that it imposes two essential conditions on the universe in order that
it be allowed to simply exist in any possible way. The first of those two condi-
tions is that all elementary particles present in the universe must be causally
related to one another as a result of having been in local contact with one an-
other at least once in the history of the universe. As I explained in section 3.9
of [1] this must be considered necessary in order that all particles be allowed
to actually consist of different elements of the same universe. The existence
of such a condition, which is responsible for the low gravitational entropy of
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the initial state of maximum matter density of the Big Bang, is what allows
me to assume that the history of the universe is in effect described by one
unique trajectory in superspace rather than by multiple unrelated trajecto-
ries which would really constitute the histories of many different universes
not causally related to one another. But, as I just mentioned, this global en-
tanglement constraint is also responsible for the fact that time actually exists
as a dimension distinct from the other three dimensions of space, which is
responsible for giving rise to the very causal structure of spacetime. What’s
more I will argue below that this condition is also necessary to explain the
classical nature of reality, under conditions where a dynamic attribute of
a quantum system becomes entangled with irreversibly evolving degrees of
freedom of the environment in which the system evolves.
The second condition would then be that which I have just identified and
which is that the universe must be self-determined from the viewpoint of
causality. This can be satisfied when the history of the universe consists of a
closed causal chain in its appropriate configuration space, which requires the
universe to eventually return to the exact same (but partly unobservable)
state in which it currently is, as it evolves along a particular trajectory in
this configuration space. This condition is what explains that it is necessary,
in order to obtain the right correlation probabilities, to take into account the
existence of two otherwise independent histories evolving in opposite direc-
tions of time, which is the distinctive feature of the realist, time-symmetric
interpretation of quantum theory developed in this report. What defines a
universe, therefore, is not just the fact that all of its constituent elements are
causally related to one another despite the spatial distances that separates
them following the expansion of space, but also the fact that the momen-
tary global configurations of those local elements are all causally related to
one another and to nothing else (they from a unique causal chain). Indeed,
when history consists of a closed trajectory in the space of all possible con-
figurations, every single global state can be in local ‘contact’ with both a
preceding and a succeeding state and this is what allows all global states to
be causally related to one another, regardless of the distance that separates
them in time. Thus, the multiverse is not merely the ensemble of all pos-
sible, causally independent universes (those which would be characterized
by distinct values of their physical attributes at arbitrarily chosen times), it
is really the ensemble of all possible, universal causal chains which exist as
inequivalent closed trajectories in superspace.
What is essential to grasp is that, despite what would seem to be implied
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by the progress that had already been achieved towards the elaboration of
a consistent time-symmetric interpretation of quantum theory, even though
there appears to be two causally independent, but interfering histories to
every process, from a cosmological viewpoint there is only one history, but
it feeds back on itself so as to form a closed causal chain which, for some
reason to be discussed below, goes through observationally indistinguishable
trajectories once forward and then once backward along the particular di-
rection of superspace that corresponds to unidirectional time. Thus, there
is no quantum system in a state of superposition, going at once and in the
same universe through all possible histories. There is one unique history, the
details of which remain in part unobservable to any observer, that unfolds as
a closed causal chain in its appropriate configuration space, subject to the
condition that all observable properties of this history be shared by the two
portions of it which are stretched along this direction of the configuration
space which we call time.
But it is in effect only in this particular sense that we may assume history
to be unique, because the uniqueness of the history that unfolds relative to
unidirectional time is merely a consequence of the fact that both the retarded
and the advanced segments of history must share the same observable macro-
scopic conditions and are submitted to a constraint of diminishing entropy
that operates in the same unique direction of superspace (at least for this por-
tion of history that unfolds on one side in time of the Big Bang), even though
this is not the direction in which the advanced portion of history is being
propagated. This interpretation allows to explain the fact that the interfering
realities are not in local causal contact with one another, because even if the
two portions of history share the same macroscopic conditions, they do not
really happen at the same epoch and therefore the particles present in the
retarded portion of a process cannot interact with those which are present
in the advanced portion of what only appears to be the same process. As
a result, it is no longer necessary to assume as an a priori hypothesis that
particles from different histories do not interact with one another in order to
avoid the contradiction that emerges in the context of a more conventional
approach when it is assumed that all branches of reality coexist in the same
portion of the universe’s history.
It must be clear that while this approach allows the state of the universe
specified by a particular point along the configuration space trajectory to be
characterized by simultaneously well-defined values of conjugate attributes,
observable data would still be subjected to quantum indeterminacy, because
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no observer that is part of the universe can determine the exact states of both
a dynamic attribute and its conjugate counterpart by imposing one particu-
lar set of experimental constraints. Thus, when position is determined with
arbitrarily good accuracy, momentum becomes totally undetermined, even if
there always exists a definite momentum state that corresponds to the rele-
vant point on the configuration space trajectory and this is reflected in the
fact that the unobserved attribute is allowed to have completely different,
interfering values in the retarded and the advanced portions of history. The
only difference between this situation and that which would appear to exist
from a more conventional quantum mechanical viewpoint is that it can now
be assumed that there does exist a unique reality in each portion of history
for the unobserved attribute associated with a given set of observational con-
straints, even though this reality can differ for the retarded and the advanced
portions of history and cannot as a matter of principle be subjected to direct
experimental knowledge.
But despite the enormous clarification and simplification which are made
possible by the adoption of such a viewpoint, it would remain to explain why
it is exactly that we are allowed to expect that the curvature of space, as
well as other experimentally determined macroscopic conditions, do not differ
much, most of the time, for those two portions of history, that is to say, we
still need to explain why it is that under normal circumstances a unique clas-
sical spacetime and a unique classical trajectory are shared by the particle
propagation processes which unfold in the retarded and advanced portions of
history, as required if the conventional mathematical framework of quantum
theory is to be compatible with what is observed on a sufficiently large scale.
As I previously mentioned, this is a particular aspect of the quantum mea-
surement problem, or the problem of the origin of the quasiclassical nature
of observed reality.
Actually, as I will explain below, it is the fact that the history of our
universe consists of one single, closed trajectory in superspace that allows
quasiclassicality to naturally emerge as a property of the physical world un-
der appropriate conditions and therefore it will be apparent that the fact that
our world is in effect classical on a sufficiently large scale allows to confirm
the validity of the hypothesis that the history of the universe constitutes a
circular process that feeds back on itself. Thus, if it was not for the closed,
or circular nature of quantum mechanical history we would really need to
assume that for some reason two independent, quantum mechanically inter-
fering processes are taking place at the same time, all the time, despite the
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fact that it would then be impossible to explain why it is that the retarded
and advanced portions of a process actually share the same experimental
conditions (because the criterion of consistency specified by the consistent
histories interpretation of quantum theory is insufficient to achieve such an
outcome, as I explained in section 10).
One thing should be clear already, though, and it is that if the history
of the universe consists of a closed causal chain, then the retarded and ad-
vanced trajectories in superspace must be smoothly joined at some point
in what appears to be the future from the viewpoint of unidirectional time
and also at a certain point in what appears to be the past from the same
unidirectional time viewpoint. As a result, no two points on the universal
causal chain can be absolutely characterized as ‘earlier’ or ‘later’. But it is
also clear that the directions of propagation in time along two correspond-
ing segments of the closed causal chain (those which appear to be in the
same macroscopic state at a given instant of time) have significance merely
as relationally defined properties (only the difference between those two di-
rections has physical meaning), because no direction of propagation can be
attributed absolute significance. Thus, the direction of time associated with
one or another portion of history along the universal causal chain is not a
direction in configuration space, but a relationally defined property of the
universal causal chain itself. Yet, the growth of (gravitational) entropy does
allow for the existence of an objectively defined direction of time, to which
can be compared the direction of propagation along a given segment of the
universal causal chain and it is from the viewpoint of this unidirectional time
parameter that the universal causal chain would eventually appear to close
and time would come to an end.
Now, it may appear that the hypothesis that the superspace trajecto-
ries associated with the retarded and advanced portions of history must be
smoothly joined at a certain point in the future could never be proven right,
given that from the unidirectional time viewpoint the closure of the universal
causal chain cannot be observed unless it has already occurred, in which case
we would no longer be there to acknowledge this fact. But, as I mentioned
above, the validity of the theoretical requirement of closure can actually be
confirmed by the observation that reality is of a quasiclassical nature, for rea-
sons I will soon explain. The existence of such an end of time, however, must
be distinguished from that which would occur as a result of an interruption of
the trajectory of the universal causal chain in superspace, which despite what
one might be tempted to assume is absolutely forbidden, given that it would
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not constitute a simple bifurcation point in unidirectional time, but would
involve a causal discontinuity even from a bidirectional time viewpoint.
One important aspect that needs to be emphasized here is that the situ-
ation of a universe which is submitted to a condition of closure of its config-
uration space trajectory is not the same as the situation of a universe which
would evolve, as a result of Poincare´ recurrence, to the exact same macro-
scopic state (characterized by the same observable conditions) in which it
was at an earlier time, which could be satisfied even if the superspace trajec-
tories associated with the retarded and advanced portions of history do not
merge at any point along the shared coarse-grained trajectory that would
take the universe to its earlier macroscopic state. In the present case it must
be assumed that when the universal causal chain closes in the future it will
be due to the fact that the retarded portion of history has by chance found
itself in the exact same state as that in which the advanced portion of the
process turned out to be, not just at an observable level, but even for what
has to do with the unobservable states of those physical attributes which are
the subject of quantum interference.
The evolution along the closed causal chain, therefore, will not merely
take the universe to a state that is similar to that in which it once was,
but eventually to the exact same point it once occupied in configuration
space, from which any further evolution would take the universe into the
exact same history through which it once went, despite the random nature
of this evolution. Yet, if an observer is present when the bifurcation point
is reached, she would not be able to experience the same history she once
experienced, but in reverse, because what would happen is indeed a reversal
of the direction along which the causal chain is propagating with respect
to unidirectional time, which means that the thermodynamic arrow of time
would reverse and reality could only be experienced in the opposite direction
along the closed trajectory (the same direction as that in which the observer
experiences reality in the retarded portion of history). Under such conditions
both an observer that is part of the retarded process and its counterpart that
evolves as part of the advanced process would simply cease to experience
reality at the bifurcation point, because consciousness is a thermodynamic
process that necessarily takes place along the direction of time in which
entropy is rising globally. But it must be understood that the closure of
the universal causal chain does not take place in position space, but really
in configuration space, or superspace and therefore it does not involve an
annihilation of the particles present in the retarded portion of history by
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those present in the advanced portion of history and it is not limited by
the requirement of energy conservation that would otherwise need to apply
with respect to unidirectional time, because in such a case continuity is only
relevant from the bidirectional time viewpoint.
Thus, the point in the future at which the retarded and advanced tra-
jectories of the universal causal chain would merge from the unidirectional
time viewpoint does not have to be of a very special nature and could be any
instant of time. Again, though, it must be clear that the closure of the uni-
versal causal chain is a phenomenon that takes place in configuration space
and therefore it may appear to violate the principle of local causality by oc-
curring all at once in position space. Indeed, even if the bifurcation process
may appear to take place at different times in distant regions of the universe
from the viewpoint of certain observers, once it happened in one region of
the universe it would have to rapidly occur in all the other regions, as the
condition that is responsible for the continuous decrease of entropy in the
past direction of time does not allow for oppositely directed thermodynamic
arrows of time to be present simultaneously in the same universe. Also, if
time can be extended to instants past the initial Big Bang singularity, then
the moment in the past at which the universal causal chain would close would
not necessarily need to be that at which the Big Bang itself occurs, but would
likely be a time, arbitrarily distant in the past, prior to the Big Bang, when
by chance alone the retarded and the advanced configuration space trajecto-
ries would meet. But it must be clear that the advanced portion of the known
history is not the trajectory that unfolds prior to the Big Bang. Both the
current history and that which may have taken place (with entropy growing
in the opposite direction of time) before the Big Bang (as apparently allowed
by certain quantum gravitation theories) have their own retarded and ad-
vanced portions of the same closed causal chain and could actually be very
different histories involving different sets of observable events.
If I believe that it is not a priori necessary to assume that the retarded
and advanced configuration space trajectories meet at the Big Bang it is be-
cause, despite the uniformity of the matter distribution and the minimum
gravitational entropy that characterized the initial maximum density state it
remains that the retarded and advanced states could in principle be different
in their unobservable quantum mechanically interfering details. This is es-
pecially true in the context where it must be assumed that the information
contained in the microscopic state of the gravitational field grows with the
density of matter, for reasons I have explained in section 3.7 of [1], so that
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the probability of an exact correspondence of the retarded and advanced
states is as small during the first instants of the Big Bang as it is at any
other time (given that the universe has the same information content and
the same number of microscopic degrees of freedom during the first instants
of the Big Bang as it has at any other time). Thus, it would only need to
be assumed that a meeting of the retarded and advanced configuration space
trajectories occurs at the Big Bang if it turned out that it is impossible for
bidirectional time to be extended past the initial maximum density state,
as would be the case from a classical viewpoint in the presence of an initial
spacetime singularity.
In any case, if the hypothesis that the universal causal chain must be
closed is justified then it becomes possible to confirm the validity of the con-
clusion stated at the end of section 8 to the effect that the sign of energy
of the particles which can be observed to propagate forward in time in the
retarded portion of history, must be opposite that of the same particles which
are propagating backward in time in the advanced portion of history, which
means that those energy signs remain unchanged relative to unidirectional
time. Indeed, if the superspace trajectories associated with those two por-
tions of history are smoothly joined at a remote point in the past, as well as
in the future, then the particles which propagate forward in time in one por-
tion of history must reverse their direction of propagation in time from the
unidirectional viewpoint at both the past and the future bifurcation points,
due precisely to the fact that they do not reverse their direction of prop-
agation from the viewpoint of bidirectional time. But this means that the
energy signs which necessarily remain unchanged relative to the direction of
time in which those particles propagate (given that their action signs do not
reverse) would appear to be reversed in comparison with those of the corre-
sponding particles which propagate in the opposite direction of time in the
current portion of history, in agreement with the conventional description of
advanced wave phenomena.
The only difference between the conventional description of advanced
waves and that which emerges from the alternative definition of the time
reversal operation I introduced in chapter 2 of [1] has to do with the fact
that the signs of all the non-gravitational charges carried by the particles
associated with those advanced waves would now appear to be reversed from
the unidirectional time viewpoint, given that it is explicitly assumed that
they remain unchanged from the viewpoint of bidirectional time when the
trajectory of the universal causal chain bifurcates in the future and in the
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past. This is without consequences, however, because the fields that provide
the experimental conditions observed in the advanced portion of history all
have their polarities reversed as well.
The circular nature of history is also what allows to explain that quantum
interferences do occur, even in the context where we are assuming that the
retarded and advanced portions of a quantum process actually take place
at two very distant epochs along the configuration space trajectory, which
would appear to imply that they should have no effect at all on one another
(locally). I believe that if there are quantum interferences between the many
possible paths allowed for the retarded and advanced portions of history it
is because the circular nature of history imposes a condition of continuity
on the quantum phase equivalent to that I have identified in section 8 when
discussing the significance of the negative probabilities which occur in the
context of a time-symmetric formulation of quantum theory.
Indeed, given that what one would need to estimate, ultimately, is the
probability of observing a certain history of the universe that comprises a de-
tailed description of all the individual subprocesses (decoherent or not) which
occur in the course of that history, then one must recognize that the phase is
actually a shared property of the unique configuration space trajectory that
provides the most accurate account of the history of the universe. But, in
the context where the whole history actually consists of a closed causal chain
that feeds back on itself, there actually exists a constraint which imposes
that all contributions by intermediary subprocesses to the evolution of the
quantum phase of the complete cosmological process that takes place along
the closed configuration space trajectory be such that they allow the phase
to end up, after a complete turn, into the exact same state in which it was
at the point of the trajectory that constitutes both its initial and its final
boundary condition. Indeed, if the universe does, in effect, evolve back to
the exact same state in which it once was, then this state cannot itself be
different from what it actually is, even for what regards unobservable physi-
cal properties like the quantum phase, otherwise the concept would have no
real significance.
It had, in fact, already been realized [30] that there is a single phase as-
sociated with the whole cosmic process that is equivalent to one very rapidly
moving clock hand. But in the context where time itself must be considered
to constitute a periodic phenomenon it follows that this wave function must
be similar to that which applies to quantum systems submitted to periodic
boundary conditions (like an electron in orbit around a hydrogen nucleus,
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whose wave function must necessarily involve an integer number of wave-
lengths). There may, thus, be something true to the previously discussed
results from canonical quantum cosmology which appear to indicate that the
wave function of the universe is of the stationary kind, even if in the present
context this no longer means that time is irrelevant to quantum cosmology.
In any case, this continuity condition is what allows me to explain why it is,
in effect, appropriate to impose on the unobservable quantum phase that it
does not end up in the course of an ordinary time-symmetric process in a state
that would be incompatible with that in which it initially was, a requirement
which I believe can be enforced in the context where certain time-symmetric
histories (with which are associated negative probabilities) are allowed to
diminish the probability of observing the very conditions necessary for their
own occurrence.
Indeed, it appears to be the requirement of continuity of the quantum
phase that explains that individual time-symmetric processes have a larger
probability to occur in ways that do not require a phase change that would in-
crease the likelihood that this phase is not left invariant after a complete turn
over the global configuration space trajectory (for the universe as a whole),
because the phase associated with a local subprocess is reinitialized upon
measurement (as a result of decoherence) which means that it is necessary
to impose a constraint of continuity independently to those phase changes
that take place in the course of individual time-symmetric processes, even if
the real constraint applies to the universal causal chain on which is imposed
the closure condition. Thus, it becomes possible to understand why it is
that there are quantum interferences between multiple different histories for
ordinary quantum processes, even in the context where we assume that only
one history actually takes place.
Those are very significant conclusions given that in the present context
observation of quantum interferences is the only way by which the advanced
portion of history can be deduced to exist from the viewpoint of an observer
that is present in the retarded portion of history. Such an explanation of
the origin of quantum interference effects would also appear to confirm that
quantum non-locality is a consequence of the non-trivial topology of the
configuration space trajectory. Indeed, according to Hans Reichenbach [31],
when faced with unexpected non-local correlations one can either invoke
‘preestablished harmony’ in the form of instantaneous couplings of distant
events that would violate the principle of local causality, or else recognize
that one is dealing with a compact topological structure in which periodicity
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naturally arises. What I have tried to explain is that the history of the
universe is just such a structure and therefore its circular nature is what
most naturally explains quantum non-locality as a phenomenon involving
the entanglement of quantum phases.
Now, as I mentioned in section 6, it has been argued by certain detractors
of the more conventional time-symmetric interpretations of quantum theory
that the problem with any such interpretation is that it is not possible to
distinguish between situations where interferences among different histories
must be assumed to exist and situations where they can actually be ignored.
I have already explained that this erroneous conclusion arises merely when
we fail to recognize that decoherence must occur, even from the viewpoint of
a time-symmetric formulation of quantum theory, under the same conditions
where it would be expected to happen according to a many-worlds interpre-
tation, even if the phenomenon has a different meaning in the context of a
time-symmetric interpretation. But, as I mentioned in section 10 there are
two problems that one must face before one can conclude that decoherence
does in effect provide the mechanism by which the quasiclassical character
of macroscopic phenomena arises, even in the context of a time-symmetric
formulation of quantum theory.
The first of those problems has to do with the fact that it may never be
possible to assume that decoherence itself constitutes a truly irreversible pro-
cess. There is no reason, in effect, to reject the possibility that given enough
time the processes giving rise to decoherence could eventually be reversed
on an arbitrarily large scale, so that the many variables of the environment
with which a quantum system has become correlated could be submitted
to quantum interference, even without deliberate intervention and long af-
ter a measurement would normally be assumed to have occurred. Indeed,
it appears that it is merely the improbability of such an evolution that ex-
plains that we do not feel compelled to recognize that measurements may
not be definitive processes and could actually be overturned in the future,
with consequences for the predictability of observable phenomena which are
taking place right now. One may be tempted to argue that this is not a real
problem, because the potential for entropy growth may be unlimited in the
future and this may allow one to expect that, as the effects of a measurement
spread irreversibly into an ever larger portion of the environment, the possi-
bility that quantum interference involving all those correlated variables may
be allowed to occur becomes ever more insignificant. Indeed, I have provided
arguments in section 3.10 of [1] to the effect that the growth of gravitational
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entropy may be unlimited in our universe, due to the presence of negative
energy matter, which would appear to provide support for the conclusion
that decoherence is truly irreversible, even in the context of a conventional
interpretation of quantum theory.
The problem, however, is that given an infinite amount of time, even
such a continuously decreasing probability may not prevent fluctuations from
eventually giving rise to quantum interference on a very large scale. There-
fore, it would seem that one cannot avoid the conclusion that decoherence
is not definitive, which should have significant consequences at the present
epoch. Now, given that I have argued in section 3.7 of [1] that the expansion
of the universe does not take place with a real growth in the amount of micro-
scopic structure or information, due to the variation of information associated
with the diminishing strength of local gravitational fields, it would appear
that the probability that the universal causal chain closes at some point in
the future is not diminishing with time. While this conclusion may perhaps
appear to be irrelevant to the problem discussed here, that is not the case,
because what it actually means is that unidirectional time will, by necessity,
eventually end at some point in the future, however distant it might be. But,
if history does not last forever, then the probability that decoherence may
be reversed on a very large scale at some point in the future, in a universe
with ever growing entropy, actually becomes null. In other words, what we
are now allowed to expect is that the universal causal chain will eventu-
ally close in the future, before decoherence has the chance to be reversed
on a large scale, which means that decoherence does not merely eliminate
quantum interferences for all practical purpose, but gives rise to classical out-
comes of measurement as a matter of principle and this conclusion remains
valid even in the context were we do not postulate that irreversibility arises
at a fundamental level. I believe that this constitute the decisive argument
that allows one to make sense, at long last, of the observation that quantum
measurements, once effected, produce definitive outcomes which are never
overturned.
The second problem one must confront is perhaps more significant. In-
deed, I have explained in section 10 that certain relatively well-known de-
velopments [19] appear to indicate that the criterion of ‘consistency’ (in the
sense of a consistent histories interpretation of quantum theory) would not
be constraining enough to allow one to expect that the quasiclassical nature
of reality would persist following a quantum measurement, conceived as an
irreversible process during which decoherence is taking place (even when one
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assumes that those measurements produce definitive outcomes). I can now
explain why it is that the realist, time-symmetric interpretation of quantum
theory I have developed is more appropriate for predicting the emergence
of a quasiclassical world that remains classical once the consequence of one
or another outcome of a quantum measurement irreversibly propagates into
the environment. What holds the key to a complete and effective solution
to this particular aspect of the quantum measurement problem and to an
explanation of the quasiclassical nature of ‘macroscopic’ reality is the ac-
knowledgment that the property of closure of the universal causal chain is
not optional and must, according to the arguments provided above, be im-
posed as an absolutely essential consistency requirement. It is only when I
recognized the unavoidable nature of this condition that I was able to un-
derstand that in the context where there must exist both a retarded and
an advanced portion to every quantum process, additional constraints ex-
ist which only become apparent during processes which can be qualified as
measurements.
So, what is it indeed that characterizes a process that can be described
as a quantum measurement? The essential ingredient of decoherence itself
appears to be irreversibility (dissipation to be more specific), but as I men-
tioned above decoherence can only be part of the solution. So what happens
as a consequence of irreversibility that does not take place under those con-
ditions where quantum interferences exist? To answer that question it may
help to consider what would be necessary for measurement not to occur and
quantum interference to exist, even after a quantum system becomes entan-
gled with its environment. It is obvious that what would be required is that
the state of the quantum system along with that of the immediate environ-
ment to which it has become correlated do not become entangled with an
even larger portion of the environment. In other words, there would need to
be no traces in the larger portion of the environment that would allow one
to tell through which history the system and its immediate environment ac-
tually went. The point at which irreversibility enters the picture, therefore,
is through the making of a record of the events involved (conceived precisely
as the kind of process during which the effects of one or another of several
alternative outcomes of the evolution of a microscopic system is amplified
to macroscopic proportions). Only when the state of each physical attribute
whose determination would allow one to tell what the history of the system
and its immediate environment was is submitted to quantum interference
before this information has the time to spread into the environment, can
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interferences actually be observed.
It would therefore appear that if irreversibility is in effect necessary for
the elimination of interferences it is because the making of a record can only
occur when future evolution takes place irreversibly. What happens when
a record is produced is that one unique cause in the past leaves multiple
recognizable and mutually consistent traces of its occurrence in the future.
A long lasting record is one whose mutually consistent traces themselves each
produce multiple recognizable and mutually consistent traces in the future
that can all be traced back to the same unique original cause in the past.
What happens when a quantum measurement, conceived as a particular, but
general instance of such a record making process, comes into effect, therefore,
is that a unique, particular outcome of the evolution of a quantum system
causally influences in a recognizable way a multitude of other events in the
future, which would all have been affected in recognizably different ways
had that original outcome been different or inexistent. What must then be
responsible for the elimination of interferences that follows decoherence is the
fact that a growing number of observable variables become correlated with
one unique specific outcome of the evolution of a microscopic system, while
all of those variables would have evolved differently if another outcome had
been obtained for the same measurement in the past.
Now, the important point in all of this is that the spreading of causal
influences does not take place with respect to an arbitrarily chosen dynamic
attribute, but always relative to position space. Indeed, as I have emphasized
in section 7, at the most fundamental level reality appears to consists of ele-
mentary particles, which are objects that are localized in position space and
which allow the propagation of causal influences through local contact, again
in position space. There is, thus, something very particular with position
space for what has to do with unidirectional causality and the irreversible
propagation of effects and this is apparent in the fact that the spreading of
wave fronts always occurs in position space and not in configuration space.
The singular status of position space is made even clearer by the fact that
the particular boundary condition which I have identified as being respon-
sible for the asymmetry of the evolution in time of systems with a large
number of independent, microscopic degrees of freedom is a condition that is
imposed on the spatial distribution of matter in the first instants of the Big
Bang. Indeed, it is the homogeneity of the spatial distribution of positive
and negative energy matter particles in the maximum density state of the
Big Bang that allows the universe to evolve irreversibly toward a state of
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larger gravitational entropy characterized by a greater inhomogeneity of the
two matter distributions, as space expands, in the future direction of time.
But, as I explained in section 3.9 of [1] this condition is what allows one
to assume that the cosmic horizon, which limits the scale of unidirectional
causal influences, actually grows with time from the minimum value it had
in the initial singularity.
What is allowed to happen on a smaller scale as a result of this particular
condition is for an irreversible spreading of effects into an ever larger volume
of space to take place in the future direction of time, as elementary particles
freely propagate in either the retarded or the advanced portion of history (this
is particularly apparent in the case where dissipation is involved). In fact,
as I explained above, the same constraint of global entanglement which gives
rise to thermodynamic irreversibility is also responsible for allowing time to
differentiate from the other three dimensions of space and therefore for giving
rise to the causal structure of spacetime that is described by relativity theory
and which is responsible for the fact that effects necessarily spread in space,
either forward or backward in time. But what characterizes unidirectional
causality is not only the fact that it operates relative to a unique dimension
of space-time, but also the fact that it does indeed give rise to an irreversible
spatial spreading of effects in the future direction of time, which is actually
what causality is usually considered to be all about. Thus, as time goes,
a growing number of independent, microscopic degrees of freedom can be
causally influenced in recognizable ways by unique causes located in the past,
while the reverse phenomenon is never observed to happen and this is really
a property that is unique to the evolution of position states.
We are now very near a solution to a very old problem. What I have
just explained is that the making of a record is the essential condition for
a quantum measurement to take place and that what it entices is the pro-
duction of a multiplicity of correlated effects involving very many otherwise
independent variables which could all have evolved differently in the future
had the outcome of this measurement itself been different. A multitude of
correlated effects as the outcome of one single quantum measurement. It is
not very difficult to realize that, as time passes, the observable difference be-
tween the consequences of one single past measurement and what would have
been the consequences of obtaining a different result for the same measure-
ment becomes ever more significant. But in the context where one recognizes
that the universal causal chain must, as a matter of principle, form a closed
trajectory in superspace, then this remark becomes highly significant.
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Indeed, in a world that would have been quasiclassical on a macroscopic
scale until now, if a measurement performed on the retarded state of a quan-
tum system was to give rise to an outcome that is different from that which
was obtained as a result of a similar measurement performed on the advanced
state of the same system by a measuring device whose irreversible evolution
actually also takes place in the future direction of time, then as time goes (in
the future) an exponentially growing number of independent variables from
the environment of the system that evolves as part of the retarded portion
of history, would be allowed to differ from those of the same system that
evolves as part of the advanced portion of history. This means that the two
trajectories in superspace, which until now had always been very similar to
one another, would begin to diverge in a way that would actually make it
increasingly less likely that they could ever merge with one another at some
point in the future, because of this property of the record making process
which is to produce an accumulation of recognizable changes in the states of
an innumerable number of independently evolving degrees of freedom as a
consequence of one little change in the past.
It is the requirement of closure that applies to the universal causal chain
that constrains the future evolution of the retarded and advanced portions
of history to not be divergent in any observable way from the unidirectional
time viewpoint, because if this condition was not obeyed the number of in-
dependent variables from both portions of history that would need to change
together in the same recognizable way at some point in the future, so as to
allow a merger of the two trajectories would become too large for the closure
requirement to ever be fulfilled. As a result, the universal causal chain must
be stretched into two similar trajectories evolving side by side along the uni-
directional direction of time in superspace for the whole duration of history,
as if two indistinguishable versions of history where taking place in parallel
all the time without ever interacting with one another. But the constraint
of non-divergence need not be any more restrictive than that, because what
remains unobserved does not give rise to the formation of a record and has
no irreversible consequences and therefore is not required to correspond for
the two portions of history by the requirement of closure of the universal
causal chain. Quantum interferences are not forbidden altogether, merely
increasingly more probably as the entanglement of a quantum system with
its environment becomes more significant and this is exactly what is required
from an observational viewpoint.
It must be clear, however, that despite the unique role played by posi-
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tion in giving rise to the formation of records, the attribute of a quantum
system that is known with perfect accuracy is not necessarily always its posi-
tion. The privileged status of position space only means that even when the
measured attribute is not position, it is nevertheless a spatial distribution
of macroscopic constraints that allow such a measurement to be performed,
because it is concerning those constraints that information is available in the
form of records. This means that there is no freedom in deciding which dy-
namic attribute is classically well-defined in any particular situation where
we have knowledge of a specific set of macroscopic conditions (while in fact
such conditions are always present for one and only one dynamic attribute,
as I mentioned in section 10). On the other hand, the attribute of a quantum
system for which only a minimum amount of information is available in the
form of irreversible records concerning the position states of various parts of a
measuring device (the environment degrees of freedom), is the attribute that
may go through any possible history in both the retarded and the advanced
portions of history, thereby giving rise to interferences.
What’s important to understand is that given that it is for position space
observables that the making of a record of past events can take place, then
it follows that the constraint of non-divergence of the retarded and advanced
configuration space trajectories is a constraint that applies only to the dy-
namic attribute of a system whose state is restricted to a subset of values
as a result of being submitted to experimental conditions of such a nature.
But such a constraint does not only give rise to non-interfering outcomes of
measurement following decoherence, but really to a quasiclassical evolution
that persists in time for the same family of consistent histories (the physically
relevant set of histories).
It had already been remarked, in effect, that decoherence, as it is tra-
ditionally conceived, allows to select position as the relevant collective ob-
servable (that which becomes correlated with the microscopic system under
study), at least for mechanical systems in the presence of dissipation. It
was conjectured that this is merely a consequence of the fact that the laws
of physics (particularly in a quantum field theoretic context) are invariant
under a change of reference system. In the present context, however, this
could only be understood to mean that the selection of position as the rel-
evant collective observable for decoherence is indeed a consequence of the
fact that unidirectional causality (the irreversible spreading of effects) op-
erates in position space, because what emerges as a result of relativistic
invariance is the causal structure of spacetime, which under appropriate con-
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ditions (when evolution is irreversible) gives rise to unidirectional causality
and therefore to the existence of persistent records of past events. The fact
that the phenomenon of dissipation merely consists in one particular instance
of irreversible spreading that necessarily takes place in position space would
therefore appear to confirm that it is the closure requirement (that must be
applied to the universal causal chain) that allows quasiclassicality to emerge
and to persist for those attributes of a quantum system whose states are
restricted by macroscopic conditions of a spatial nature.
There should be no doubt that the existence of such an objectively de-
fined preferred basis is absolutely necessary from an observational viewpoint,
as if none arose it would be impossible to determine what causes the per-
sistence of the quasiclassical nature of reality (even under the assumption
that the universal causal chain is closed), because if reality was classical with
respect to one family of consistent, coarse-grained histories at a given time
and then relative to another such family at a later time, as allowed in a
more conventional context, then this reality would no longer appear classical
from the first viewpoint after this transformation has occurred. But when
quasiclassicality is the outcome of imposing a requirement of closure to the
universal causal chain and irreversiblity is a feature of the spreading of ef-
fects in position space, it follows that a preferred basis (a preferred choice
of dynamic attribute to represent quantum states) is naturally selected for
the elimination of quantum interferences and it is from the viewpoint of the
records which are available concerning the constraints (of a spatial nature)
that select this dynamic physical attribute that the world necessarily appears
to remain classical following a measurement. I believe that those conditions,
therefore, allow to satisfy Dowker and Kent’s requirement for an additional,
purely quantum mechanical principle that would allow one to select a partic-
ular set of (consistent) histories as being of particular physical significance,
without having to rely on solipsist arguments.
So here we are, having actually explained why it is that in practice one
never observes quantum superpositions involving macroscopic states of mea-
suring apparatuses. If we never experience histories in which a cat is alive
and dead all at once, it is because if the cat was not either alive or dead in
both the retarded and the advanced portions of history this would change
the future in ways which would render impossible an eventual meeting of the
retarded and advanced trajectories in configuration space that is necessary
for the universe to be self-determined from the viewpoint of causality. The
identified constraint simply makes it extremely unlikely (as unlikely in fact as
154
the growth of entropy that took place while the retarded and advanced states
became distinct is important) that such an evolution could ever be deduced
to have occurred. The essential characteristic sought by Von Neumann and
which would differentiate a measuring apparatus from the system it measures
is simply the possibility that exists for the measuring device to generate a
record of its particular evolution, which has decisive consequences in the
context where reality is a causal chain that must close at some point in the
future. From that viewpoint, of course, quantum interference of macroscopic
states is not completely impossible, but even if such an unlikely phenomenon
was to happen, then one would not see a cat that is both alive and dead
at the same time, because one is always confined to directly perceive only
the portion of history (either the retarded or the advanced) in which one
happens to be located and in any such a history there is always a unique set
of causally related facts.
But this does not mean that a state of superposition involving a macro-
scopic portion of reality would have no apparent consequences, because if
the advanced state was to become distinct from the retarded state on a
large scale, then the estimation of transition probabilities for future pro-
cesses would be affected in dramatic ways from the viewpoint of observers
which are part of the process while it is under way, which means that their
future would actually become unpredictable unless they assume that such a
divergence from classicality has indeed occurred and this is how they would
actually gain knowledge of this distinction between the current retarded and
advanced states. But if the condition of closure of the universal causal chain
has the expected consequences, then the observers which were part of such a
process would not be allowed to remember through which history they went
on either the retarded or the advanced portion of the process after quan-
tum interference is over, as otherwise this knowledge could spread into the
environment25.
25This observation cannot constitute the basis of an alternative explanation of thermo-
dynamic time asymmetry, because if one does not assume that there exists a constraint
for the retarded and advanced states not to diverge that is made necessary by the inde-
pendent condition of low gravitational entropy at the Big Bang, which from my viewpoint
is responsible for time irreversibility, then one has no reason to expect that the retarded
and advanced portions of history should converge back to the same macroscopic state after
having diverged on a large scale and this means that our memory of the particular history
which actually took place would not need to vanish and therefore its persistence would
not need to be correlated with a history where entropy grows in the future.
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The point that is perhaps the most difficult to understand concerning
what I believe would qualify as an appropriate account of experiments of the
Schro¨dinger cat type in which there would be interferences of macroscopic
states is that in the final state of such an experiment the cat would have
to be neither in a live-with-no-poison-in-its-blood state, nor in a dead-with-
poison-in-its-blood state, even though it is true that the animal may no
longer exist in a recognizable form, because this is not the same as a cat
that is dead due to having absorbed the poison released as a result of the
measurement on the quantum particle having produced a negative result,
even if it does mean that the cat may no longer be alive in the final state.
What is required therefore is that it be impossible to tell from the information
that is present in the final state whether the cat was killed by the poison or
whether it might have been alive without any poison in its blood before the
final measurement was performed that would have revealed the existence
of quantum interferences, so that even if the cat no longer exists in the
final state it would not be correct to say that it was killed as a result of
the particular outcome of the particle disintegration process. In any case,
given that no complex macroscopic system such as a cat was ever subjected
to any reproducible experiment in which quantum interferences would have
been observed, then it would appear that the requirement of closure which
I suggest must be imposed on the universal causal chain is well motivated,
because it does allow one to expect that macroscopic objects, which can never
be completely isolated from their environment, should practically never be
found in states of quantum superposition.
An additional advantage of the approach proposed here, is that it allows
one to understand how it is that global consistency would be enforced in
the context where a classical time travel experience would occur and the
course of history could potentially be altered so as to give rise to an alternate
future. Indeed, when the effects of a future measurement can be propagated
backward in time as a result of the existence of an advanced portion of history
and there is a condition for the retarded and advanced portions of history to
share the same observable macroscopic conditions in the future (so that the
universal causal chain can close at some point), it follows that the present can
only be influenced by the future to be such as to give rise (through forward
in time causation) to classical outcomes of measurement rather than to a
retarded state that would differ from the advanced state. In other words,
the present cannot be influenced by the future in such a way that it would
be likely to evolve toward a different future. Thus, even if the second law
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of thermodynamics could be temporarily violated in a local region of space,
perhaps as a result of a formidably improbable fluctuation, and information
about the future would become available, no violation of the principle of
global consistency could arise.
The circularity of the causal process is what allows consistency to be pre-
served in a way that would be impossible in the absence of an advanced coun-
terpart to every retarded propagation process. The conclusion that global
consistency would always be preserved in a quantum mechanical context,
therefore, need not depend on the hypothesis that all histories are followed
all at once and that a ‘splitting of branches’ occurs whenever an alternate
reality is produced, as is often assumed, because it can be derived much
more naturally by recognizing that in order that the universe be causally
self-determined, its history must consist in a closed causal chain. Yet it does
seem appropriate to assume that it is quantum theory that would ultimately
be responsible for the impossibility of even a classical time travel paradox,
as I suggested in section 4, because the limitation discussed here is made un-
avoidable as a result of the time-symmetric nature of quantum reality, which
through purely local causal influences enforces consistency on a global scale
(as necessary for the existence of non-local correlations).
Now, it must be clear that a condition of closure, similar to that which
applies for the future, must also apply to the evolution that takes place in
the past direction of time, because even if entropy does not increase in this
direction of time, so that there is no constraint arising from the making of
records (no record exists of the future), if we do not require the universal
causal chain to close at a certain point in the past, then reality would not
necessarily remain quasiclassical relative to the same family of consistent,
coarse-grained histories in the past direction of time, which means that the
existence of a unique past compatible with the ensemble of mutually con-
sistent records of it would not be required. The fact that quasiclassicality
persists in the past for those dynamic attributes which are submitted to the
same kind of experimental conditions as applies on those that remain quasi-
classical in the future, allows to confirm that past classicality is due to the
same constraint of closure of the universal causal chain as applies on future
evolution (now applying to the evolution that takes place before the Big
Bang) and not merely to the fact that entropy diminishes in the past26. Just
26One should note that it is not possible to assume that the universal causal chain
closes at the Big Bang and yet that there is a history taking place in reverse prior to the
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as is the case for the future, it is not possible to say when it is exactly that
such a meeting of the retarded and advanced configuration space trajecto-
ries would occur and the only condition is that it does not occur before the
time at which the initial singularity is formed in the past, because otherwise
global entanglement would not have had the time to occur and the universe
would not have been allowed to exist as an entity formed of causally related
elements.
Thus, in the context where time would extend past the initial maximum
density state of the Big Bang, there would actually exist a constraint that
would apply to the evolution of the retarded and advanced states that takes
place in this portion of history that would require them not to differ in their
measured, observable properties, because entropy would then be growing in
the past, for reasons I have discussed in section 3.9 of [1]. But this does not
mean that the evolution that takes place in the past direction of time before
the maximum density state is reached would not be similarly constrained
by the closure requirement, because if this requirement is to be satisfied
at some point in the distant past, on the other side in time of the initial
singularity, then the past evolution that is taking place on our side in time
of the Big Bang must already be such as to not allow a divergence that
would involve a spatial position observable. Indeed, it is only when there
is no such divergence as we approach the initial maximum density state in
the past, before the thermodynamic arrow of time reverses, that the initial
retarded and advanced states are allowed to be compatible with the closure
requirement that applies to the evolution that takes place ‘subsequently’, in
the past direction of time, prior to the Big Bang, and which is similar from
the viewpoint of its thermodynamic properties to that which is taking place
in the future, on our side in time of the initial singularity.
Up to this point I have only discussed the emergence of quasiclassicality as
it arises in a conventional quantum mechanical context where the metric
properties of spacetime constitute a common, unique background over which
both the retarded and advanced portions of a process unfold, either with or
without interference, depending on whether or not the particular history of
the particles propagating over this background space gives rise to the making
of a record. But what right do we have to assume that the metric properties of
Big Bang, otherwise the meeting of the retarded and advanced trajectories in superspace
would no longer have any meaning even for the future, because when the closure condition
would be met history could nevertheless continue as if nothing had actually happened.
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spacetime themselves should always be shared by the retarded and advanced
histories if all other physical quantities can under appropriate circumstances
differ and interfere for the two trajectories of the universal causal chain?
If the other macroscopic conditions which are shared by both portions of
history are so determined merely as a result of the fact that they give rise
to an irreversible spreading of effects, then why would the metric properties
of spacetime which are shared by both portions of history be simply given
once and for all in their classical form, instead of being subjected to the same
rules that govern the other physical attributes of our universe? The truth,
of course, is that the metric properties of space are not always classically
well-defined and that they may differ and interfere for the two portions of
history.
It is already understood in fact that macroscopic changes to the gravita-
tional field are a very potent way by which decoherence can be triggered, as
confirmed by the fact that the motion of planets is one of the phenomena for
which the absence of quantum interferences is the most conclusive and the
most persistent, while it was shown that this is not unrelated to the mag-
nitude of the gravitational fields involved. Now, I have already mentioned
that in a quantum gravitational context what we would be dealing with are
situations where the intrinsic curvature of space would be allowed to dif-
fer in the retarded and advanced portions of history. I may now add that
this would occur whenever information in the form of records would only
be available about the extrinsic curvature of space associated with its rate
of change along the universal causal chain (for a rigorous definition of the
distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic curvature see [32]). Indeed, the
intrinsic and extrinsic curvatures of a spacelike hypersurface are the quan-
tum gravitational equivalent of position and momentum and therefore they
constitute conjugate physical attributes whose states cannot be determined
together with arbitrarily high precision using one unique set of experimen-
tal constraints. But this does not mean that all histories involving distinct
intrinsic curvatures are followed all at once when the extrinsic curvature is
known with high precision, but merely that the intrinsic curvature may be
different for the corresponding retarded and advanced portions of history un-
der such conditions, because information in the form of records of the actual
history is available only about the extrinsic curvature.
The situation we normally experience (outside the quantum gravitational
regime) is one where the curvature of space in general is classically well-
defined (knowledge is available about both the intrinsic curvature and its
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rate of change) and there are no quantum interferences arising from the cur-
vature of space being potentially different for the retarded and advanced
portions of a process, as is necessary for conventional quantum theory to
provide a viable description of reality. But that need not always be the case
and indeed under situations where we would try to determine the extrinsic
curvature of space with a very high degree of precision, by measuring the rate
of change of the gravitational field on a very small scale, then the intrinsic
curvature of space would be subjected to quantum interference, as its state
would no longer be constrained to be the same in the retarded and advanced
portions of history, for reasons I already mentioned. Under such conditions
it would no longer be possible to estimate transition probabilities while using
one unique set of metric properties, that is to say, by assuming the existence
of one single classical spacetime over which particles would propagate in both
portions of a process and it would be necessary to take into account the pos-
sibility that the metric properties of space themselves could evolve differently
in the two portions of history. It would then be quantum interferences be-
tween the many possible histories of space curvature which would determine
what metric properties are likely to emerge upon observation. When inter-
ference would happen to be constructive, a given curvature would have more
chances to be observed and when interference would be destructive, the very
boundary conditions necessary for the observation of such a curvature would
themselves be unlikely to have existed in the first place.
From such considerations it transpires that time must still exist in a
certain form, even in the quantum gravitational regime, despite the fact that
causality may no longer operate in the same direction of spacetime uniformly
over all space on the smallest scale. Indeed, the initial constraint of global
entanglement that is responsible for selecting the particular signature of the
metric of spacetime that gives rise to a universally valid distinction between
time and the other three dimensions of space would no longer be effective
on a very small scale, where quantum fluctuations can be expected to give
rise to arbitrarily strong local gravitational fields. But it must be clear that
time itself is not subject to quantum interferences or superpositions, as is
sometimes suggested, and if it may be distinct for the two portions of history
it is only in the sense that on a smaller scale time may flow faster, or slower, or
in differing directions of spacetime locally for the two portions of a quantum
gravitational process, due to the fact that the curvature of space may not
be the same in both portions of history, which may therefore give rise to
differing durations for otherwise similar propagation processes.
160
It is not that there is no definite space and time in the quantum gravi-
tational regime, simply that even if there exists a unique curvature of space
throughout history it can differ for the two corresponding portions of history
along the universal causal chain, to the extent that there may in fact no
longer be a simple correspondence between those two portions of history on
a very small scale along the trajectory in superspace. Reality always remains
a unique closed causal chain, even though on a very small scale the regularity
and the linearity of its progression in superspace may be altered given that
we need to take into account the fact that the metric properties of space and
the gravitational field may themselves no longer remain unaffected by the in-
herent randomness of quantum mechanical evolution which is then, in effect,
allowed to give rise to a divergence of the retarded and advanced trajectories
in superspace, as long as no record is available regarding what those metric
properties actually are.
What is significant for a quantum mechanical description of gravitation
and space curvature from the viewpoint of the developments introduced in the
first part of this section is that there must be a level at which the curvature
cannot remain superposed and must give rise to a quasiclassical evolution
and this turning point would be determined by the availability of informa-
tion concerning the metric properties of space. It is in effect precisely when
the consequences on the propagation of elementary particles of a particular
curvature of space irreversibly spreads into the environment and gives rise to
the formation of mutually consistent records that the relevant metric proper-
ties must begin to evolve quasiclassically, because the requirement of closure
of the universal causal chain can only be satisfied when such an evolution is
observed, just as is the case in a more conventional context. Irreversibility
would therefore be the essential condition for a classical spacetime structure
to emerge and therefore it is when the state of the gravitational field becomes
observable that it is no longer subjected to interference effects and that it is
no longer allowed to affect the propagation of matter particles differently for
the retarded and advanced portions of a process.
What this means is that the existence of a decoherent spacetime is itself
dependent on the existence of unidirectional time, which emphasizes just
how important it is that there exists an independent constraint of the kind
I have previously identified for the emergence of irreversibility, because in
a quantum gravitational context, when the irreversible character of time
itself does not emerge from the relevant theoretical description, decoherence
cannot alone give rise to the classical spacetime structure. What will be
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very important for the argument that will be developed in the concluding
section of this report, is the observation that if random fluctuations of the
metric properties of space exist that would have no observable effects of the
kind that would require the gravitational field to actually have the exact same
configuration in both the retarded and the advanced portions of history, then
those fluctuations might be allowed to exert an unexpected influence on the
propagation of elementary particles, even on a scale well above that at which
gravitation becomes as strong as the other interactions. What I will now
explain is how decisive this apparently inconsequential conclusion really is.
13 Objectification and the role of gravitation
I must immediately warn the reader that the developments that will be the
subject of this concluding section of my last report will probably be consid-
ered more speculative than other portions of my analysis and I would not
myself consider such a judgment entirely inaccurate. Yet I believe that it is
important to discuss what I have learned concerning the possible role played
by gravitation in solving the problem of objectification, because the solution
I will propose to this most insoluble problem of the interpretation of quantum
theory is actually motivated by the same desire to uphold the validity of the
principle of local causality that motivated the approach I followed in dealing
with other problems in cosmology and quantum mechanics. Despite the fact
that this discussion comes last, it is actually based on results I had obtained
in the earliest portion of my research program, while I was still working on
the problem of elaborating a generalized, classical theory of gravitation that
would describe the interaction of positive and negative energy matter.
It is one of those strange turns of fate that while I was searching for a
paper in the immense science and engineering library at McGill University
I came upon an article in a very old volume that discussed a failed theory
that sought to explain the randomness of quantum measurement results as
being caused by perturbations attributable to the interaction of a quantum
system with a background of gravitons present in its environment. As I now
understand, this was a particular instance of classical hidden variables theory
which was inadequate mainly as a result of the fact that it was incompatible
with the requirements imposed by quantum entanglement and non-locality.
Yet, for some reason, I had the strong intuition that the idea that gravita-
tion was involved in explaining certain aspects of the quantum mechanical
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description of reality was generally valid and should be further explored.
This imperative remained in the back of my mind as a guiding principle as I
explored other problems in fundamental theoretical physics and even though
I soon realized how such a proposal could be made viable it is only much
later that I came to understand that there is actually something unavoidable
with the hypothesis that gravitation must become an integral element of a
truly consistent formulation of quantum theory.
In the previous section I suggested that quantum theory, as it is currently
interpreted, is incomplete given that it does not explicitly require the exis-
tence of a closed universal causal chain, while, as I have explained, such a
concept is essential if we are to obtain a theory that allows for the emer-
gence of a maximum quasiclassical domain. But at this point it was still
possible to argue that the current formulation of quantum theory (under its
most appropriate form) is compatible with this more complete version of the
theory. However, given that the proposed interpretation is dependent on the
assumption that there exists a unique reality, and in a certain sense a unique
history, behind all quantum mechanical processes, even in the presence of
quantum interferences, then it transpires that in order to obtain a complete
solution to the quantum measurement problem one can no longer avoid hav-
ing to address the issue associated with the existence of a unique datum as
the outcome of every quantum measurement.
Indeed, Omne`s’ argument (see for example [33]) to the effect that the
problem of objectification simply does not exist, because there is no logical
way to express it (how could it matter that the electron is found to exist
in one particular state following measurement if one cannot even say that
it went trough one or another slit in the double slit experiment) would only
apply in the context of a more conventional interpretation of quantum theory
according to which reality is not unique in any way when it is not observed27.
I believe that this difficulty is merely a reflection of the inadequacy of the
orthodox interpretation, which, as I have argued at length in the previous
sections of the current report, suffers from logical inconsistencies of its own,
due in part to its rejection of scientific realism. From the perspective of
a more consistent interpretation of quantum theory which does not suffer
27There appears to be some confusion in Omne`s’ account concerning the true nature of
the problem we are dealing with here, as he also argues that the problem of objectification
arises merely when one assumes that decoherence is not a definitive process, while, as I
have explained in sections 10 and 12 this is a distinct issue, which can be appropriately
solved when one recognizes the necessity for a closure of the universal causal chain.
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from such weaknesses it becomes not only easier to state the problem of
objectification, but also easier to solve it.
Anyhow, what should be clear is that while decoherence is constraining
enough to predict classical outcomes of measurement (when a closure re-
quirement is imposed on the universal causal chain), it does not select from
the multiple possibilities so obtained a unique outcome, but rather leaves all
potentialities on an equal footing, which is somewhat unsatisfactory, given
that only one possibility is observed to be actualized following any measure-
ment. As a result, here again one must face the possibility that quantum
theory is incomplete, but now in a way that would appear to require that it
be reformulated. Indeed, even in the context of the realist time-symmetric
interpretation of quantum theory I have proposed, it would appear that the
question of completeness can only be positively answered once one allows
for a further extension of the formalism from the viewpoint of which the
uniqueness of measurement results would no longer constitute an additional
problem, but would rather provide a hint as to what goes on when a particle
propagates in the space of its unobserved physical attributes.
Those remarks are particularly significant given that the hypothesis that
all the unobserved histories allowed by the quantum mechanical formalism
are actually occurring all at once in the very same universe is not viable
as a solution to the objectification problem, that is to say, for explaining
the unique and random nature of measurement results, given that it would
require assuming that despite all the evidence, history is not, in fact, unique.
I have already explained, in effect, that it is inappropriate to argue that
an attribute that is indefinite in the quantum mechanical sense of the word
could be objectively indefinite, in the sense that it would not satisfy the
requirements of scientific realism in any possible way. But if we are allowed
to conceive of a reality of the kind I have proposed, where even in the absence
of direct observation particles always follow unique, but possibly different
paths in the retarded and advanced portions of history, then the question
necessarily arises as to what determines which path is actually followed by a
particle in between measurements?
You may recall that I have argued in section 10 that the unpredictability
of quantum measurement results is not a consequence of the measurement
process itself. It is therefore necessary to assume that there is already ran-
domness before a particle meets a detector, while it is still propagating in
the two unobserved portions of history and what remains unexplained is the
variable nature of this evolution, which applies even for physical systems
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prepared in the exact same way. What is it indeed that determines the par-
ticular evolution of a certain physical attribute that takes place in between
measurements and which causes one unique outcome of measurement to be
actualized from among many apparently equivalent possibilities? What I
have realized is that in order to answer this question it is necessary to rec-
ognize that the current theory is merely an idealization and that it must
be reformulated to give rise to a more elaborate, but statistically equivalent
model, in which the unique outcomes of measurement would be a natural
consequence of the existence of fundamentally unobservable, random factors
of influence, whose existence is inevitable and does not have to be postulated
on purpose in order to solve the problem of objectification.
A related question one may ask is whether the concept of objective chance
which follows from the fundamental unpredictability of quantum measure-
ment results itself constitutes an appropriate notion in the context of a realist
interpretation of quantum theory? In other words, if objective indefiniteness
is to be rejected, must one also reject the associated concept of objective
chance? The conclusion to which I have arrived is that this depends on what
we mean by objective chance. If we are asking whether the unpredictability
of measurement results can be circumvented given a more precise assessment
of the microscopic state of a quantum system, then the answer would defi-
nitely be no. But if what we understand by objective chance is the idea that
the unique unobserved path of a quantum system might be ‘determined’ by
nothing at all, instead of being the outcome of fundamentally unobservable
causes, that is to say, if we are asking whether it is possible for a distinctive
feature of an unobservable aspect of reality to have no identifiable cause, then
the answer could only be provided in light of what we already know about
reality at the level where it can be observed and by taking into account any
possibility that there may be for such a distinctive feature to actually be
causally determined (in the time-symmetric sense of the word). Only if we
decide that an absence of causes is not physically unacceptable and if we
can be confident that no influence exists that would provide such unobserv-
able causes, can we argue that such a strong concept of objective chance
is still applicable at the most fundamental level of description of physical
phenomena.
It is often remarked that the notion of objective chance conflicts with
common sense, but that this merely reflects another failure of our intellect to
grasp the essentially distinct and counterintuitive nature of quantum reality.
Again, however, I would like to argue that this is not all there is and that
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from the mere viewpoint of logical consistency there is actually something
problematic with assuming that a reality can differ and yet that such a dif-
ference need not be the result of any known physical influence, even of a
fundamentally unobservable nature. What is easy to overlook is that allow-
ing for a difference that would have no ‘cause’ may conflict with the idea that
the physical attributes of all the objects which are present in our universe
need to be describable by referring only to aspects of reality which are an
integral part of this universe. Indeed, if one assumes that it is acceptable for
certain aspects of reality which would exist beyond the observable portion of
physical phenomena to have no identifiable causes (even of a random nature)
originating from within the universe in which those phenomena arise, then
it may no longer be possible to avoid the conclusion that those particular-
ities actually are the product of external intervention, which would simply
mean that our universe is an incomplete instance of reality. I believe that a
physical model that would offer a complete account of what happens inside
any given universe must, therefore, avoid postulating an absence of causes
for physically distinct aspects of our reality. This is probably the purest form
of the principle of local causality.
There is, thus, something rational in our aversion for a reality that would
differ without any identifiable (even if potentially unobservable) causes, that
is to say, there are good motives to doubt that a strong concept of objec-
tive chance is relevant to our description of physical reality. No distinctive
feature of our universe should have as a cause ‘nothing’. If events are in
general related in statistically significant ways to other events of a similar
nature through what we call causality, then we are justified to expect that
there should be no event that would be related to something we call nothing.
That does not mean, however, that we have to reject the notion that quan-
tum measurements produce results which are absolutely unpredictable, as I
already mentioned, because even a causally determined world would, in the
context of the existence of closed causal chains and backward in time cau-
sation, involve an irreducible randomness, given that the cause of an event
can be influenced backward in time by this very same event, despite the
fact that no information is allowed to flow backward concerning that future
event (so that it necessarily remains unpredictable), as I explained in section
4. What this means is that even if unobservable causes were to be found
to exert an influence on unobserved portions of a quantum process, reality
would remain fundamentally random and not just unpredictable, even if it
is causally determined in every way. This is the exquisite beauty of time-
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symmetric causality: it allows for causal determination without giving rise
to complete determinism28.
What allows the wave function to evolve deterministically, but only until
a measurement occurs, even in the context where one must assume that the
underlying evolution is of a random nature, is the fact that we are dealing
with a unique reality for which what happens in the future contributes to
determine what happens in the past. In such a context the outcome of a
measurement on a quantum system at time t2 can change what happens to
the system as far back as the time t1 when the system was prepared, which
allows the evolution that took place immediately after t1 to agree with the
outcome of a measurement that took place at time t2 despite the fact that
this evolution is taking place randomly on a local level. Thus, the fact that
the evolution of the system appears to have been deterministic until time t2
(at which decoherence took place and the state vector was reduced), is not
incompatible with the hypothesis that the system evolved randomly before
that measurement, because this random evolution was influenced all along by
what happened at a later time, when the measurement was performed, given
that from the viewpoint of time-symmetric causality the system is required
to obey constraints which may be determined by what happens to the system
following that measurement. But, once the potentialities are actualized at
time t2 the observed outcome is only required to be compatible with what
actually happened in the past and this is what explains that randomness
becomes apparent. Quantum evolution is always random, but a real change
is actually occurring when a measurement takes place which makes it seem
like this is where randomness originates, because right until the measurement
is actually performed multiple different outcomes are still possible and the
system appears to evolve indifferently toward all those final states all at
once and this is what makes this evolution appear deterministic, as it always
happens in the same way from an observational viewpoint.
In any case, as long as the unidentified causes which may explain the
variation of the unobserved paths of quantum particles from one measure-
ment to the other would themselves remain unobservable, reality would re-
main unpredictable from the viewpoint of all observers. I would therefore
28Such a conclusion would seem to confirm that a time reversal operation that would
apply to the present state of the whole universe defined over a given space-like hypersurface
would not necessarily give rise to the exact same history in reverse, but could potentially
give rise to an entirely different and genuinely unpredictable evolution, as I suggested in
section 3.6 of [1].
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object suggesting that the validity of a causal theory based on the realist
conception of reality developed in the preceding sections of the present re-
port would imply that the wave function provides an incomplete description
of the state of a quantum system, because the wave function does provide the
most complete account of how a system evolves as a result of the observable
constraints exerted on it, only this still leaves us with a statistical description
for the physical attributes which are left unconstrained by the macroscopic
experimental conditions which apply to both the retarded and the advanced
portions of a process. I believe that this provides an important clue as to the
nature of those unobservable random factors of influence.
What must be clear, first of all, is that the existence of such unobserv-
able causes, obeying the principle of local causality, is not ruled out by the
phenomenon of quantum entanglement in the context of the realist, time-
symmetric interpretation of quantum theory I have proposed, because even
if the trajectories of both elements of an entangled pair are separately influ-
enced by those unobservable causes, when there is as much influence of the
future on the past as there is of the past on the future it is possible for the
two entangled systems to evolve so as to enforce the non-local requirements
imposed by the existence of the shared quantum phase. This is why one
must differentiate such an approach to the problem of objectification from
the naive realist interpretations of quantum theory which were proposed in
the past and which can be appropriately called classical hidden variables
theories. Here it is the very concept of an objective reality that differs in
essential ways, given that we are now dealing with a universal causal chain
that feeds back on itself to give rise to two interfering, but otherwise inde-
pendent versions of history for each and every process, to which must be
independently applied the requirement of local causality. Thus, different un-
observable causes can apply on the retarded and advanced portions of history
along the trajectories followed by any of two entangled systems, but given
that the two portions of both processes interfere with one another quantum
mechanically as a result of being part of the same closed causal chain, it
becomes possible for non-local correlations to exist between the outcomes of
measurements performed on the two otherwise independently evolving sys-
tems.
From my viewpoint, the reality that is causally determined is not unique
in the classical sense and this is what allows even a causal theory to agree
with the requirements imposed by the quantum entanglement of distant par-
ticles, without requiring complex and arbitrary non-local mechanisms of a
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conspiratorial nature, in contrast with all classical hidden variables theories.
The only difference between a causal theory involving unobservable causes
of the kind I suggest may need to be considered and the orthodox inter-
pretation of quantum theory would therefore be that, from my viewpoint,
not only is it possible to assume that there can indeed exist a unique real-
ity, even in between measurements of a certain physical attribute for which
quantum interferences are observed, but it is also possible for this reality to
be causally determined, as all observed phenomena. One of the advantages
of this particular approach would therefore be that it naturally agrees with
a much larger portion of observational evidence which clearly indicates that
when there is an effect, there usually is a cause, even if its consequences may
sometimes remain unpredictable.
The approach I will now propose for solving the objectification problem is
the exact opposite of an approach that would be based on the many-worlds
interpretation of quantum theory, because instead of positing a deterministic
evolution involving multiple simultaneously occurring histories, I’m assum-
ing a random evolution involving one causally determined history (forming
a closed causal chain). Thus, from my viewpoint, one no longer needs to
assume that reality is deterministic theoretically, but random observation-
ally, which all by itself certainly constitutes significant progress. In fact, it
is well-known to specialists that the many-worlds interpretation of quantum
theory suffers from an additional inconsistency which is associated precisely
with the hypothesis that in general no unique outcome follows measure-
ment. The problem is that when all potentialities are actualized together
(in the same universe) it seems that outcome probabilities become meaning-
less, while quantum theory is all about probabilities and nothing else, which
actually makes this usually favored approach completely useless.
In any case, what should be clear already is that if the same measurements
performed on identically prepared quantum systems may produce different
outcomes, then those variations must originate from the fact that even when
an optimal experimental characterization of the evolution of a physical sys-
tem is available it necessarily leaves aside fundamentally unobservable, but
causally significant aspects of the process. It is only the fact that tradition-
ally it appeared impossible to assume the existence of such a more profound
level of reality without explicitly violating the principle of local causality
that explains that we came to believe that such an otherwise more consistent
viewpoint was no longer viable, even though a time-symmetric interpreta-
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tion of quantum theory of the kind I have proposed actually makes this more
natural approach perfectly sensible. Indeed, once one recognizes that, as a
matter of principle, no information could ever be obtained concerning the
causes which may explain the randomly variable character of the paths of
unobserved dynamic attributes, then one must conclude that no violation
of the uncertainty principle could occur as a result of the existence of such
causes. It is only under the incorrect assumption that additional information
could be obtained about this unobserved layer of reality (that is not already
accounted for by the quantum state of a system), that violations of the con-
servation of information and of the second law of thermodynamics would be
allowed to arise.
Now, even though it has long been my opinion that both the classical
theory of gravitation and quantum field theory must be altered prior to
being integrated into a quantum theory of the gravitational interaction, it is
only after I realized that our understanding of classical gravitational fields
leaves aside important aspects which are made unavoidable by the quantum
nature of the gravitational interaction that I began to appreciate the fact
that the quantization issue does not concern merely the general theory of
relativity, but that it probably means that quantum theory itself needs to be
reformulated so as to take into account those properties of the gravitational
field which arise as a consequence of the very quantum mechanical nature of
this interaction. To be more specific, while I do recognize that the classical
theory of gravitation must be submitted to a quantization procedure on the
appropriate quantum gravitational scale, I also believe that quantum theory
must be made to obey the requirement of general covariance, but on a much
larger scale, even under those conditions where we currently assume the
existence of a flat and invariant spacetime.
This requirement can be fulfilled once one acknowledges that the trajec-
tory of the universal causal chain in superspace that describes the evolution
of the intrinsic or extrinsic curvature of space for the whole universe can
differ for the retarded and advanced portions of history, as a result of pertur-
bations of this trajectory which are attributable to unobservable fluctuations
of the classical gravitational field. What must be developed, therefore, is a
theory where spacetime does not merely provide an additional set of macro-
scopic constraints, as a result of a particular state of the gravitational field
being entangled with observable, irreversibly evolving environment degrees
of freedom, but where the local inertial reference systems may be allowed
to fluctuate in unobservable ways that may differ for the two time-reversed
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portions of a process submitted to the same macroscopic conditions.
In the preceding report of this series [1] I have developed a generalized
framework for relativity theory which helped confirm the validity of the hy-
pothesis that spacetime curvature really is a consequence of the existence
of an interaction. Indeed, once one recognizes that local inertial reference
systems are dependent on the energy sign of the particles experiencing them,
then one must accept that there is no such thing as a metric structure of space
independent from the nature of the interaction that determines its proper-
ties. Thus, the concept of negative energy matter which emerged from my
analysis of the quantum mechanical notion of bidirectional time allowed me
to develop a better classical theory of the gravitational field, which helped
confirm the validity of the hypothesis that the metric properties of space and
time really are the product of an interaction. What I would like to discuss
now is the possibility that a better understanding of the microscopic proper-
ties of classical gravitational fields could provide the basis for a reformulation
of quantum theory which may actually turn out to be necessary for producing
a truly consistent quantum theory of the gravitational interaction.
But, instead of arguing that it is the equivalence principle and the idea
that gravitation is a manifestation of the curvature of space that is wrong,
given that it appears to conflict with the current formulation of quantum
theory, I would suggest that quantum theory itself must somehow come to
incorporate the equivalence principle. It would be very surprising, indeed,
that general covariance could turn out to be incorrect as a requirement to be
imposed on our most fundamental theory of elementary particle interactions.
If this requirement is found to be valid on the largest scale, as well as on the
quantum gravitational scale, it should probably also be valid on the inter-
mediary scale of ordinary quantum theory. Even from the viewpoint of the
generalized gravitation theory I have proposed, it is still necessary to assume
that the inertial and gravitational masses of a particle really constitute the
same attribute, even though positive and negative masses would respond in
the same way to an external force, which actually allows to reinforce the
validity of the equivalence principle, as I have explained in section 1.5 of the
preceding report. That does not mean that gravitation is not an interac-
tion, but merely that the metric properties of space are a manifestation of
the existence of such an interaction, which is indicative of the way quantum
theory could be reformulated to integrate certain aspects of the gravitational
interaction. Thus, I believe that gravitation must no longer be assumed to
merely be involved in defining a deterministically evolving, locally uniform
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spacetime background, but must be understood to provide a randomly vari-
able influence participating in the determination of the unobserved paths of
elementary particles under absolutely all circumstances.
Thus, even if I do recognize that the classical theory of gravitation must be
subjected to a quantization procedure on the scale at which this interaction
becomes as strong as the other known interactions, I also believe that the
quantized nature of gravitation would have consequences on a much larger
scale at which this interaction can still be appropriately described by using
the approximation of a continuous force field associated with the curvature of
spacetime. The way this would be achieved is by reformulating quantum field
theory so as to make it compatible with the requirement of general covariance
even on the scale of ordinary quantum phenomena where we usually assume
that there is no local variations of the metric properties of space. It must
be clear, therefore, that the approach I will propose does not constitute a
replacement for current quantum gravitation theories (such as loop quantum
gravity), but merely provides a complementary contribution to the field,
similar in scope to my derivation of the number of discrete degrees of freedom
relevant to the state of matter under the influence of an elementary black
hole (see sections 2.11 and 3.3 of [1]) or to my explanation of the emergence
of a universal time variable in the initial Big Bang state (which was discussed
in section 11 of the present report).
What I’m suggesting, more specifically, is that one must recognize that
due to a certain, usually overlooked property of classical gravitational fields
associated with the quantized nature of the gravitational interaction it follows
that a randomly variable influence is exerted on the trajectory of matter and
radiation particles in the space of those dynamic physical attributes which
are not the subject of direct observation. What is significant here is that even
though such influences are indeed unobservable, they nevertheless have im-
portant consequences on the outcome of quantum measurements, given that
they actually allow to explain what determines the unique, but randomly
variable states which are singled out following decoherence. From that view-
point, even the classical spacetime continuum over which the unobservable
paths of quantum particles are assumed to unfold would no longer constitute
a locally uniform, static background, but would fluctuate as much as the
particle trajectories themselves. This proposal is merely an extension of the
general relativistic idea that it is no longer possible to speak of a situation
where there is an absence of gravitational field. Indeed, Einstein himself
reflected on the irrelevance of such a notion by noting that even in those sit-
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uations where the metric is Euclidean and no mass is present nearby, there
is still a gravitational field, only it is a field that does not vary with position
(while an absence of gravitational field would require that there exist no met-
ric properties at all). Here the idea is that even when it would appear, from a
superficial, macroscopic viewpoint, that the gravitational field does not vary
with position, in fact it still exerts a decisive, randomly variable influence
on the trajectories of elementary particles depicted in the sum-over-histories
formulation of quantum theory.
What makes such a viewpoint unavoidable, is the fact that even the con-
ventional formulation of quantum theory implicitly takes into account the
existence of gravitational interactions all along the unobservable trajectories
of quantum particles, given that it assumes the relevance of a locally uniform
spacetime background in which the matter particles propagate. But, as Lee
Smolin once remarked, it is difficult to imagine how a dynamical theory of
spacetime (such as a background independent quantum theory of gravita-
tion) could actually be derived from a theory where the geometry of space
is assumed to be fixed (such as conventional quantum field theory). What
I’m suggesting is that once we recognize that gravitation exerts a decisive
influence, even on the scale of ordinary quantum theory, then it is also nec-
essary to recognize that the gravitational field is not constrained to have the
properties of local uniformity and predictability that we usually attribute
to it (in the context where large measures of action are involved and classi-
cal physics is a suitable approximation). The gravitational field definitely is
omnipresent and does have an effect at every ‘point’ along the unobserved
trajectories of elementary particles (including gravitons), but I believe that
what the random, but unique character of the paths which are followed in
the unobserved retarded and advanced portions of any process indicate is
that this classical gravitational field cannot be required to be completely
uniform and deterministically evolving locally, but must rather be allowed to
fluctuate in ways that could differ for the retarded and advanced portions of
the process, when the existence of those random fluctuations would have no
immediate observational consequences.
If there is no valid motive to reject the possibility that the gravitational
field may so fluctuate in the absence of observations, then what one would
have to recognize is that it is the local inertial reference systems which are
allowed to vary unpredictably with position and time. In fact, I believe that
this should have been expected, even independently from any consideration
of a quantum mechanical nature, given that from a Machian viewpoint local
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inertial reference systems arise as a result of the gravitational interaction
with the ensemble of matter in the universe and such influences must nec-
essarily involve unpredictable variations with both position and time, as the
matter distribution itself is not perfectly unchanging and uniform over the
entire universe and throughout history, even if, on the average, such fluctu-
ations should necessarily cancel out due to the large number of individual
interactions involved. What happens is that even in the presence of a sta-
tistically uniform distribution of forces, when the trajectory of a particle is
the outcome of multiple, near simultaneous, quantized interactions, such as
is the case with ordinary Brownian motion, then there necessarily arise fluc-
tuations in the number of interactions taking place in one direction that are
not necessarily matched by those taking place simultaneously in the oppo-
site direction and this must give rise to small variations in the equilibrium
of forces acting on the particle (which would here be the inertial forces that
determine the local free-fall reference system).
Those considerations are particularly significant in the context where, as
I have explained in section 1.6 of [1], the absence of gravitational interactions
with the matter that is missing in the direction of a void in an otherwise uni-
form matter distribution can actually have a considerable influence on the
motion of matter particles, even if that is not always recognized. Thus, if the
local inertial reference systems which determine the trajectory of a particle
with a given sign of energy must ultimately be conceived as being the out-
come of such an equilibrium in the sum of gravitational forces attributable to
all the matter in the universe with the same sign of energy, as I explained in
section 1.4 of the preceding report, then we certainly have enough reasons to
believe that the unobservable trajectories entering the sum-over-histories for-
mulation of quantum theory should be randomly influenced by the presence
of fluctuations in the equilibrium of inertial forces, given that gravitational
forces are themselves conveyed by elementary particles and must, therefore,
fluctuate. The crucial point is that this would be true even in the context
where the approximation of a classical spacetime continuum would still be
valid (and the metric would remain Euclidean locally), given that we are not
concerned here with individual quantum interactions, but with fluctuations
in a very large number of such interactions taking place nearly simultane-
ously.
It is possible to understand why such unobservable fluctuations in the
equilibrium of inertial gravitational forces should have decisive consequences
on the evolution of quantum systems, even outside the quantum gravitational
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regime, by recognizing that even though the gravitational interaction is very
weak, inertia, as a gravitational phenomenon, exerts a very significant influ-
ence on the trajectories of elementary particles, given that it is an outcome
of the interactions which are taking place with all the other matter particles
present in the universe, whose number largely compensates the very small
probability that a given particle emits a graviton in the course of an ordinary
quantum process29. In such a context it would appear that it is merely the
existence of statistical regularities in the random fluctuations of the classical
gravitational field that allows the metric properties of spacetime to be de-
scribed as deterministically evolving on the scale at which ordinary quantum
theory itself becomes irrelevant.
If those considerations are valid it would then mean that what one needs
to formulate is a time-symmetric version of stochastic gravitational field the-
ory (based on the generalized gravitational field equations introduced in sec-
tion 1.15 of my preceding report) that would apply to individual portions
of the universal causal chain, independently. For this purpose, it is nec-
essary to recognize that the locally uniform and deterministically evolving,
classical gravitational field merely constitutes an approximation that must
emerge from a more accurate description where randomness is explicitly in-
volved. The classical description can therefore be expected to break down on
the action scale associated with ordinary quantum phenomena, where ran-
dom fluctuations of the metric properties of space are unavoidable. What
explains that such fluctuations can usually be ignored is the fact that it is
precisely on such a scale that they can be expected to remain unobservable,
while they must cancel out for the most part when larger measures of action
are involved. It may then be that it is only because we fail to take into
account the existence of such local fluctuations in the metric properties of
spacetime that we obtain a description of quantum processes that violates
the requirement of general covariance and in which the mass of particles ap-
pears to constitute a relevant parameter, which puts quantum theory at odds
with general relativity (this is apparent in the context of experiments which
show that quantum interference effects can exist which are dependent on the
mass of a particle, even when gravitation is the only macroscopic constraint
involved, as is the case with the classical neutron interferometer experiment
29One can appreciate the strength of inertial forces by observing that even in the absence
of local masses, the equivalent gravitational field which balances the external force on a
particle as it deviates from its free-fall state of motion is easily as large as that which
would be attributable to an entire planet located in its immediate vicinity.
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in a gravitational field).
A more adequate formulation of quantum field theory that would in-
tegrate this semi-classical description of gravitational fields would allow to
eliminate this incompatibility. Such a theory, which would be similar in form
to that of near-equilibrium thermodynamics (given that it would allow for
random fluctuations in a medium that is nevertheless classically well-defined
on a local level), would only break down on the quantum gravitational scale
where the approximation of a classical spacetime continuum would no longer
be valid. This means that there are actually three levels of applicability to
a theory of the gravitational field, because the intermediary, semi-classical
level, where gravitation is usually assumed to be irrelevant actually also in-
volves this interaction in a decisive way. On such a scale gravitation may
already be considered to merge with quantum theory, but merely in the
sense that fluctuations of a quantum mechanical origin must now apply to
the classical gravitational field, while quantum evolution becomes causally
determined as a consequence of the very gravitational nature of the iner-
tial forces to which it is submitted, even in the absence of observable, local
perturbations of the curvature of spacetime. What makes this hypothesis sig-
nificant is the universal nature of the gravitational interaction and the fact
that it is allowed to affect not only the propagation of all matter particles,
but also that of the particles associated with all interaction fields, including
its own, without having to refer to a preexisting background structure, given
that this is the interaction that determines the very metric properties of the
spacetime over which the other fields fluctuate.
Now, if local fluctuations of the metric properties of spacetime actually
occur which remain unobservable, then they would have effects which would
be indistinguishable from temporary violations of the conservation of momen-
tum and energy, given that energy would be exchanged with the gravitational
field that would not be accounted for classically. I believe that this is what
explains that virtual processes, like ordinary particle interaction processes,
involve such violations of energy and momentum conservation, which are al-
lowed to occur merely as long as they remain within the limits of quantum
uncertainty, that is to say, as long as they remain unobservable. Indeed, even
from a semi-classical viewpoint the reality of a particle’s existence may de-
pend on the presence of a local gravitational field or acceleration (think about
the Unruh effect for instance) and in such a case all that matters is that once
the presence of a particle is actually measured by a detector, even when this
is made possible as a result of an exchange of energy with the gravitational
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field, then this event must become an established fact that is not dependent
on the position or the state of acceleration of an observer, as is possible
when the reality of particle detection is enforced by quantum interference.
What’s different from the viewpoint of the approach advocated here, is that
the undetected virtual particles present in the vacuum can now be considered
to be as real as other matter particles, because what differentiates them is
merely the fact that they do not exist permanently, with invariant energies,
but merely as a result of energy exchanges with the randomly fluctuating
classical gravitational field30.
Anyhow, if the unmeasurable violations of energy and momentum which
are allowed by quantum indeterminacy are taking place as a result of un-
detectable exchanges of energy with the fluctuating gravitational field, this
would explain why it is that only the conservation of energy, momentum and
angular momentum is allowed to be violated in such a way, while the elec-
tric and other non-gravitational charges of elementary particles (the static
attributes) are always rigorously conserved despite quantum uncertainty. In
this context the fact that the quantum indefiniteness associated with the po-
sition of a particle diminishes with the magnitude of its momentum would
also appear all the more natural, given that a particle with a larger energy
can be expected to interact with more gravitons all at once and therefore
to be less affected by individual interactions, as if it was experiencing a re-
duced level of fluctuation in the equilibrium between the sum of all such
interactions (which may actually explain why the variation of the quantum
phase associated with the propagation of elementary particles is dependent
not only on the energy of the particles involved, but also on their mass, even
though this parameter would drop out of the equations if one considered the
appropriate locally fluctuating, inertial reference system).
Similarly, the fact that quantum indefiniteness in momentum rises as we
consider increasingly smaller regions of space can be seen to be a reflection
of the fact that the level of random fluctuations in the classical gravitational
field rises as we consider smaller space intervals for which the quantized na-
ture of the gravitational field is more pronounced, until we reach the Planck
30It is interesting to observe that the description of black hole radiation as being an
outcome of the quantum tunneling of particles past the gravitational potential energy
barrier would in this context imply that it is actually a local variation of the gravitational
potential energy of the black hole itself that allows the decay to occur, because quantum
tunneling would then be the outcome of a local, but unobservable variation of gravitational
energy.
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scale where (as I explained in section 2.11 of my preceding report) every
matter particle is submitted to the gravitational field of an elementary black
hole and momentum is totally undetermined (given that it can be either pos-
itive or negative, but with maximum magnitude in both the retarded and
the advanced portions of a process). To avoid confusion, however, it is nec-
essary to understand that despite the fact that the degree of randomness to
which are submitted elementary particles as a result of the existence of unob-
servable fluctuations in the gravitational field may depend on the magnitude
of their energy (given that the frequency associated with the propagation
of a particle is determined by the magnitude of its energy), interference ef-
fects cannot be considered to be an aspect of the gravitational field itself,
because fluctuations in the metric properties of space merely explain why
it is that one particular trajectory is followed in the retarded and advanced
portions of history, while it is still the constructive or destructive nature of
the interferences associated with a complete time-symmetric process which
determines whether those trajectories are likely to be followed, when one
takes into account the existence of the quantum phase and the closed nature
of the universal causal chain.
An interesting outcome of such an approach is that it allows one to more
easily understand why it is that photons and other massless particles are al-
lowed to have unmeasurable (but theoretically mandatory) velocities larger
or smaller than the normal speed of light in a vacuum and to travel along
curved trajectories on a small scale (as Feynman diagrams for radiative cor-
rections so appropriately illustrate), because when one takes into account
the existence of unobservable, local fluctuations of the metric properties of
space, it is still possible to assume that massless particles in a given energy
eigenstate always travel along straight lines at their normal c velocity, as
long as one recognizes that this propagation takes place along the geodesics
of a locally curved spacetime. This is made possible in the context of a
generalized gravitation theory of the kind I proposed in [1], where matter
configurations may exist that give rise not to gravitational attraction and an
apparent diminution of the speed of light, but to gravitational repulsion and
an apparent increase of the limiting velocity experienced by massless posi-
tive energy particles (as a result of space dilation). From such a perspective
the multiple possible trajectories of unobserved, dynamic quantum attributes
would simply be the causally determined geodesics of a randomly evolving
dynamical spacetime, rather than the random paths of particles evolving over
a locally invariant and deterministically evolving spacetime.
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It must be emphasized that what I’m proposing is not that there arise
stochastic perturbations of the Schro¨dinger equation itself when a measure-
ment takes place, as is sometimes proposed in order to try to explain the
random nature of quantum measurement results. Once again, it should be
clear that the irreducible randomness of quantum processes cannot be as-
sumed to be a consequence of what goes on during measurement and the
desired generally covariant formulation, that would allow to reproduce the
statistical predictions of the current theory, would differ merely in that it
would allow to explain what determines the particular unobservable trajec-
tories followed by elementary particles in between measurements, while the
absence of interferences that follows quantum measurement would still be
a mere consequence of decoherence enforced by the requirement of closure
of the universal causal chain. From my viewpoint it would also be deco-
herence and the closure requirement that would trigger the process of state
vector reduction that would arise when a quantum superposition of randomly
fluctuating space curvatures would develop that would have observable con-
sequences. As long as the randomly fluctuating curvature of space that may
exist in a certain retarded portion of history and that which may exist in the
related, advanced portion of history remain without immediate observable
consequences, they are allowed to differ as any other attribute of the systems
which are taking part in a quantum process. Such differences in the curva-
ture of space may trigger decoherence, just like other observable distinctions
between the retarded and the advanced states, but it is precisely the fact that
that they are not required to do so under all circumstances that explains the
randomly variable nature of quantum measurement results.
To sum up, I believe that instead of simply rejecting the foundations
of the current classical theory of gravitation to accommodate the quantum
mechanical nature of reality, we should first redefine the foundations of quan-
tum theory to take into account a certain overlooked but unavoidable aspect
of a consistent semi-classical theory of gravitation that would allow to ex-
plain how the unique, but random outcomes of quantum measurement are
determined from the perspective of time-symmetric causality. It is important
to mention, however, that the idea that the unique retarded and advanced
portions of history which take part in every quantum process are influenced
by local fluctuations in the classical gravitational field is not absolutely nec-
essary for the validity of the solutions I have provided to other aspects of
the problem of the interpretation of quantum theory. In fact, one may even
consider that what solves the problem of objectification in the context of the
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realist interpretation of quantum theory I have proposed is the very fact that
such an interpretation allows for reality to be unique in a certain way. It is
clear, indeed, that even when the unique reality behind interfering quantum
mechanical histories is not causally determined in every way, it nevertheless
remains unique from a time-symmetric viewpoint, which already goes a long
way toward easing the tension between the theory and the observed out-
comes of measurement. But while we may never be able to directly confirm
that the unobserved quantum paths, despite their absolutely unpredictable
nature, are nevertheless causally determined in every way, the fact that it
is already possible to envisage the exact form of a theory that would sat-
isfy those consistency requirements should encourage us to recognize that
the only reasonable conclusion is that reality is not fundamentally without
causes.
14 Conclusion
When I began doing research in fundamental theoretical physics some 30
years ago, I did not suspect that some of the early ideas and insights I was
trying to develop would eventually become essential for producing a consis-
tent interpretation of quantum theory. But, the hypothesis that the grav-
itational interaction is symmetric under exchange of positive and negative
energy matter turned out to be indispensable to the formulation of an inter-
pretation of quantum mechanics in which no implicit or explicit assumptions
contradict one another or some observable aspects of reality, because this
idea is what allows one to understand how it is possible for thermodynamic
time asymmetry to emerge despite the time-symmetric nature of causality.
Indeed, outside the context of the generalized gravitation theory introduced
in chapter 1 of [1] there would be no meaning to consider that there must be a
constraint on the emergence of a maximum quasiclassical domain imposed by
a requirement of closure of the universal causal chain. Actually it wouldn’t
even be possible to assume that there exists a universal time variable along
which the causal chain unfolds. As a matter of fact, if we were to ignore the
theoretical developments I previously introduced it wouldn’t be possible to
assume that there is a reality at all in the absence of measurement, unless
we are willing to reject some equally unavoidable theoretical requirements
derived from observation, like the principle of local causality.
Now, the most significant aspect of a quantum mechanical description of
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reality is certainly the use of interfering probability amplitudes in place of
conventional probabilities (or equivalently the appearance of negative proba-
bilities for time-symmetric histories). But in the context of an interpretation
of quantum theory that satisfies the requirement of scientific realism the ex-
istence of interference effects can be understood to be a consequence of the
circular nature of causality that is associated with the closed nature of the
universal causal chain and this again serves to demonstrate the dependence of
a consistent interpretation of quantum theory on purely cosmological aspects
of reality, where a generalized theory of gravitation constitutes an essential
element of the appropriate model. This dependence is further emphasized
by the fact that gravitation may ultimately be involved in giving rise to a
completely satisfactory solution to the objectification problem in the con-
text where a more accurate understanding of the phenomenon of inertia
implies that one must reconsider the validity of the conventional formulation
of quantum field theory and contemplate the possibility that it be replaced
by a statistically equivalent theory no longer dependent on the concept of a
locally uniform, deterministic spacetime background.
It is also the notion that causes cannot be restricted to propagate only
in the future direction of time, as the classical principle of causality would
appear to require, that made unavoidable a picture of quantum reality involv-
ing two corresponding, time-reversed, but noninteracting histories for each
process. The understanding that this is made necessary when all causes are
required to belong within our universe then made possible the elaboration of
the first complete solution to the quantum measurement problem. Indeed,
I have explained that the requirement of a relational description of reality
imposes a condition of continuity to the universal causal chain which can
be most naturally satisfied when causality is appropriately conceived of as a
circular phenomenon in which time plays a role similar to that which would
be played by space in a closed universe, while such a closure is what allows
to explain the persistence of quasiclassicality following decoherence. In such
a context it becomes clear that there is no real difficulty associated with the
assumption that there does exist a unique reality at all times, as long as
one recognizes that this reality does not consist of one single classical history
propagating in one single direction of time at all times, which would require
some extraneous ‘pilot wave’ to perhaps explain the existence of quantum in-
terferences involving multiple distinct trajectories. Once this is understood
one no longer needs to retreat into complicated and confused philosophy in
order to try to explain the simplest and most elementary phenomena taking
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place right in front of us all the time.
The problem that there was traditionally is that we regarded quantum
non-locality as a mere curiosity of a quantum mechanical description of re-
ality and we were convinced that it did not constitute a challenge to our
conventional understanding of causality, simply because we could not see
how the difficulty could be resolved if it is, in effect, real. The fact that
the theory nevertheless allowed to produce accurate predictions, while the
kind of non-locality involved did not allow information to be transmitted in-
stantaneously appeared to legitimate this position and this is what explains
that people stopped searching for a solution to the problem of the apparent
incompatibility between quantum entanglement and the constraint imposed
by relativity theory on the propagation of causal influences. All along we
continued searching, with more and more sophisticated experiments, for pos-
sible loopholes that could explain quantum non-locality as being an outcome
of conventional unidirectional causality, just like people kept searching for
manifestations of our motion relative to absolute space over a century ago.
This happened because we were not willing to accept the conclusion that
reality is non-local, a fact which can only be made acceptable once it is
recognized that quantum phenomena still satisfy a certain time-symmetric
notion of local causality.
While I was progressing toward a better understanding of quantum me-
chanics I realized that my position concerning the many-worlds interpretation
of quantum theory is somewhat similar to my position regarding the weak
anthropic principle. Indeed, while I do believe that both anthropic selec-
tion and the existence of a multiplicity of causally independent universes are
necessary concepts, I have also shown that the many-worlds interpretation,
which is often considered to be a multiverse theory, is not viable as a realist
interpretation of quantum theory, from both a logical and an observational
viewpoint. But, I have also explained why the quantum measurement prob-
lem is not to be considered as a mere illusion in a world where the emergence
of quasiclassicality would be a subjective notion associated with the biased
nature of the perception of reality that would be characteristic of our con-
scious experience. But such an approach could only be made legitimate on
the basis of the validity of the weak anthropic principle, whose relevance is
therefore diminished by the developments I have introduced in this report. It
is somewhat ironical, therefore, that the weak anthropic principle was once
considered to be bad science on the basis of the fact that it would require
the existence of multiple universes, whose existence could not be confirmed
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by any other means, because, as I previously mentioned, this stubbornness
is actually a form of solipsism which in the above described context would
be supported by the weak anthropic principle, which would therefore require
the existence of a multiplicity of universes.
Concerning the realist conception of quantum reality developed in this
report, it is perhaps appropriate to note that while it can be expected that
the most virulent objections to such an interpretation of quantum theory
would probably have to do with the ‘hypothesis’ of a unique reality behind
interfering quantum mechanical histories, I think that this resistance is not
merely an undesirable byproduct of the long tradition of instrumentalism
that emerged from the Copenhagen interpretation, but also constitutes an
unfortunate consequence of the more profound inadequacy of a philosophi-
cal position that originates from Descartes’ desire to free himself from the
‘superfluous’ hypothesis that his mind may not be all that there is in the
world. I must emphasize once again that it is my strong belief that the most
significant challenge currently facing fundamental theoretical physics and the
development of a consistent philosophy of the natural world is that of over-
coming the psychological barrier associated with the reluctance to accept as
real what one cannot perceive directly and to realize the sterility and the
inadequacy of the opposite viewpoint, when what one wants to assess is the
nature of reality itself. Here it may not be consistency alone which is at stake,
but the very meaningfulness of the whole exercise, that which embodies the
quest for the ultimate representation of reality.
15 Summary
To conclude this report, I would like to provide a summary of all the results
which were obtained concerning both the issue of time-symmetric causality
and the problem of the interpretation of quantum theory in the context of the
revised understanding of the concepts of time reversal and thermodynamic
irreversibility which was developed in the preceding report of this series. The
decisive results are the following.
1. The causal relationships that may exist between various events are
always established by the propagation of elementary particles across
spatial distances either forward or backward in time.
2. One must distinguish between a classical, unidirectional concept of
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causality according to which causes always exert their effects in the
same unique future direction of time and a more fundamental, bidirec-
tional concept of causality where causes are allowed to produce effects
which are located in their own past.
3. The unique, invariable direction of time relative to which entropy grows
and information flows (as a result of the formation of records) is inde-
pendent from the direction of propagation in time of elementary par-
ticles which determines the true direction in which causality operates
and effects propagate.
4. It is possible to assume that a unique future is causally related to the
experienced present just like a unique past is causally related to the
same present, because what makes it seem like the future is not unique
is merely the fact that information is only available about the past,
while unconstrained evolution is only possible in the future direction
of time as a result of the limit imposed by the constraint of global
entanglement on entropy growth in the past. In such a context, im-
posing final conditions cannot be less appropriate than imposing initial
conditions.
5. It is not possible for backward in time propagated effects to change past
history, because if an event in the future changes the outcome of an
observation in the past, this change is already effected at the moment
in the past at which the observation first occurred.
6. Even though backward in time causation is not forbidden, the causal
ordering postulate is still valid, because special-relativistic transforma-
tions are merely required to preserve the direction in which a causal
chain propagates in time and this requirement can be satisfied even
when the direction involved is not the future.
7. The time-symmetric nature of causality implies that a certain event
can both influence another event and be influenced by that very same
event, which means that the cause of a certain event can also be an
effect of the same event.
8. As a consistency requirement, it must be imposed on histories that
they are not self-contradictory. But despite the fact that backward
causation may appear to allow this condition to be violated, given that
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it may give rise to closed causal chains, it is in fact ultimately the time-
symmetric nature of causality that is responsible for circumventing the
development of factual inconsistencies.
9. In the context where it is impossible for the future to be causally de-
termined by the past alone, because the future itself can be involved in
determining the past that determines this very future, reality remains
fundamentally random, even when causally determined.
10. Once it is recognized that a universe actually consists of a unique en-
semble of events causally related to one another and to nothing else,
then it follows that if an event in the past is influenced by an event
in the future, this past event cannot be altered in such a way that it
would become causally related to a different future, as may occur in the
course of a hypothetical time-travel experience according to a certain
version of the many-worlds interpretation of quantum theory.
11. What would differentiate a time travel experience from the kind of
backward in time propagation that routinely takes place in the course
of certain elementary particle processes is the fact that with time travel
a macroscopic system would need to evolve with its thermodynamic
arrow of time reversed and pointing toward the past instead of the
future, which is not fundamentally impossible, but which is formidably
unlikely given that it would require a violation of the second principle
of thermodynamics and a growth of entropy in the past direction of
time, which is forbidden by the constraint of global entanglement that
imposes a low entropy Big Bang.
12. Given that for a knowledge paradox to occur, a sustained increase of
entropy would need to take place in the past direction of time while the
information is being transferred from the future toward the past, then
it follows what what makes such a phenomenon unlikely to observe is
not the requirement of global consistency, but simply the constraint
that is responsible for thermodynamic time asymmetry.
13. What is forbidden is not backward in time propagation, but the de-
crease of entropy that would be required for traveling back in time as
a thermodynamic phenomenon.
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14. What makes time travel paradoxes fundamentally impossible is not the
requirement of entropy growth in the past and the necessary violation
of the second law of thermodynamics which explains the unlikeliness of
time travel, but the very same constraints that forbid a contradiction to
occur at a fundamental level, as when elementary particles are propa-
gating backward in time without being involved in anti-thermodynamic
evolution.
15. It is the fact that we are used to experience the future as unknowable
in advance that explains that it appears doubtful that we would not be
able to alter the course of reality at will if we were able to travel back
in time, even though it is necessary to assume that a unique future is
causally related to our present state and that events would necessarily
happen that would prevent a time traveler from influencing the past in
a way that would change its own future.
16. The absence of advanced waves cannot be attributed merely to the
unlikeliness of such a phenomenon as it would be observed from the
unidirectional time viewpoint, because the very same convergence of
wave fronts is actually taking place in the past direction of time and
this is not the outcome of the unlikeliness of present conditions. In the
absence of a specific constraint what one would expect to observe is a
spreading of wave fronts in both the future and the past directions of
time.
17. What the difficulties encountered by early time-symmetric approaches
to a solution to the problem of advanced waves illustrates is that it is
not possible to explain the absence of advanced waves as being a mere
consequence of constructive and destructive interference effects.
18. Given that in a quantum mechanical context the presence of advanced
waves would require an increase of entropy to take place in the past
direction of time, then it is necessary to recognize that such a phe-
nomenon and more generally the propagation of information from the
future toward the past, is forbidden by the condition of ever decreasing
entropy imposed on past evolution by the global entanglement con-
straint, which does not mean that elementary particles cannot prop-
agate backward in time, but merely that the number of ‘final’ states
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toward which they can evolve in the past practically never grows with
time.
19. The processes we experience in this portion of history are all mirrored
by processes which obey the same macroscopic observable macroscopic
conditions, but which take place in the opposite chronological order
in a portion of history that must be assumed independent of that we
experience from the viewpoint of local causality.
20. It is the fact that early time-symmetric interpretations of quantum the-
ory required assuming that the retarded and advanced waves are prop-
agating in the same portion of history that is problematic, because in
such a context the particle submitted to the constraint of those classical
waves in the classical double slit experiment must go through only one
slit, corresponding to this unique history, which in turn requires a cer-
tain fundamental temporal asymmetry to be introduced in the theory,
in violation of the time-symmetric nature of its equations.
21. The fact that two causally independent histories unfolding in opposite
directions of time are involved in every quantum process is reflected
in the fact that one must multiply the wave function by its complex
conjugate to obtain the appropriate probability for a process to occur.
22. Our reluctance to recognize the reality of post selection, or the possi-
bility for a state vector to be determined by what ‘happened’ in the
future instead of what happened in the past, is merely a consequence of
the prejudice toward a unidirectional conception of causality which we
inherited from our thermodynamically constrained experience of reality
and does not rest on any rationally formulated argument.
23. Once it is recognized that among the two portions of history associ-
ated with every quantum process there necessarily exists at least one
portion of history that unfolds from the past toward the future, then it
becomes possible to explain the thermodynamic arrow of time as being
the consequence of the initial condition of low gravitational entropy
imposed on the initial Big Bang state by the global entanglement con-
straint, because the evolution of at least one of the two state vectors
associated with those two portions of history is then determined by
past conditions.
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24. It is imperative to avoid altering the conventional rules of logic in order
to understand facts and this can only be achieved by generalizing our
concepts about the physical world in such a way that no implicit or
explicit contradiction is allowed to persist.
25. It is still possible and desirable to provide a realist description of phys-
ical processes based on the concept of particle trajectory even in the
context where quantum interference involving multiple position states
must be assumed to constitute an essential aspect of reality.
26. Once it is recognized that the elementary particle concept is essential to
a consistent interpretation of quantum theory, we have no choice but to
recognize that the current interpretation of the theory is incomplete,
because it does not provide a clear and unambiguous description of
what happens when a particle’s position is not under direct observation.
27. What must be considered undeniable about reality is precisely that it
is real and rejecting this hypothesis in order to avoid certain conceptual
difficulties would constitute a logical contradiction. But it would not
make sense to attribute reality only to something that exists as a fact
rather than as a possibility and to avoid describing the actual ways
by which certain physical processes can occur when it is not possible
to directly observe what happens in the course of any one particular
process.
28. If the only alternative to assuming the existence of classical hidden
variables in a realist interpretation of quantum theory was to consider
the wave function as reality itself, then explicit non-locality would be
unavoidable, because the wave function, like classical hidden variables
themselves, is a non-local entity.
29. A consistent interpretation of quantum theory must satisfy two appar-
ently incompatible requirements which are the uniqueness of history
and the necessity to allow quantum interferences to occur between the
many distinct possibilities that may exist for the unobservable aspects
of this unique history.
30. If the values taken by conjugate physical attributes cannot be deter-
mined at the same time with an arbitrarily high degree of precision it
is simply because the macroscopic experimental constraints necessary
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to determine the exact state of those physical attributes cannot be re-
alized all at the same time, while it is those macroscopic constraints
(associated with the existence of records) that determine which physical
observable is not subject to quantum interferences.
31. If a purely phenomenological model of reality such as that which con-
stitutes the core of the orthodox interpretation of quantum theory may
appear to be more appropriate than a realist model for explaining cer-
tain observations, this is merely because the constraint of scientific
realism cannot be applied to quantum phenomena as they are tradi-
tionally described, but only becomes appropriate in the context of a
time-symmetric description of those phenomena.
32. Even if the wave function provides the most complete description of the
state of a quantum system, it is necessary to assume that two systems
prepared in the same quantum state may evolve differently at the level
of the dynamic physical attributes whose states are not determined by
the macroscopic conditions of an experiment, given that a subsequent
measurement of those originally undetermined attributes may produce
outcomes that differ from one experiment to the other.
33. To solve the quantum reality problem one must explain how it is pos-
sible for a particle to follow a path along which all of its conjugate
dynamic attributes have unique values at all times, despite the fact
that the many trajectories which can be followed by the attribute that
is not directly observed interfere with one another, as if no single, def-
inite trajectory was ever followed.
34. There exists no valid argument in support of the hypothesis that all
histories are followed together in the same universe as different coexist-
ing and interfering ‘branches’ and all experimental evidence indicates
that there exists a unique history of some kind.
35. When it is assumed that decoherence merely allows to eliminate the
interferences between many coexisting ‘branches’ of history, then quan-
tum entanglement becomes problematic, because it requires the exis-
tence of explicitly non-local influences to enforce the selection of one
branch over another following measurement.
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36. Backward in time causation, even when it obeys the principle of local
causality, may give rise to non-local correlations, but if the existence of
such correlations cannot be assumed to allow faster-than-light commu-
nication it is because the backward propagated influences are submitted
to the constraint of diminishing entropy that is imposed on past evolu-
tion by the constraint of global entanglement, which means that such
backward causation cannot allow information to flow from the future
toward the past.
37. Our conventional, unidirectional experience of reality is not necessar-
ily incompatible with backward causation, as long as the effects which
are propagated backward in time do not give rise to the kind of back-
ward in time communication that would be allowed in the absence of
a constraint on the growth of entropy in the past direction of time.
38. In the context of a time-symmetric formulation of quantum theory it
is no longer necessary to assume that there exists an absolute distinc-
tion between a cause and its effect and this allows one to avoid the
contradiction that emerges from a conventional viewpoint when we are
dealing with measurements performed at space-like separated locations
on entangled systems and chronological order is an observer dependent
aspect.
39. If the two histories which constitute the retarded and advanced por-
tions of every quantum process were to be identical, even in terms of
their unobserved physical attributes, they would still differ in that the
direction of propagation in time of all the particles involved would be
opposite for those two histories.
40. The path followed by a quantum system in the space of its unobserved
dynamic attributes must be allowed to differ for the retarded and the
advanced portions of a process and this is what explains that all paths
must be taken into account in the determination of transition proba-
bilities for any given process, even though the system only ever goes
through one particular path in the retarded portion of history and then
again through one particular (but possibly different) path in the ad-
vanced portion of history.
41. It is no longer necessary to assume that when the path followed by a
particle is not observed the object actually behaves as if it was a differ-
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ent entity (a classical wave), because in the context of a realist, time-
symmetric interpretation of quantum theory one can explain the inter-
ferences which are made conspicuous in the statistical distribution of
measurement results without having to adopt such a self-contradictory
viewpoint.
42. Once it is understood that two causally independent histories are in-
volved in any single quantum process then it becomes clear that what
the existence of interferences involving multiple different paths means
is not that the unobserved attribute of a quantum system is in no state
at all, or that it is at once in all possible states, but merely that while
many possibilities are allowed for its state in the retarded portion of
history, many possibilities are also allowed for its state in the advanced
portion of history which need not be the same as its state in the re-
tarded portion of history.
43. Even if the retarded portion of history can be distinct from its time-
reversed portion at the level of their intricate, unobservable details, it
must be required of those two portions of history that they nevertheless
remain identical from the viewpoint of their observable macroscopic
features.
44. What explains that it is possible for the probability of occurrence of
one single event to be null, or for the event to be absolutely certain,
despite the fact that not all the paths contributing to a determina-
tion of those probabilities are followed at once in one single history, is
the fact that the presence of quantum interferences allows a complete
time-symmetric history (composed of a retarded and an advanced por-
tion) to contribute negatively to the final probability of a process and
this actually allows all the different alternatives to contribute to the
probability of one single process.
45. The profound significance of the apparently inconsistent probabilities,
which are obtained for certain processes and which are usually consid-
ered (from the viewpoint of the consistent histories interpretation of
quantum theory) to imply that nothing can be said of reality under
such conditions only emerges when they are considered in the context
of a realist, time-symmetric conception of reality.
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46. The fact that conventional logic still applies on the classical scale, even
from the viewpoint of a conventional interpretation of quantum the-
ory, can be understood to result not from the fact that reality is only
consistent on such a scale, but from the fact that the two portions of
history which are unfolding in opposite time directions always appear
to be the same on such a scale.
47. Once one acknowledges the existence of the unobservable quantum
phase, one must conclude that whenever the probability for a time-
symmetric process involving unobserved attributes to occur in one spe-
cific way is negative, if the process was to occur in this specific way
it would diminish the chances that the initial conditions which would
have actually given rise to it existed in the first place, thereby making
the sum of probabilities for all the possible ways the process could occur
smaller than it would otherwise be. Likewise, when the probability of
an individual time-symmetric history involving unobserved attributes
is larger than one, then its occurrence would decrease the chances that
alternative initial conditions existed, which is another way to say that
it would actually increase the chances that the actual initial conditions
that gave rise to this history did indeed occur.
48. It is merely the fact that negative probabilities can only arise when
quantum interferences are actually present, while in general interfer-
ences are only apparent when the actual path followed by a quantum
system is not subjected to direct observation, that explains that we ap-
pear to be justified to assume that negative probabilities cannot arise
and must be physically insignificant, even though this concept is essen-
tial to a proper understanding of quantum reality and can be assigned
a clear meaning.
49. What enforces the non-local character of the consequences of a choice of
measurement that is to be performed on one of two entangled particles
is the existence of an advanced portion of history which allows the effect
of a measurement performed in the future on this particle to propagate
backward in time to the initial entangled state and then forward in
time in the retarded portion of the other particle’s history to affect the
measurement result performed on this other particle, even when this
measurement is separated from the measurement performed on the first
particle by a space-like interval.
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50. In the presence of an advanced portion to each quantum process, the in-
terference effects which are observed to characterize the measurements
performed on one of two entangled particles depend on the experi-
mental conditions which apply on its entangled counterpart, simply
because the phase changes which arise in the course of such processes
are occurring as a result of the boundary conditions applying on the
complete time-symmetric process and therefore over the entire experi-
mental setup and not just as a result of the conditions imposed on the
propagation of one or the other particle.
51. If it seems impossible from a conventional viewpoint to assume that
each of two entangled particles follow a unique and causally indepen-
dent trajectory prior to a measurement on one or the other particle, it
is because this measurement may determine whether interferences will
be observed or not for both particles and when interferences are present
the trajectories of both particles are no longer well-defined from a clas-
sical viewpoint. Thus, unless it is the state of the correlated attribute
that is actually measured for one of two entangled particles it is not
possible, as a matter of principle, to tell what the two corresponding
trajectories really are in any particular case and as a result interferences
do arise.
52. The manner by which the past state of one of two entangled particles
is causally influenced by the choice of measurement performed on the
other particle in the future is not different from the usual manner by
which causal influences are propagated forward in time, except that
no information can be carried by the effects so produced, given that
entropy cannot rise as the causal influences propagate in the past di-
rection of time when a condition of global entanglement must apply on
the initial Big Bang state.
53. The fact that the wave function sometimes appear to be a subjective
property, dependent on whether information concerning the conditions
of a future measurement to be performed on a system is available or
not, is a mere consequence of the fact that we cannot know in advance
what the backward in time evolving state of a complete time-symmetric
process is before we obtain information about that future measurement,
even though this measurement already affects the present state of the
system.
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54. The idea that the concept of a localized elementary particle may no
longer be valid in the presence of quantum entanglement and that it
should be replaced by a holistic (explicitly non-local) concept of reality
at a fundamental level is not justified.
55. Even though there must exist a time-reverse analog to ordinary quan-
tum entanglement that must give rise to non-local correlations arising
from post selection, the existence of such correlations cannot allow
faster than light communication, because the constraint of global en-
tanglement requires entropy to decrease in the past for all processes
which are occurring in the same universe and this means that no causal
signal can propagate toward the future and then backward in time to
a distant location as a result of post selection, even if causality does
operate both forward and backward in time at a fundamental level.
56. The decoherent branches hypothesis would not allow one to avoid hav-
ing to postulate the existence of distinct dynamical laws that would
apply only during processes that can be qualified as measurements, be-
cause in such a context instead of having to explain what is the cause
of the unique outcome of measurement that is observed following deco-
herence, one would have to explain what are the multiple causes of the
many different outcomes which would be actualized all at once, which
means that the uniqueness of measurement results is not less, but rather
more problematic when one assumes that all trajectories are followed
all at once when an attribute is not subject to measurement.
57. While it may not be possible to reject the hypothesis that an infinity of
causally independent universes exist in parallel, it must be clear that
the idea that many interfering branches of history exist in the same
universe is a distinct hypothesis which is certainly not as unavoidable.
58. It is not necessary to assume the existence of many branches of history
in order to avoid the conclusion that a unique classically well-defined
state existed before decoherence took place, that would merely have
been revealed by the measurement, because the unique reality that
would characterize a quantum process in the absence of measurement
on a certain dynamic attribute does not involve a unique classical path,
but rather involves both a unique retarded state and a unique and
possibly different advanced state, which allows all possible intermediary
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states to contribute to the final probability amplitude, as required from
an experimental viewpoint.
59. If reality was not of the unique time-symmetric type and the decoher-
ent branches hypothesis was assumed to alone provide a solution to
the quantum measurement problem, then an alternative explanation of
quantum non-locality would have to be found, as it cannot be provided
by this interpretation.
60. The fact that no quantum interference is ever observed for irreversibly
evolving systems indicates that the classical definiteness of measure-
ment results is related to the irreversible character of the measurement
process.
61. It would not be appropriate to assume that the changes which are
taking place in the course of a measurement are merely subjective, be-
cause following measurement the observed attribute is no longer unique
merely in a time-symmetric quantum way, but acquires the same unique
value in both the retarded and the advanced portions of history.
62. The complexity and the large number of independent degrees of free-
dom of a macroscopic system with which an observed quantum system
may become entangled, do not alone provide the conditions necessary
for giving rise to a quantum measurement.
63. The global entanglement constraint is what allows decoherence to occur
and to always take place in the same future direction of time, which
is necessary but not entirely sufficient to explain the persistence of the
quasiclassical nature of history that follows quantum measurements.
64. Despite the fact that the wave function always evolves deterministi-
cally, except during measurements, it is not appropriate in the context
of a realist interpretation of quantum theory to assume that it is the
evolution that takes place in the course of a measurement which is alone
responsible for giving rise to the unpredictability of quantum phenom-
ena and it is incorrect to assume that different physical laws apply
when quantum potentialities are actualized that do not apply during
the ‘unitary’ evolution that takes place in between measurements.
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65. In face of the experimental evidence from which quantum theory emer-
ged, the desire to restrict the application of the criterion of logical con-
sistency to aspects of reality which behave in conformity with classical
expectations is just as irrational as the desire to uphold determinism.
66. The problem with the suggestion that if we perceive a quasiclassical
world it is merely because, as observers, we have evolved to take ad-
vantage of only those ‘consistent’ formulations of history according to
which the world does in effect remain quasiclassical, is that it would
require one to assume that all evidence of past quasiclassicality and all
expectations of future quasiclassicality are mere illusions for which no
rational explanation would exist.
67. If we want to explain observations, then we must identify the constraint
that allows to select the physically relevant set of histories in which
quasiclassicality is experienced by all observers.
68. To obtain a satisfactory extension of the current formalism of con-
sistent histories that would allow to solve the quantum measurement
problem, a criterion must be provided for the selection of a set of his-
tories that is not a priori ‘consistent’ (in the classical sense), but that
would nevertheless allow both the quasiclassical character of reality and
the consistency of its historical description to naturally emerge on the
appropriate scale.
69. For the current explanation of the observed absence of quantum inter-
ferences following decoherence to be valid, it must be shown that it is
appropriate to assume that the practical limitations that may prevent
the observation of interferences between macroscopic states will never
be overturned at any time in the future, because even if there is only
an infinitesimal chance that such an observation is performed, given an
infinite amount of time it should eventually happen and in such a case
the consequences would be felt immediately.
70. The absence of change on the scale of the universe as a whole, which
one may expect to be a consequence of the fact that the universe has
a fixed value of energy, does not mean that time is not a meaningful
concept for relating the changes taking place in one part of the universe
with those occurring in another part, because it is not required of local
subsystems that they have invariant energies.
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71. Time would be irrelevant to our description of reality on the cosmo-
logical scale only if it could not differentiate itself from the other three
dimensions of spacetime in the context where all four dimensions are
kept on an equal footing and are required to be equivalent from a fun-
damental viewpoint by the general theory of relativity.
72. It is possible to understand how a metric of spacetime can emerge that
uniformly selects one particular direction of four-dimensional spacetime
as being that which is associated with the dimension of time across an
entire space-like hypersurface in the context where it is recognized that
the smoothness of the initial matter distribution at the Big Bang arises
as a consequence of imposing a constraint of global entanglement that
applies uniformly, down to the quantum gravitational scale, over that
entire slice of spacetime, because this constraint is actually a condition
for the existence of relationships of local causality between all elements
of the universe which are present in the initial state, while on the
quantum gravitational scale the principle of local causality is enforced
by an embryonic element of time directionality associated with the
causal structure of spin foams.
73. What is required by the global entanglement constraint is that at least
one space-like hypersurface exists over which the embryonic, quantum
gravitational element of time directionality is oriented in the same di-
rection of spacetime in all locations, thereby consistently imparting on
spacetime a unique signature with which is associated a uniform direc-
tion for the flow of time that is shared throughout the universe and
that is allowed to persist due precisely to the condition of smoothness
which is imposed by this constraint on the initial matter distribution.
74. It is no longer necessary to appeal to the weak anthropic principle to
explain either thermodynamic time asymmetry or the very existence of
a universal time variable.
75. The conclusion that there must emerge a unique dimension of time in
four-dimensional spacetime legitimizes a formulation of quantum cos-
mology as having to do with the dynamics of extended three-dimensional
space-like hypersurfaces whose histories constitute unique trajectories
in superspace.
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76. The entire history of three-dimensional space-like hypersurfaces cannot
be predicted from knowledge of one particular slice of spacetime and at
each local measurement the state of the universe needs to be actualized,
which illustrates the relevance of time and more specifically of causality
in establishing the actual relationships between the multiple extended
three-dimensional spaces forming a history.
77. What would invalidate a truly timeless quantum theory of gravitation
is the fact that such a theory would be incompatible with the existence
of a fundamental time direction degree of freedom, such as revealed by
violations of T symmetry, because any relationship of time directional-
ity must necessarily involve a sequence of events related to one another
following a definite and unique order and such a relationship is essential
to a consistent description of physical reality in a semi-classical context.
78. Even though time, like space itself, is not present in its classical form
on the quantum gravitational scale, if time, or more specifically local
causality, did not exist under any form at a fundamental level, then
we should not experience a dimension of time distinct from the other
dimensions of space.
79. The present state of the universe as a whole, including that of its gravi-
tational field or spacetime curvature, can be defined over one space-like
hypersurface which can be represented as a point in superspace, while
time must be conceived as the global variable to which are related the
multiple local measures of change that take place as the state of the uni-
verse evolves along one particular trajectory in this configuration space
and which determines how those extended states are ordered along this
trajectory.
80. When the thermodynamic arrow of time is a consequence of the con-
straint of global entanglement, the conclusion that closed time-like
curves cannot naturally arise becomes unavoidable, which means that
the history of any universe satisfying this constraint (which would be
any universe whose elements must be causally related to one another)
can always be represented as a path in the configuration space of three-
dimensional space-like hypersurfaces.
81. From the viewpoint of a realist, time-symmetric interpretation of quan-
tum theory the purpose of quantum cosmology is to estimate the prob-
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ability of observing a global state of the universe, defined as a point
in superspace, when another such global state has been observed, by
summing-up the probabilities associated with all the different ways by
which those two points can be joined together as a result of evolving
once forward and once backward in time along two possibly distinct
trajectories in superspace for which even the curvature of space could
differ locally, as long as this difference remains unobservable.
82. If the history of the universe was described by one universal causal
chain freely evolving in superspace along the dimension corresponding
to unidirectional time, there would need to be external causes that
would determine how the universe began to get going along the partic-
ular trajectory in which it is found to be, but this cannot be allowed
given that the existence of an external cause is forbidden by the con-
straint of relational definition of the physical attributes of the universe
which constitutes a basic consistency requirement.
83. If there is to be no first cause not determined from within the universe
itself, then the history of the universe must consist of a closed causal
chain that is stretched along the direction relative to which unidirec-
tional time unfolds in superspace, which is the only way the universe
can provide the cause of its own present condition as being nothing but
a remote effect of this very same present condition.
84. When the history of the universe consists of a closed trajectory in super-
space it is necessary, in order to obtain the right correlation probabil-
ities, to take into account the existence of two otherwise independent
histories evolving in opposite directions of time, even though from a
cosmological viewpoint there is only one history which goes through ob-
servationally indistinguishable trajectories once forward and then once
backward along the particular direction of superspace that corresponds
to unidirectional time.
85. It is no longer necessary to assume without reason that the particles
taking part in different possible versions of history do not interact with
one another in order to avoid the contradiction that emerges in the
context of a conventional interpretation of quantum theory when it is
assumed that those interfering realities actually coexist in the same
portion of the universe’s history, because the retarded and advanced
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portions of history do not really happen at the same epoch despite the
fact that they share the same macroscopic conditions.
86. From the viewpoint of unidirectional time the universal causal chain
would eventually need to close and when it would the time we experi-
ence would come to an end, but despite the unobservable nature of such
an event the validity of the theoretical requirement of closure can actu-
ally be confirmed by the observation that reality is of a quasiclassical
nature.
87. For the universal causal chain to close at some point in the future it is
required that the retarded portion of history by chance finds itself in
the exact same, partly unobservable state as that in which the advanced
portion of the process turns out to be.
88. If time extends to instants past the initial Big Bang singularity, then
the moment in the past at which the causal chain would close would not
necessarily be that at which the Big Bang itself occurs, but could be any
arbitrarily distant moment in the past, prior to the Big Bang, because
even under the conditions of uniform matter distribution and minimum
gravitational entropy that prevailed in the initial maximum density
state, the retarded and advanced states could be very different in their
unobservable quantum mechanically interfering details, given that the
information contained in the microscopic state of the gravitational field
grows with the density of positive and negative energy matter.
89. Due to the condition of continuity which must apply to the past and
future bifurcation points of the universal causal chain, the energy of
the particles which can be observed to propagate forward in time in
the retarded portion of history, must be opposite that of the same par-
ticles which are propagating backward in time in the advanced portion
of history, which means that they remain unchanged relative to unidi-
rectional time. The signs of all the non-gravitational charges carried by
the particles which are propagating backward in time in the advanced
portion of history would for their part appear to be reversed from the
unidirectional time viewpoint, but this is without consequences, be-
cause the fields that provide the experimental conditions present in the
advanced portion of history all have their polarities reversed as well.
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90. The circular nature of history allows to explain that quantum interfer-
ences do occur, even in the context where we are assuming that only
one history actually takes place and it is recognized that the retarded
and advanced portions of a quantum process actually take place at two
very distant epochs along the configuration space trajectory, because
this circularity imposes a condition of continuity on the quantum phase,
which can only be satisfied when all contributions by intermediary sub-
processes to the evolution of the quantum phase of the complete cos-
mological process that takes place along the closed configuration space
trajectory are such that they allow this quantum phase to end up, af-
ter a complete turn along this trajectory, into the exact same state in
which it was at the point of the trajectory that constitutes both its
initial and its final boundary condition.
91. Given that the amount of microscopic structure or information does not
grow when the universe expands, due to the variation of information
associated with the diminishing strength of local gravitational fields,
it follows that the probability that the universal causal chain closes at
some point in the future is not diminishing with time and therefore it
can be expected that unidirectional time will eventually end at some
point in the future which is not infinitely distant and in such a case
the probability that decoherence may eventually be reversed on a very
large scale in the remote future, in a universe with ever growing entropy,
actually becomes null.
92. The fact that the making of a record is necessary for the elimination
of quantum interferences means that it is the irreversible growth in
the number of observable variables from the environment of a quantum
system which become correlated in observationally distinguishable ways
with one unique specific outcome of a measurement performed on this
system that must be responsible for the absence of interferences that
follow measurement of an originally superposed physical attribute.
93. The irreversible spreading of effects that characterizes the making of a
record does not take place with respect to an arbitrarily chosen dynamic
attribute, but always relative to position space, because what is growing
irreversibly as time passes is the number of available position states
which can be influenced in a recognizable way by unique causes located
in the past.
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94. When it is recognized that the property of closure of the universal causal
chain is not optional and must be imposed as an absolutely essential
consistency requirement, one is allowed to explain the quasiclassical
nature of the evolution that follows a quantum measurement, that is
to say, the fact that the retarded and advanced states of that part of
the environment that becomes entangled with a quantum system are
very unlikely to become different in any observable way in the future
(as unlikely as the growth of entropy that would have taken place while
they would have become distinct is important), because in a world that
would have been quasiclassical on a macroscopic scale until now, if a
measurement performed on the retarded state of a quantum system
was to give rise to an outcome that is different from that which was
obtained as a result of a similar measurement performed on the ad-
vanced state of the same system, then as time passes an exponentially
growing number of independent variables from the environment of the
system that evolves as part of the retarded portion of history, would be
allowed to differ from those of the same system that evolves as part of
the advanced portion of history and this means that it would become
increasingly less likely that the retarded and advanced trajectories in
superspace could ever merge with one another at some point in the
future.
95. As a result of the closure requirement, the universal causal chain must
be stretched into two similar trajectories evolving side by side along
the unidirectional direction of time in superspace for the whole dura-
tion of history, as if two observationally indistinguishable versions of
history where taking place in parallel all the time without ever inter-
acting with one another, even though what cannot be observed and is
without irreversible consequences is not required to correspond for the
related portions of those two histories, which allows for the histories of
unobserved attributes to interfere quantum mechanically.
96. The privileged status of position space in triggering decoherence only
means that even when the measured attribute is not position, it is nev-
ertheless a spatial distribution of macroscopic constraints that allows
such a measurement to be performed, because it is concerning those
constraints that information is available in the form of records. But,
this means that there is no freedom in deciding which dynamic at-
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tribute is classically well-defined in any particular situation where we
have knowledge of a specific set of macroscopic conditions and there-
fore it is relative to the dynamic attribute of a system whose state is
restricted to a subset of values as a result of being submitted to exper-
imental conditions of such a nature that a constraint of non-divergence
of the retarded and advanced superspace trajectories exists which does
not only give rise to non-superposed measurement results following de-
coherence, but really to a quasiclassical evolution that persists in time
for the same family of consistent histories (the physically relevant set
of histories).
97. In the context where a condition of closure must be imposed on the
universal causal chain it becomes possible to understand how global
consistency would be enforced even in the context where information
about the future would become available, because if the universal causal
chain is to be allowed to close at some point, the retarded and advanced
portions of history must share the same observable macroscopic condi-
tions in the future which means that the present can only be influenced
by the future (through backward causation) to be such as to give rise
(through forward causation) to a retarded state that is identical to the
advanced state and not to a different future.
98. Even if entropy does not increase in the past direction of time, so
that there is no constraint arising from the making of records of the
future, reality must remain quasiclassical relative to the same family
of consistent coarse-grained histories in this direction of time as well,
because the same constraint of closure of the universal causal chain as
applies on future evolution also applies to the evolution which may be
assumed to take place before the Big Bang and this evolution involves
an irreversible increase of entropy in the past, which means that if this
requirement is to be satisfied at some point in the distant past, on
the other side in time of the initial singularity, then the past evolution
that is taking place on our side in time of the Big Bang must already
be such as to not allow a divergence of the retarded and advanced
trajectories that would involve a spatial position observable given that if
this condition is not fulfilled this would prevent the closure requirement
from being satisfied at a prior time (in the more remote past).
99. In a quantum gravitational context we would be dealing with situations
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where the intrinsic curvature of space would be allowed to differ in the
retarded and advanced portions of history, which could occur whenever
information in the form of records would only be available about the
extrinsic curvature of space associated with its rate of change along
the universal causal chain. Under such conditions it would no longer
be possible to estimate transition probabilities in ordinary quantum
mechanics while assuming the existence of one single spacetime over
which particles would propagate in both portions of a process.
100. Given that the constraint of global entanglement that is responsible
for selecting the particular signature of the metric of spacetime that
gives rise to a universally valid distinction between time and the other
three dimensions of space would no longer be effective on the quantum
gravitational scale, where fluctuations can be expected to give rise to
arbitrarily strong local gravitational fields, it follows that causality may
no longer operate in the same direction of spacetime uniformly over all
space on that scale, so that there may in fact no longer be a simple
correspondence between the retarded and the advanced portions of the
trajectory in superspace.
101. The metric properties of space can only be classically well-defined when
the consequences on the propagation of elementary particles of a par-
ticular curvature of space irreversibly spreads into the environment
and gives rise to the formation of mutually consistent records and this
means that the existence of a decoherent spacetime is itself dependent
on the existence of a unidirectional time variable.
102. The hypothesis that all the interfering histories allowed by the observ-
able conditions of an experiment are actually occurring all at once in
the very same universe is not viable as a solution to the objectification
problem, that is to say, for explaining the unique and random nature of
measurement results, given that it would require assuming that despite
all the evidence, history is not, in fact, unique.
103. Given that it is necessary to assume that there is already randomness
before a measurement is performed on a particle, while the object is still
propagating in the two unobserved portions of history, then a solution
to the objectification problem must allow to explain what determines
the particular evolution of a certain physical attribute that takes place
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in between measurements and which later causes one unique outcome of
measurement to be actualized from among many apparently equivalent
possibilities.
104. Quantum theory is an idealization and it must be reformulated to give
rise to a more elaborate, but statistically equivalent model, from the
viewpoint of which the unique outcomes of measurement would be a
natural consequence of the existence of fundamentally unobservable,
random factors of influence operating all along the unobserved trajec-
tories of elementary particles.
105. If what we understand by objective chance is the idea that the unique
unobserved paths of quantum systems may have no identifiable cause
at all, instead of being the unpredictable outcome of fundamentally
unobservable causes, then it would appear that the concept of objective
chance is problematic, because it may violate the requirement that
all the distinct physical attributes of our universe be describable by
referring only to aspects of reality which are an integral part of this
universe.
106. In the context where backward in time causation is allowed, even a
causally determined world would involve an irreducible randomness,
given that the cause of an event can then be influenced backward in
time by this very same event, despite the fact that no information is
allowed to flow backward concerning that future event.
107. The fact that a quantum system only appears to evolve randomly after
a measurement is performed on a previously superposed physical at-
tribute of that system is not incompatible with the hypothesis that the
system evolved randomly before that measurement, because in the con-
text of a time-symmetric interpretation of quantum theory one must
assume that this random evolution was influenced all along by what
happened at a later time, when the measurement was performed.
108. The existence of unobservable causes obeying the principle of local
causality is not ruled out by the phenomenon of quantum entanglement
in the context of a realist, time-symmetric interpretation of quantum
theory, because even if the trajectories of both elements of an entangled
pair are independently influenced by those unobservable causes, when
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there is as much influence of the future on the past as there is of the
past on the future it is possible for the two entangled systems to evolve
so as to enforce the non-locality imposed by the existence of the shared
quantum phase.
109. When, as a matter of principle, no information can be obtained con-
cerning the causes which may explain the randomly variable character
of the paths of the unobserved dynamic attributes of a quantum sys-
tem, then no violations of the uncertainty principle are allowed to occur
as a result of the existence of such causes.
110. It is possible for the trajectory of the universal causal chain in super-
space that describes the evolution of the intrinsic or extrinsic curvature
of space for the whole universe to differ for the retarded and advanced
portions of history as a result of the existence of local perturbations
which would be attributable to unobservable, random fluctuations of
the classical gravitational field arising from the quantized nature of in-
ertial gravitational forces (which determine the local inertial reference
systems) and this may provide the basis for a reformulation of quantum
theory that would provide a satisfactory solution to the objectification
problem.
111. Gravitation may not merely be involved in defining a deterministi-
cally evolving, locally uniform spacetime background over which quan-
tum processes unfold, but must be understood to provide a randomly
variable influence participating in the determination of the unobserved
paths of elementary particles under absolutely all circumstances.
112. When the trajectory of a particle is the outcome of multiple, near si-
multaneous, quantized interactions, such as is the case with ordinary
Brownian motion, then there necessarily arise fluctuations in the statis-
tical equilibrium of forces acting on the particle and one can expect that
this would be the case with the inertial forces that determine the local
inertial reference systems, even in the context where the approximation
of a classical spacetime continuum would still be valid locally.
113. It may be that it is because we fail to take into account the existence of
unobservable, local fluctuations in the metric properties of spacetime
that we obtain a description of quantum processes that is not generally
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covariant and in which the mass of particles appears to constitute a
relevant parameter.
114. If unobservable, local fluctuations of the metric properties of spacetime
actually occur, they would have effects which would be indistinguish-
able from those violations of the conservation of momentum and energy
which are allowed by the uncertainty principle, given that under such
conditions energy would be exchanged with the gravitational field that
would not be accounted for classically.
115. The fact that quantum indefiniteness in momentum rises as we consider
increasingly smaller regions of space may be a reflection of the fact that
the magnitude of random fluctuations in the classical gravitational field
rises as we consider smaller space intervals for which the consequences of
the quantized nature of the gravitational field become more significant.
116. When one takes into account the existence of unobservable, local fluc-
tuations in the metric properties of space, it is possible to assume
that massless particles in a given energy eigenstate always travel along
straight lines at their normal c velocity locally, as long as one recognizes
that this propagation takes place along the geodesics of a locally curved
spacetime and in such a context the multiple possible trajectories of
unobserved, dynamic quantum attributes really are the causally deter-
mined geodesics of a randomly evolving dynamical spacetime, rather
than the random paths of particles evolving over a locally invariant and
deterministically evolving spacetime.
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